Narrative:

While preparing to depart for bos, the symbol was posted for automatic deicing. Our certified deicer came to the cockpit and asked if we wanted type 1 and 4 treatment. I replied yes, as the WX conditions were snowfall with scattered snow and ice patches adhering to the wings and airframe. Sometime later the snowfall ended and sky conditions started to clear. Our deicer called me on the headset and asked if we still wanted type 4 treatment. My first officer and I discussed the situation, and we both observed that the removal of snow and ice accumulation on the txwys and ramps had not yet begun, and that aircraft power-ups on the ramps and txwys were blowing snow, ice, and snow chunks all over each others' aircraft. Seeing the possible refreezing hazard and that the extra protection was necessary, I reaffirmed the need for type 4 treatment. A couple of mins later, the deicing manager, who was named X, was questioning the need for type 4 treatment and my decision, as the WX conditions were improving. I explained to X the problem that ice and snow were being blown all over taxiing aircraft from accumulations on the ramps and txwys, along with the fact that the temperature was below freezing, that unless I could be guaranteed that the snow and ice being blown about by taxiing aircraft would not refreeze onto my airframe, that it was necessary and I would not change my decision, as it could jeopardize the safety of my passenger and crew. He then replied that I was the only guy requesting type 4 at the moment. I was then told he was calling for an assistant chief pilot to come to the gate and talk to me about my decision. Captain Y came to the gate and I explained my reason and decision. He noted the presence of blowing snow and ice from aircraft power-ups from the accumulations on the ramps and txwys and quickly understood the situation. He left in total agreement with my decision, and later said to me that his summons to the gate was a wasted trip. I have no doubt or question that our deicing personnel are well-trained for the task of safely deicing our aircraft. However, the deicing manager, X, is not to my knowledge, a professional aviator, and therefore lacks the knowledge, background, and yrs of experience necessary to comprehend certain hazards to safety of flight, particularly the reasoning for the deicing procedures taken, as well as the full detriment and danger of airframe icing conditions. I say this not disparage his competence as a deicing manager in any way whatsoever. It is simply a statement of fact. Furthermore, this was a direct violation of far, captain's authority/authorized of the aircraft, and airline management policy, aircraft deicing, 'the captain's decision concerning deicing requirements is final.' there can be no argument that observation and adherence to captain's authority/authorized is a major contributing factor for the enviable safety record that we enjoy and maintains its leadership in the industry. On a side note, while taxiing out of the ramp, my first officer and I heard the ramp tower tell another aircraft waiting to be deiced, that they were short of help, and that they would get to his aircraft when they could. Additionally, we could have departed the gate for bos that much sooner, if the deicing manager would not have wasted the extra time to question my judgement, as it was not his call or authority/authorized in the first place. My thanks to captain Y and the ord flight office for their continued outstanding and professional support.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PIC OF A S80 ASSERTS HIS COMMAND AUTH UPON THE FOREMAN IN CHARGE OF RAMP OP PREFLT PROC DEICING TO PERFORM THE HIGHER RATED TYPE OF DEICING PROC. IN GND CREW RESPONSE THE FOREMAN CALLS OUT ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT FOR SECOND OPINION. CAPT WINS.

