Narrative:

Approach path incursion to runway 27L at ord. Original contact with ord approach control on 119.0 16 DME west of krena intersection following loss of contact with ZAU. Last instruction was to maintain 320 KTS and level at 10000 ft to krena. Approach control subsequently instructed a descent to 7000 ft. We followed by slowing to 250 KTS then began the descent. The first officer was flying to what we expected was approachs to runway 27L and had briefed the approach for this runway. Leveling at 7000 ft, the first officer noted a difference in horizon pitch reference of 5 degrees. Thinking the adjustment knob had been moved, I asked him to adjust the horizon ball to compare with the captain's indicator and the standby horizon indication. Approach control gave further clearance to descend and maintain 4000 ft and slow to 210 KTS. Approach frequency was set for runway 27L. Believing that clearance was given for runway 27L we prepared for the approach. Clearance was given to turn to heading 180 degrees, maintaining 4000 ft and slow to 170 KTS. Further clearance was given to maintain 4000 ft and heading 250 degrees to intercept the approach course. That's all I heard, because at the same moment the first officer was speaking about a gyroscope problem and that the horizon indicator was beginning to tumble. The captain took control to complete the turn to 250 degrees and fly the approach. Approach control then instructed us to change to tower frequency. The first officer read back the instruction then changing to the frequency given, but found it was a frequency other than tower. He asked me as we intercepted the localizer what the tower frequency was for the runway. I said 120.75 for the south side. Upon tuning this frequency, the tower said descend immediately to 3000 ft and turn right to intercept runway 27R approach. At this point we were struck with the realization that we intercepted the wrong approach path. I was stunned by what could have occurred, but landed VFR on runway 27R. Broken cloud layers above 3200 ft prevented us from clearly seeing other traffic, but we saw aircraft lights in sight well ahead and further out as we turned to final. I think the loss of contact with ZAU caused some distress to develop followed by attending to slowdown and incremental descent, plus attention diverted to the horizon indicator concerns as to which side was faulty, coupled with the busy frequency on approach led us to channel our actions toward landing on runway 27L as we previously briefed. I believe that had we known or were clearly aware that simultaneous approachs were being conducted to parallel runways the procedures for both runways 27L&right would have been thoroughly reviewed and prepared for either runway. My method of planning in the future will be to review and prepare for the possibility of approachs to either one of parallel runway when simultaneous approachs are in operation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BECAUSE RWY 27L AND RWY 9R ARE THE DESIRED RWYS FOR ACFT GOING TO THE CARGO RAMP, THE DC8-55 CREW ANTICIPATED AND PLANNED RWY 27L EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE APCHING FROM THE N. THEY WERE ALIGNED WITH RWY 27L WHEN THE TWR ADVISED THEM THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE RWY 27R APCH. ACFT WAS VECTORED TO THE PROPER APCH PATH.

Narrative: APCH PATH INCURSION TO RWY 27L AT ORD. ORIGINAL CONTACT WITH ORD APCH CTL ON 119.0 16 DME W OF KRENA INTXN FOLLOWING LOSS OF CONTACT WITH ZAU. LAST INSTRUCTION WAS TO MAINTAIN 320 KTS AND LEVEL AT 10000 FT TO KRENA. APCH CTL SUBSEQUENTLY INSTRUCTED A DSCNT TO 7000 FT. WE FOLLOWED BY SLOWING TO 250 KTS THEN BEGAN THE DSCNT. THE FO WAS FLYING TO WHAT WE EXPECTED WAS APCHS TO RWY 27L AND HAD BRIEFED THE APCH FOR THIS RWY. LEVELING AT 7000 FT, THE FO NOTED A DIFFERENCE IN HORIZON PITCH REF OF 5 DEGS. THINKING THE ADJUSTMENT KNOB HAD BEEN MOVED, I ASKED HIM TO ADJUST THE HORIZON BALL TO COMPARE WITH THE CAPT'S INDICATOR AND THE STANDBY HORIZON INDICATION. APCH CTL GAVE FURTHER CLRNC TO DSND AND MAINTAIN 4000 FT AND SLOW TO 210 KTS. APCH FREQ WAS SET FOR RWY 27L. BELIEVING THAT CLRNC WAS GIVEN FOR RWY 27L WE PREPARED FOR THE APCH. CLRNC WAS GIVEN TO TURN TO HDG 180 DEGS, MAINTAINING 4000 FT AND SLOW TO 170 KTS. FURTHER CLRNC WAS GIVEN TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT AND HDG 250 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE APCH COURSE. THAT'S ALL I HEARD, BECAUSE AT THE SAME MOMENT THE FO WAS SPEAKING ABOUT A GYROSCOPE PROB AND THAT THE HORIZON INDICATOR WAS BEGINNING TO TUMBLE. THE CAPT TOOK CTL TO COMPLETE THE TURN TO 250 DEGS AND FLY THE APCH. APCH CTL THEN INSTRUCTED US TO CHANGE TO TWR FREQ. THE FO READ BACK THE INSTRUCTION THEN CHANGING TO THE FREQ GIVEN, BUT FOUND IT WAS A FREQ OTHER THAN TWR. HE ASKED ME AS WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC WHAT THE TWR FREQ WAS FOR THE RWY. I SAID 120.75 FOR THE S SIDE. UPON TUNING THIS FREQ, THE TWR SAID DSND IMMEDIATELY TO 3000 FT AND TURN R TO INTERCEPT RWY 27R APCH. AT THIS POINT WE WERE STRUCK WITH THE REALIZATION THAT WE INTERCEPTED THE WRONG APCH PATH. I WAS STUNNED BY WHAT COULD HAVE OCCURRED, BUT LANDED VFR ON RWY 27R. BROKEN CLOUD LAYERS ABOVE 3200 FT PREVENTED US FROM CLRLY SEEING OTHER TFC, BUT WE SAW ACFT LIGHTS IN SIGHT WELL AHEAD AND FURTHER OUT AS WE TURNED TO FINAL. I THINK THE LOSS OF CONTACT WITH ZAU CAUSED SOME DISTRESS TO DEVELOP FOLLOWED BY ATTENDING TO SLOWDOWN AND INCREMENTAL DSCNT, PLUS ATTN DIVERTED TO THE HORIZON INDICATOR CONCERNS AS TO WHICH SIDE WAS FAULTY, COUPLED WITH THE BUSY FREQ ON APCH LED US TO CHANNEL OUR ACTIONS TOWARD LNDG ON RWY 27L AS WE PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED. I BELIEVE THAT HAD WE KNOWN OR WERE CLRLY AWARE THAT SIMULTANEOUS APCHS WERE BEING CONDUCTED TO PARALLEL RWYS THE PROCS FOR BOTH RWYS 27L&R WOULD HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED AND PREPARED FOR EITHER RWY. MY METHOD OF PLANNING IN THE FUTURE WILL BE TO REVIEW AND PREPARE FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF APCHS TO EITHER ONE OF PARALLEL RWY WHEN SIMULTANEOUS APCHS ARE IN OP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.