Narrative:

The 'altitude awareness' policy at our airline is for the first officer to set the new altitude assignment in the altitude alerter, point to it, and say the altitude, and upon hearing that, the captain also points and repeats the new altitude. Although briefed prior to beginning this trip that standard company procedures would be followed, this first officer was continuously lax in performing them. He was observed and corrected for reading the checklist from memory, and very rarely verbally announced new altitude assignments. Correcting fellow crew members is difficult, because it often results in such hostility that CRM breaks down, and safety is affected. Such was the case on the second day of this trip. Shortly after takeoff, we were assigned a higher altitude by departure control and the first officer set the new altitude and said nothing. I was repeating to ATC the assignment, and when I finished I waited for the first officer to say something. He said nothing, so I pointed and stated the altitude. He then said 'thank you.' my reply was that our altitude awareness was to state the altitude, not say 'thank you.' his response was an explosion of excuses and anger. A tirade of emotion that completely blocked our receiving further instructions from ATC. ATC repeated their instructions while this first officer continued to loudly state that he did nothing wrong, and would not do anything different. ATC gave up calling us, and we continued on a course of flight that could have affected the safety of our flight. I took the aircraft away from him until he calmed down, then offered it back to him, but he did not want to fly anymore. I finally realized that ATC was not talking to us and re-established contact myself while flying the aircraft. As part of a scheduled crew change the first officer was relieved at the next stop.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG OFF CRW CLBING TO 4000 FT. FO, PNF, REFUSED TO USE COMPANY ESTABLISHED PROC TO ANNOUNCE ALT. CAPT ATTEMPTED TO HANDLE THE INSUBORDINATION BUT THE FO REFUSED TO COOPERATE. COM WAS LOST WITH DEP CTLR FOR A SHORT PERIOD.

Narrative: THE 'ALT AWARENESS' POLICY AT OUR AIRLINE IS FOR THE FO TO SET THE NEW ALT ASSIGNMENT IN THE ALT ALERTER, POINT TO IT, AND SAY THE ALT, AND UPON HEARING THAT, THE CAPT ALSO POINTS AND REPEATS THE NEW ALT. ALTHOUGH BRIEFED PRIOR TO BEGINNING THIS TRIP THAT STANDARD COMPANY PROCS WOULD BE FOLLOWED, THIS FO WAS CONTINUOUSLY LAX IN PERFORMING THEM. HE WAS OBSERVED AND CORRECTED FOR READING THE CHKLIST FROM MEMORY, AND VERY RARELY VERBALLY ANNOUNCED NEW ALT ASSIGNMENTS. CORRECTING FELLOW CREW MEMBERS IS DIFFICULT, BECAUSE IT OFTEN RESULTS IN SUCH HOSTILITY THAT CRM BREAKS DOWN, AND SAFETY IS AFFECTED. SUCH WAS THE CASE ON THE SECOND DAY OF THIS TRIP. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, WE WERE ASSIGNED A HIGHER ALT BY DEP CTL AND THE FO SET THE NEW ALT AND SAID NOTHING. I WAS REPEATING TO ATC THE ASSIGNMENT, AND WHEN I FINISHED I WAITED FOR THE FO TO SAY SOMETHING. HE SAID NOTHING, SO I POINTED AND STATED THE ALT. HE THEN SAID 'THANK YOU.' MY REPLY WAS THAT OUR ALT AWARENESS WAS TO STATE THE ALT, NOT SAY 'THANK YOU.' HIS RESPONSE WAS AN EXPLOSION OF EXCUSES AND ANGER. A TIRADE OF EMOTION THAT COMPLETELY BLOCKED OUR RECEIVING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM ATC. ATC REPEATED THEIR INSTRUCTIONS WHILE THIS FO CONTINUED TO LOUDLY STATE THAT HE DID NOTHING WRONG, AND WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING DIFFERENT. ATC GAVE UP CALLING US, AND WE CONTINUED ON A COURSE OF FLT THAT COULD HAVE AFFECTED THE SAFETY OF OUR FLT. I TOOK THE ACFT AWAY FROM HIM UNTIL HE CALMED DOWN, THEN OFFERED IT BACK TO HIM, BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO FLY ANYMORE. I FINALLY REALIZED THAT ATC WAS NOT TALKING TO US AND RE-ESTABLISHED CONTACT MYSELF WHILE FLYING THE ACFT. AS PART OF A SCHEDULED CREW CHANGE THE FO WAS RELIEVED AT THE NEXT STOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.