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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 391236 |
Time | |
Date | 199801 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : tol |
State Reference | OH |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | ATR 72 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 10250 flight time type : 7000 |
ASRS Report | 391236 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 2300 flight time type : 500 |
ASRS Report | 392100 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe non adherence : clearance non adherence : required legal separation other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
The events that led up to our situation occurred as follows. We were being vectored for the ILS runway 25 approach. The aircraft was in atmospheric icing conditions with moderate rime ice accreting on the aircraft at 2400 ft MSL. We asked approach to give us a turn close to the marker, so that we would limit our time in the ice. All checks were completed prior to our final vectors for the approach, except for the before landing checklist. The first officer was flying the aircraft with the autoplt on and the approach mode selected. We intercepted the localizer normally and awaited for the GS to come alive. During this time period I was monitoring the icing situation outside the aircraft. Then when I returned my attention inside the aircraft I noticed we were above the GS and on top of the OM. The autoplt did not capture the GS, and at this time we received a frequency change from approach to contact the tower. Also we started the process of the before landing checks. I made sure the first officer realized our position and that the autoplt did not capture the GS. We were inside the OM at this time and uncoupled the autoplt and started a descent to capture the GS. We then intercepted the GS, finished the before landing checklist, along with all other required callouts and I monitored the approach. I know for a fact that we did switch to the tower when instructed by approach because we both heard the frequency change in the radios. I also looked up to the position of the taxi light switch, which was on. This is our reminder, and is used to confirm we were cleared to land. We broke out of the clouds at 1900 ft to 1800 ft AGL, but flight visibility was less than 1 mi. We picked up the runway environment at about 1 1/2 mi from the approach end of runway 25, and visibility was getting better. We landed normally and turned off the runway approximately 2500 ft to 3000 ft down the runway. At that time we noticed trucks on the runway at the very far end of the runway. Note that this runway is 10200 ft long. After performing our shut down checks at the gate, we went inside the terminal to discuss our situation with the controllers via telephone. I feel that many factors contributed to this event. First the high workload at the time of the frequency change from approach to tower. We were monitoring our icing conditions and performing checklist, along with the failure of the autoplt to capture the GS. I was also very much involved with flying this aircraft, monitoring the approach and may have not verbally contacted the tower. I also feel the tower should have known where we were and should have prompted radio contact with us, if we did not make radio contact with them. Also during snow removal procedures the equipment should be off the runway prior to commencing an approach to that airport. There were many contributing factors taking place during this event. I do feel all parties involved learned valuable lessons and thank god it was a learning experience. I know my personal procedures are going to change somewhat due to this event. Verify runways are clear, and always get a response.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ARRIVING ATR72 REQUESTED A TURN IN AT THE OM DUE TO MODERATE RIME ICING THAT WAS ACCUMULATING ON THE ACFT, FORGETS TO CONTACT TWR AT THE OM AND LANDS WITHOUT CLRNC IN IMC CONDITIONS. SNOW VEHICLES WERE OPERATING AT THE END OF THE RWY WHEN THE ATR72 LANDED.
Narrative: THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO OUR SIT OCCURRED AS FOLLOWS. WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE ILS RWY 25 APCH. THE ACFT WAS IN ATMOSPHERIC ICING CONDITIONS WITH MODERATE RIME ICE ACCRETING ON THE ACFT AT 2400 FT MSL. WE ASKED APCH TO GIVE US A TURN CLOSE TO THE MARKER, SO THAT WE WOULD LIMIT OUR TIME IN THE ICE. ALL CHKS WERE COMPLETED PRIOR TO OUR FINAL VECTORS FOR THE APCH, EXCEPT FOR THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. THE FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT WITH THE AUTOPLT ON AND THE APCH MODE SELECTED. WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC NORMALLY AND AWAITED FOR THE GS TO COME ALIVE. DURING THIS TIME PERIOD I WAS MONITORING THE ICING SIT OUTSIDE THE ACFT. THEN WHEN I RETURNED MY ATTN INSIDE THE ACFT I NOTICED WE WERE ABOVE THE GS AND ON TOP OF THE OM. THE AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE THE GS, AND AT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED A FREQ CHANGE FROM APCH TO CONTACT THE TWR. ALSO WE STARTED THE PROCESS OF THE BEFORE LNDG CHKS. I MADE SURE THE FO REALIZED OUR POS AND THAT THE AUTOPLT DID NOT CAPTURE THE GS. WE WERE INSIDE THE OM AT THIS TIME AND UNCOUPLED THE AUTOPLT AND STARTED A DSCNT TO CAPTURE THE GS. WE THEN INTERCEPTED THE GS, FINISHED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST, ALONG WITH ALL OTHER REQUIRED CALLOUTS AND I MONITORED THE APCH. I KNOW FOR A FACT THAT WE DID SWITCH TO THE TWR WHEN INSTRUCTED BY APCH BECAUSE WE BOTH HEARD THE FREQ CHANGE IN THE RADIOS. I ALSO LOOKED UP TO THE POS OF THE TAXI LIGHT SWITCH, WHICH WAS ON. THIS IS OUR REMINDER, AND IS USED TO CONFIRM WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS AT 1900 FT TO 1800 FT AGL, BUT FLT VISIBILITY WAS LESS THAN 1 MI. WE PICKED UP THE RWY ENVIRONMENT AT ABOUT 1 1/2 MI FROM THE APCH END OF RWY 25, AND VISIBILITY WAS GETTING BETTER. WE LANDED NORMALLY AND TURNED OFF THE RWY APPROX 2500 FT TO 3000 FT DOWN THE RWY. AT THAT TIME WE NOTICED TRUCKS ON THE RWY AT THE VERY FAR END OF THE RWY. NOTE THAT THIS RWY IS 10200 FT LONG. AFTER PERFORMING OUR SHUT DOWN CHKS AT THE GATE, WE WENT INSIDE THE TERMINAL TO DISCUSS OUR SIT WITH THE CTLRS VIA TELEPHONE. I FEEL THAT MANY FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT. FIRST THE HIGH WORKLOAD AT THE TIME OF THE FREQ CHANGE FROM APCH TO TWR. WE WERE MONITORING OUR ICING CONDITIONS AND PERFORMING CHKLIST, ALONG WITH THE FAILURE OF THE AUTOPLT TO CAPTURE THE GS. I WAS ALSO VERY MUCH INVOLVED WITH FLYING THIS ACFT, MONITORING THE APCH AND MAY HAVE NOT VERBALLY CONTACTED THE TWR. I ALSO FEEL THE TWR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN WHERE WE WERE AND SHOULD HAVE PROMPTED RADIO CONTACT WITH US, IF WE DID NOT MAKE RADIO CONTACT WITH THEM. ALSO DURING SNOW REMOVAL PROCS THE EQUIP SHOULD BE OFF THE RWY PRIOR TO COMMENCING AN APCH TO THAT ARPT. THERE WERE MANY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TAKING PLACE DURING THIS EVENT. I DO FEEL ALL PARTIES INVOLVED LEARNED VALUABLE LESSONS AND THANK GOD IT WAS A LEARNING EXPERIENCE. I KNOW MY PERSONAL PROCS ARE GOING TO CHANGE SOMEWHAT DUE TO THIS EVENT. VERIFY RWYS ARE CLR, AND ALWAYS GET A RESPONSE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.