Narrative:

Due to the presence of freezing precipitation, our aircraft was in need of deicing before departure. Due to the availability of type I fluid only, the captain and I decided to deice the aircraft without passenger aboard and deice a second time at the end of the departure runway. This was due to the holdover time of type I fluid in light freezing rain (2-6 mins). However, during the first deice process, the amount of ice accumulation on the aircraft was beyond the capability of the FBO's deicing equipment and only about 1/2 of the aircraft was deiced as the FBO was running low on fluid. A decision was made to then taxi the aircraft with no passenger aboard to a hangar in order to avoid any more contamination of the aircraft. During taxi, we followed an airport plow as he plowed a path through the 1-2 inches of snow that had fallen. The captain gave no indication during taxi that the braking action was poor. Current airport field conditions had all surfaces braking action poor. During taxi between 2 rows of hangars, the left wingtip struck the corner of the hangar. I believe what really caused the accident was the combination of inferior FBO deice equipment, the unavailability of type ii fluid on the field, and improper positioning of aircraft wingwalkers during taxi. Had all the ice been removed the first time the aircraft would not have needed to be put in a hangar. Had all the captain's windows been cleared of snow, he may have had a better view of his wingtip and avoided the collision.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BAE3200 ELECTED TO DEICE ACFT PRIOR TO PAX BOARDING. TYPE I FLUID ONLY AVAILABLE AND IN LIMITED SUPPLY. ONLY HALF OF ACFT DEICED. ELECTED TO PUT THE ACFT IN A HANGAR SINCE ICE WAS STILL ACCUMULATING. DUE TO LIMITED VISIBILITY AND IN THE HANGAR AREA, THE L WINGTIP STRUCK CORNER OF A BUILDING. CAPT HAD GIVEN NO INDICATIONS BRAKING WAS POOR. ARPT HAD BEEN RPTING POOR BRAKING TXWYS AND RWY.

Narrative: DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF FREEZING PRECIP, OUR ACFT WAS IN NEED OF DEICING BEFORE DEP. DUE TO THE AVAILABILITY OF TYPE I FLUID ONLY, THE CAPT AND I DECIDED TO DEICE THE ACFT WITHOUT PAX ABOARD AND DEICE A SECOND TIME AT THE END OF THE DEP RWY. THIS WAS DUE TO THE HOLDOVER TIME OF TYPE I FLUID IN LIGHT FREEZING RAIN (2-6 MINS). HOWEVER, DURING THE FIRST DEICE PROCESS, THE AMOUNT OF ICE ACCUMULATION ON THE ACFT WAS BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF THE FBO'S DEICING EQUIP AND ONLY ABOUT 1/2 OF THE ACFT WAS DEICED AS THE FBO WAS RUNNING LOW ON FLUID. A DECISION WAS MADE TO THEN TAXI THE ACFT WITH NO PAX ABOARD TO A HANGAR IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY MORE CONTAMINATION OF THE ACFT. DURING TAXI, WE FOLLOWED AN ARPT PLOW AS HE PLOWED A PATH THROUGH THE 1-2 INCHES OF SNOW THAT HAD FALLEN. THE CAPT GAVE NO INDICATION DURING TAXI THAT THE BRAKING ACTION WAS POOR. CURRENT ARPT FIELD CONDITIONS HAD ALL SURFACES BRAKING ACTION POOR. DURING TAXI BTWN 2 ROWS OF HANGARS, THE L WINGTIP STRUCK THE CORNER OF THE HANGAR. I BELIEVE WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE ACCIDENT WAS THE COMBINATION OF INFERIOR FBO DEICE EQUIP, THE UNAVAILABILITY OF TYPE II FLUID ON THE FIELD, AND IMPROPER POSITIONING OF ACFT WINGWALKERS DURING TAXI. HAD ALL THE ICE BEEN REMOVED THE FIRST TIME THE ACFT WOULD NOT HAVE NEEDED TO BE PUT IN A HANGAR. HAD ALL THE CAPT'S WINDOWS BEEN CLRED OF SNOW, HE MAY HAVE HAD A BETTER VIEW OF HIS WINGTIP AND AVOIDED THE COLLISION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.