Narrative:

Dca experienced a natural gas leak in the old terminal that forced the evacuate/evacuation of the control tower. The tower was closed for what seemed like more than an hour. When operations began again, it seemed that not all of the communication equipment in the tower was working as well as it should have been. The controllers were very busy because all the airplanes were trying to get out before the curfew. We started engines and taxied to spot lima 1, and then called for taxi clearance. The instructions given by the ground controller were 'taxi by taxiway left and taxiway K, hold short of runway 5 at taxiway K.' without even a clue that there was a problem, I missed taxiway K and made the next left at taxiway J which immediately put me on runway 15. The first hold line we saw was on the east side of runway 15. No taxiway markers, no white lights, no hold line -- nothing had caught our attention that we were making a mistake. My first clue was looking left and seeing the red lights at the approach end of runway 15 as we were crossing the east boundary of the runway and approaching the hold line on the east side. At this point, we were both petrified at what had happened. We taxied clear of the runway, remained in line with the airplanes ahead of us, switched to tower frequency as we became #1 and were cleared for takeoff in sequence. The frequency on ground control was full of chatter, and airplanes were all over the place. The controller never realized what we had done. Cause: the controller was extremely busy, numerous airplanes were moving on the txwys, taxiway markings and lights did not catch our attention and, of course, there was gross pilot error. I had not been to dca at night with that taxi pattern being used since the opening of the new taxiway. In my mind, I knew exactly where I was, but in actuality, I was screwed up! I do feel that someone should take a close look at that location on the airport and do it at night from the cockpit with the airplane sitting on top of spot lima 1. I could not believe how quickly the error was made and how very dangerous it could have been.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A B737-300 FAILED TO FOLLOW THE TAXI INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY TWR RESULTING IN NOT HOLDING SHORT OF RWY AND TAXIING ACROSS IT BEFORE REALIZING THEIR TRANSGRESSION.

Narrative: DCA EXPERIENCED A NATURAL GAS LEAK IN THE OLD TERMINAL THAT FORCED THE EVAC OF THE CTL TWR. THE TWR WAS CLOSED FOR WHAT SEEMED LIKE MORE THAN AN HR. WHEN OPS BEGAN AGAIN, IT SEEMED THAT NOT ALL OF THE COM EQUIP IN THE TWR WAS WORKING AS WELL AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. THE CTLRS WERE VERY BUSY BECAUSE ALL THE AIRPLANES WERE TRYING TO GET OUT BEFORE THE CURFEW. WE STARTED ENGS AND TAXIED TO SPOT LIMA 1, AND THEN CALLED FOR TAXI CLRNC. THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE GND CTLR WERE 'TAXI BY TXWY L AND TXWY K, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 5 AT TXWY K.' WITHOUT EVEN A CLUE THAT THERE WAS A PROB, I MISSED TXWY K AND MADE THE NEXT L AT TXWY J WHICH IMMEDIATELY PUT ME ON RWY 15. THE FIRST HOLD LINE WE SAW WAS ON THE E SIDE OF RWY 15. NO TXWY MARKERS, NO WHITE LIGHTS, NO HOLD LINE -- NOTHING HAD CAUGHT OUR ATTN THAT WE WERE MAKING A MISTAKE. MY FIRST CLUE WAS LOOKING L AND SEEING THE RED LIGHTS AT THE APCH END OF RWY 15 AS WE WERE XING THE E BOUNDARY OF THE RWY AND APCHING THE HOLD LINE ON THE E SIDE. AT THIS POINT, WE WERE BOTH PETRIFIED AT WHAT HAD HAPPENED. WE TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY, REMAINED IN LINE WITH THE AIRPLANES AHEAD OF US, SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ AS WE BECAME #1 AND WERE CLRED FOR TKOF IN SEQUENCE. THE FREQ ON GND CTL WAS FULL OF CHATTER, AND AIRPLANES WERE ALL OVER THE PLACE. THE CTLR NEVER REALIZED WHAT WE HAD DONE. CAUSE: THE CTLR WAS EXTREMELY BUSY, NUMEROUS AIRPLANES WERE MOVING ON THE TXWYS, TXWY MARKINGS AND LIGHTS DID NOT CATCH OUR ATTN AND, OF COURSE, THERE WAS GROSS PLT ERROR. I HAD NOT BEEN TO DCA AT NIGHT WITH THAT TAXI PATTERN BEING USED SINCE THE OPENING OF THE NEW TXWY. IN MY MIND, I KNEW EXACTLY WHERE I WAS, BUT IN ACTUALITY, I WAS SCREWED UP! I DO FEEL THAT SOMEONE SHOULD TAKE A CLOSE LOOK AT THAT LOCATION ON THE ARPT AND DO IT AT NIGHT FROM THE COCKPIT WITH THE AIRPLANE SITTING ON TOP OF SPOT LIMA 1. I COULD NOT BELIEVE HOW QUICKLY THE ERROR WAS MADE AND HOW VERY DANGEROUS IT COULD HAVE BEEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.