Narrative: WHILE PREPARING TO DEPART FOR BOS, THE SYMBOL WAS POSTED FOR AUTOMATIC DEICING. OUR CERTIFIED DEICER CAME TO THE COCKPIT AND ASKED IF WE WANTED TYPE 1 AND 4 TREATMENT. I REPLIED YES, AS THE WX CONDITIONS WERE SNOWFALL WITH SCATTERED SNOW AND ICE PATCHES ADHERING TO THE WINGS AND AIRFRAME. SOMETIME LATER THE SNOWFALL ENDED AND SKY CONDITIONS STARTED TO CLR. OUR DEICER CALLED ME ON THE HEADSET AND ASKED IF WE STILL WANTED TYPE 4 TREATMENT. MY FO AND I DISCUSSED THE SIT, AND WE BOTH OBSERVED THAT THE REMOVAL OF SNOW AND ICE ACCUMULATION ON THE TXWYS AND RAMPS HAD NOT YET BEGUN, AND THAT ACFT PWR-UPS ON THE RAMPS AND TXWYS WERE BLOWING SNOW, ICE, AND SNOW CHUNKS ALL OVER EACH OTHERS' ACFT. SEEING THE POSSIBLE REFREEZING HAZARD AND THAT THE EXTRA PROTECTION WAS NECESSARY, I REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR TYPE 4 TREATMENT. A COUPLE OF MINS LATER, THE DEICING MGR, WHO WAS NAMED X, WAS QUESTIONING THE NEED FOR TYPE 4 TREATMENT AND MY DECISION, AS THE WX CONDITIONS WERE IMPROVING. I EXPLAINED TO X THE PROB THAT ICE AND SNOW WERE BEING BLOWN ALL OVER TAXIING ACFT FROM ACCUMULATIONS ON THE RAMPS AND TXWYS, ALONG WITH THE FACT THAT THE TEMP WAS BELOW FREEZING, THAT UNLESS I COULD BE GUARANTEED THAT THE SNOW AND ICE BEING BLOWN ABOUT BY TAXIING ACFT WOULD NOT REFREEZE ONTO MY AIRFRAME, THAT IT WAS NECESSARY AND I WOULD NOT CHANGE MY DECISION, AS IT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF MY PAX AND CREW. HE THEN REPLIED THAT I WAS THE ONLY GUY REQUESTING TYPE 4 AT THE MOMENT. I WAS THEN TOLD HE WAS CALLING FOR AN ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT TO COME TO THE GATE AND TALK TO ME ABOUT MY DECISION. CAPT Y CAME TO THE GATE AND I EXPLAINED MY REASON AND DECISION. HE NOTED THE PRESENCE OF BLOWING SNOW AND ICE FROM ACFT PWR-UPS FROM THE ACCUMULATIONS ON THE RAMPS AND TXWYS AND QUICKLY UNDERSTOOD THE SIT. HE LEFT IN TOTAL AGREEMENT WITH MY DECISION, AND LATER SAID TO ME THAT HIS SUMMONS TO THE GATE WAS A WASTED TRIP. I HAVE NO DOUBT OR QUESTION THAT OUR DEICING PERSONNEL ARE WELL-TRAINED FOR THE TASK OF SAFELY DEICING OUR ACFT. HOWEVER, THE DEICING MGR, X, IS NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE, A PROFESSIONAL AVIATOR, AND THEREFORE LACKS THE KNOWLEDGE, BACKGROUND, AND YRS OF EXPERIENCE NECESSARY TO COMPREHEND CERTAIN HAZARDS TO SAFETY OF FLT, PARTICULARLY THE REASONING FOR THE DEICING PROCS TAKEN, AS WELL AS THE FULL DETRIMENT AND DANGER OF AIRFRAME ICING CONDITIONS. I SAY THIS NOT DISPARAGE HIS COMPETENCE AS A DEICING MGR IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER. IT IS SIMPLY A STATEMENT OF FACT. FURTHERMORE, THIS WAS A DIRECT VIOLATION OF FAR, CAPT'S AUTH OF THE ACFT, AND AIRLINE MGMNT POLICY, ACFT DEICING, 'THE CAPT'S DECISION CONCERNING DEICING REQUIREMENTS IS FINAL.' THERE CAN BE NO ARGUMENT THAT OBSERVATION AND ADHERENCE TO CAPT'S AUTH IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR FOR THE ENVIABLE SAFETY RECORD THAT WE ENJOY AND MAINTAINS ITS LEADERSHIP IN THE INDUSTRY. ON A SIDE NOTE, WHILE TAXIING OUT OF THE RAMP, MY FO AND I HEARD THE RAMP TWR TELL ANOTHER ACFT WAITING TO BE DEICED, THAT THEY WERE SHORT OF HELP, AND THAT THEY WOULD GET TO HIS ACFT WHEN THEY COULD. ADDITIONALLY, WE COULD HAVE DEPARTED THE GATE FOR BOS THAT MUCH SOONER, IF THE DEICING MGR WOULD NOT HAVE WASTED THE EXTRA TIME TO QUESTION MY JUDGEMENT, AS IT WAS NOT HIS CALL OR AUTH IN THE FIRST PLACE. MY THANKS TO CAPT Y AND THE ORD FLT OFFICE FOR THEIR CONTINUED OUTSTANDING AND PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.