Narrative:

I want to start at the crew's arrival at the airport. I believe it to be important as to how the following events contributed to the incident. The captain, 3 flight attendants and myself arrived at the airport at XA35 am. As we entered the ticketing area, I noticed approximately 40 passenger lined up at our airline's counter. It was dark, the counter's lights were off and there was no sign of any ticket agents in the area. Next we all arrived at our gate at XA40 am. The gate agent was not at the counter and additionally the airplane was not at the jetway. A gate agent is needed for access to the locked jetway door. We could not get to operations to get the required paperwork and find out why the airplane was not at the gate. This occurrence also disappointed me. The captain was allowed access to an adjacent jetway (another air carrier's jetway). He eventually opened the door which allowed me to enter our jetway and go to operations. We arrived at operations around XA50-XA55 am. The airplane was still not at the gate and the operations agent informed us that our aircraft was being towed from the maintenance hangar. There was no sense of urgency in the ground crew assembled in operations. This again disappointed me as it was now XB00 am, 25 mins to departure. A normal schedule allows the first officer 45 mins for his or her preflight duties. The aircraft finally was towed to the gate between XB05-XB10 am. At this point, I felt a great urgency to make up for lost time. I then began my preflight duties. I completed my preliminary cockpit preparation and next accomplished the walk around inspection of the aircraft. It was still dark and there was a lot of exterior activity around the aircraft. The catering truck was loading the aircraft at the right forward galley door. The forward cargo bay had a belt loader positioned against it, also the airplane was being fueled. After doing a thorough preflight exterior inspection, I joined the captain on the flight deck. We did the normal cockpit preparation. At this time we fixed a number of switch position that were incorrect. All standard procedures and normal checklists were then followed. No problems occurred and we departed oakland airport via the coast 4 departure. Out of 10000 ft the captain noticed that the standby pneumatic airspeed/altimeter was inoperative. The captain's and my primary mach/airspeed and altimeters were operating normally. Seattle maintenance control was advised by a direct phone patch. Seattle maintenance advised us to continue the flight to orange county and mechanics would meet the airplane at the gate. The captain wrote in the maintenance log that the standby altimeter/airspeed indicator was inoperative. The mechanics met us at the gate and were shown and told of the write-up. Later the mechanics informed us that they could not find anything out of the norm. Our flight from orange county to seattle was canceled. The mechanics who met the aircraft were personnel that our air carrier contracts out to non maintenance airports such as orange county. Mechanics from our maintenance base of lax would be sent down to try to solve the problem. At approximately XH05 pm, over 4 hours after the initial write-up, we were called out to the aircraft. As I walked to the plane, I noticed the pitot static pressure testing equipment installed. The mechanics informed us they had found a piece of tape obstructing the right alternate static port. I observed a 1 - 1 1/2 inch piece of tape across the interior of the alternate static port disc. This was the cause of the inoperative alternate airspeed/altimeter indicator. As the first officer it was my duty to find this small piece of tape. I didn't, but there were many contributing factors to my oversight. A simple solution would be to have a large and long red warning flag attached to the tape so it could be easily detected. Additionally, there should be an open maintenance write-up in the logbook when pitot and/or static ports are covered. Emotionally, any time an airplane comes out of maintenance -- slow down! Clear your head, diligently follow preflight inspections and procedures and do not worry about making an impossible on-time departure. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this B737-400 first officer missed the fact that maintenance personnel had sealed the standby static port with a small piece of tape while the aircraft was in the hangar. He said that there was too much self induced pressure to complete his preflight and too much interference from ramp service personnel and vehicles for him to properly and thoroughly complete his walk around inspection in the time he allotted to it. He said that when the instrument problem was discovered in-flight nobody thought of the static port being blocked. The mechanics from lax discovered this as they were hooking up the pitot static test system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FLC NOTICES THAT THE STANDBY INSTS WERE MALFUNCTIONING AND LATER DISCOVERED THAT THE STANDBY STATIC PORT WAS BLOCKED WITH TAPE. B737-400.

