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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 356096 |
Time | |
Date | 199612 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : lhs airport : lax |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 8000 msl bound upper : 8000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : lax |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Route In Use | arrival other enroute : on vectors enroute airway : lax |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 50 flight time total : 4300 flight time type : 970 |
ASRS Report | 356096 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure non adherence : clearance other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
The scheduled part 135 commuter flight was en route from pmd to lax. The crew was tracking the pmd 118 degree radial portion of the kimmo 1 arrival at lax. They were then told to fly heading 180 degrees and intercept the lhs 139 degree radial portion of the kimmo 1 arrival. The first officer was flying and the captain was engaged in typical arrival chores. The crew was told that they had overshot the lhs 136 degree radial and had entered another control sector and were subsequently given a heading to reintercept. Both the pilot's HSI's showed within tolerances for being on the STAR, deflection was only approximately a DOT off. It is the author's (captain's) belief that the approach controller had overstated the supposed problem, however, there were a few things that the crew could have done to have prevented the situation, for example: 1) the navigation radios were not reset to lhs 139 degrees right away, they should have been. 2) the first officer could have seen the captain was involved in chores and set at least his own navigation radio in a more timely manner and then paid more attention to keeping the aircraft on proper course. 3) the captain should have interrupted his chores long enough to at least set the navigation radios timely and properly. Furthermore, once that was done the captain should have divided his attention more efficiently between descent chores and monitoring the flight path. All in all, a very basic lesson which unfortunately got lost in the daily grind of 2 commuter airline pilots.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLC OF COMMUTER LTT OVERSHOT INTERCEPT RADIAL AND ENTERED ANOTHER CTL SECTOR. NAV RADIO FREQ NOT RESET IN A TIMELY MANNER TO VOR FREQ.
Narrative: THE SCHEDULED PART 135 COMMUTER FLT WAS ENRTE FROM PMD TO LAX. THE CREW WAS TRACKING THE PMD 118 DEG RADIAL PORTION OF THE KIMMO 1 ARR AT LAX. THEY WERE THEN TOLD TO FLY HDG 180 DEGS AND INTERCEPT THE LHS 139 DEG RADIAL PORTION OF THE KIMMO 1 ARR. THE FO WAS FLYING AND THE CAPT WAS ENGAGED IN TYPICAL ARR CHORES. THE CREW WAS TOLD THAT THEY HAD OVERSHOT THE LHS 136 DEG RADIAL AND HAD ENTERED ANOTHER CTL SECTOR AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN A HDG TO REINTERCEPT. BOTH THE PLT'S HSI'S SHOWED WITHIN TOLERANCES FOR BEING ON THE STAR, DEFLECTION WAS ONLY APPROX A DOT OFF. IT IS THE AUTHOR'S (CAPT'S) BELIEF THAT THE APCH CTLR HAD OVERSTATED THE SUPPOSED PROB, HOWEVER, THERE WERE A FEW THINGS THAT THE CREW COULD HAVE DONE TO HAVE PREVENTED THE SIT, FOR EXAMPLE: 1) THE NAV RADIOS WERE NOT RESET TO LHS 139 DEGS RIGHT AWAY, THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN. 2) THE FO COULD HAVE SEEN THE CAPT WAS INVOLVED IN CHORES AND SET AT LEAST HIS OWN NAV RADIO IN A MORE TIMELY MANNER AND THEN PAID MORE ATTN TO KEEPING THE ACFT ON PROPER COURSE. 3) THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE INTERRUPTED HIS CHORES LONG ENOUGH TO AT LEAST SET THE NAV RADIOS TIMELY AND PROPERLY. FURTHERMORE, ONCE THAT WAS DONE THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE DIVIDED HIS ATTN MORE EFFICIENTLY BTWN DSCNT CHORES AND MONITORING THE FLT PATH. ALL IN ALL, A VERY BASIC LESSON WHICH UNFORTUNATELY GOT LOST IN THE DAILY GRIND OF 2 COMMUTER AIRLINE PLTS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.