Narrative: I WANT TO START AT THE CREW'S ARR AT THE ARPT. I BELIEVE IT TO BE IMPORTANT AS TO HOW THE FOLLOWING EVENTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT. THE CAPT, 3 FLT ATTENDANTS AND MYSELF ARRIVED AT THE ARPT AT XA35 AM. AS WE ENTERED THE TICKETING AREA, I NOTICED APPROX 40 PAX LINED UP AT OUR AIRLINE'S COUNTER. IT WAS DARK, THE COUNTER'S LIGHTS WERE OFF AND THERE WAS NO SIGN OF ANY TICKET AGENTS IN THE AREA. NEXT WE ALL ARRIVED AT OUR GATE AT XA40 AM. THE GATE AGENT WAS NOT AT THE COUNTER AND ADDITIONALLY THE AIRPLANE WAS NOT AT THE JETWAY. A GATE AGENT IS NEEDED FOR ACCESS TO THE LOCKED JETWAY DOOR. WE COULD NOT GET TO OPS TO GET THE REQUIRED PAPERWORK AND FIND OUT WHY THE AIRPLANE WAS NOT AT THE GATE. THIS OCCURRENCE ALSO DISAPPOINTED ME. THE CAPT WAS ALLOWED ACCESS TO AN ADJACENT JETWAY (ANOTHER ACR'S JETWAY). HE EVENTUALLY OPENED THE DOOR WHICH ALLOWED ME TO ENTER OUR JETWAY AND GO TO OPS. WE ARRIVED AT OPS AROUND XA50-XA55 AM. THE AIRPLANE WAS STILL NOT AT THE GATE AND THE OPS AGENT INFORMED US THAT OUR ACFT WAS BEING TOWED FROM THE MAINT HANGAR. THERE WAS NO SENSE OF URGENCY IN THE GND CREW ASSEMBLED IN OPS. THIS AGAIN DISAPPOINTED ME AS IT WAS NOW XB00 AM, 25 MINS TO DEP. A NORMAL SCHEDULE ALLOWS THE FO 45 MINS FOR HIS OR HER PREFLT DUTIES. THE ACFT FINALLY WAS TOWED TO THE GATE BTWN XB05-XB10 AM. AT THIS POINT, I FELT A GREAT URGENCY TO MAKE UP FOR LOST TIME. I THEN BEGAN MY PREFLT DUTIES. I COMPLETED MY PRELIMINARY COCKPIT PREPARATION AND NEXT ACCOMPLISHED THE WALK AROUND INSPECTION OF THE ACFT. IT WAS STILL DARK AND THERE WAS A LOT OF EXTERIOR ACTIVITY AROUND THE ACFT. THE CATERING TRUCK WAS LOADING THE ACFT AT THE R FORWARD GALLEY DOOR. THE FORWARD CARGO BAY HAD A BELT LOADER POSITIONED AGAINST IT, ALSO THE AIRPLANE WAS BEING FUELED. AFTER DOING A THOROUGH PREFLT EXTERIOR INSPECTION, I JOINED THE CAPT ON THE FLT DECK. WE DID THE NORMAL COCKPIT PREPARATION. AT THIS TIME WE FIXED A NUMBER OF SWITCH POS THAT WERE INCORRECT. ALL STANDARD PROCS AND NORMAL CHKLISTS WERE THEN FOLLOWED. NO PROBS OCCURRED AND WE DEPARTED OAKLAND ARPT VIA THE COAST 4 DEP. OUT OF 10000 FT THE CAPT NOTICED THAT THE STANDBY PNEUMATIC AIRSPD/ALTIMETER WAS INOP. THE CAPT'S AND MY PRIMARY MACH/AIRSPD AND ALTIMETERS WERE OPERATING NORMALLY. SEATTLE MAINT CTL WAS ADVISED BY A DIRECT PHONE PATCH. SEATTLE MAINT ADVISED US TO CONTINUE THE FLT TO ORANGE COUNTY AND MECHS WOULD MEET THE AIRPLANE AT THE GATE. THE CAPT WROTE IN THE MAINT LOG THAT THE STANDBY ALTIMETER/AIRSPD INDICATOR WAS INOP. THE MECHS MET US AT THE GATE AND WERE SHOWN AND TOLD OF THE WRITE-UP. LATER THE MECHS INFORMED US THAT THEY COULD NOT FIND ANYTHING OUT OF THE NORM. OUR FLT FROM ORANGE COUNTY TO SEATTLE WAS CANCELED. THE MECHS WHO MET THE ACFT WERE PERSONNEL THAT OUR ACR CONTRACTS OUT TO NON MAINT ARPTS SUCH AS ORANGE COUNTY. MECHS FROM OUR MAINT BASE OF LAX WOULD BE SENT DOWN TO TRY TO SOLVE THE PROB. AT APPROX XH05 PM, OVER 4 HRS AFTER THE INITIAL WRITE-UP, WE WERE CALLED OUT TO THE ACFT. AS I WALKED TO THE PLANE, I NOTICED THE PITOT STATIC PRESSURE TESTING EQUIP INSTALLED. THE MECHS INFORMED US THEY HAD FOUND A PIECE OF TAPE OBSTRUCTING THE R ALTERNATE STATIC PORT. I OBSERVED A 1 - 1 1/2 INCH PIECE OF TAPE ACROSS THE INTERIOR OF THE ALTERNATE STATIC PORT DISC. THIS WAS THE CAUSE OF THE INOP ALTERNATE AIRSPD/ALTIMETER INDICATOR. AS THE FO IT WAS MY DUTY TO FIND THIS SMALL PIECE OF TAPE. I DIDN'T, BUT THERE WERE MANY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO MY OVERSIGHT. A SIMPLE SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HAVE A LARGE AND LONG RED WARNING FLAG ATTACHED TO THE TAPE SO IT COULD BE EASILY DETECTED. ADDITIONALLY, THERE SHOULD BE AN OPEN MAINT WRITE-UP IN THE LOGBOOK WHEN PITOT AND/OR STATIC PORTS ARE COVERED. EMOTIONALLY, ANY TIME AN AIRPLANE COMES OUT OF MAINT -- SLOW DOWN! CLR YOUR HEAD, DILIGENTLY FOLLOW PREFLT INSPECTIONS AND PROCS AND DO NOT WORRY ABOUT MAKING AN IMPOSSIBLE ON-TIME DEP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS B737-400 FO MISSED THE FACT THAT MAINT PERSONNEL HAD SEALED THE STANDBY STATIC PORT WITH A SMALL PIECE OF TAPE WHILE THE ACFT WAS IN THE HANGAR. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS TOO MUCH SELF INDUCED PRESSURE TO COMPLETE HIS PREFLT AND TOO MUCH INTERFERENCE FROM RAMP SVC PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES FOR HIM TO PROPERLY AND THOROUGHLY COMPLETE HIS WALK AROUND INSPECTION IN THE TIME HE ALLOTTED TO IT. HE SAID THAT WHEN THE INST PROB WAS DISCOVERED INFLT NOBODY THOUGHT OF THE STATIC PORT BEING BLOCKED. THE MECHS FROM LAX DISCOVERED THIS AS THEY WERE HOOKING UP THE PITOT STATIC TEST SYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.