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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 362367 |
Time | |
Date | 199702 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ezf |
State Reference | VA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | King Air C90 E90 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | other other : other pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 9000 flight time type : 1200 |
ASRS Report | 362367 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly other anomaly other other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : declared emergency other |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
The WX conditions at ezf on the day in question, were a ceiling of 1400 ft overcast and 10 mi visibility with a strong southwesterly wind around 17 KTS gusting to 23 KTS. We shot the NDB runway 24 approach broke out some 4 mi from the airport canceled the IFR and proceeded VFR. The touchdown was a text book one, 110 ft down from the runway numbers full propellers and condition levers were brought up for maximum reverse, if needed, the touchdown was with full flaps and slightly below blue line about 100-105 KTS. We were slightly left of center and began to correct with no brakes and only in beta with the propellers. What was a normal touchdown and ground roll soon changed at about 1000 ft down the runway (about 2000 ft remaining). When I thought we would be coming to a stop in the next couple hundred ft, the aircraft veered uncontrollably to the left and within seconds we were in the grass and sliding sideways coming to a stop within less than 15 seconds up a small embankment having struck both propellers and taking out a steel cone that outlined the runway boundary. The chain of events that led to this incident commenced in dec of 1996 with the installation of the cleveland brakes and wheels. During that yr with all the 'directional steering' problems we had had, and the uncertainty of what indeed would be the response of the aircraft when brakes and or propeller reversal was utilized left both pilots with some degree of subconscious uncertainty. Furthermore, there was an unwillingness perhaps to fully implement those system especially when the steering control problems arose. It was nothing that the PF did that day to induce the incident. It was the inability to steer the aircraft with the conventional steering system of the aircraft and the reluctance to input full braking and/or maximum reverse thrust under the circumstances (not knowing what would actually occur and not wanting to make a bad situation even worse) that caused the incident. During the abort at teb, I was flying the aircraft from the left seat. During the landing incident at ezf, I was in the right seat not flying, however, the 2 occurrences seemed very similar, the only difference was that one was during an acceleration to a takeoff and the other was during a deceleration from a landing. Simple physics would dictate that it was clearly easier to abort the takeoff and control the situation than it was to maintain directional control of the aircraft after landing. What could have been done to perhaps have made some difference, would be to have flown the plane and have put it through trial runs of utilizing full reverse and full braking so that there was no question or reluctance on the pilot's part from wanting to use those system if necessary knowing and having the confidence that they would work effectively. Instead, we accepted the findings and assurances of the maintenance personnel without question. However, they had cried wolf at least on 4 occasions with the brakes and three with the propeller/governor irregularities. Additionally, there should be a study done on whether or not this sort of occurrence is perhaps more common than known with respect to other king airs that have the cleveland brake and wheel installations. I know that in our case the brakes are still of concern and an unresolved issue. We will refuse to fly that aircraft until the entire wheel and brake system has been inspected and replaced. Additionally, our approach with our aircraft squawk system and follow up will be looked at and modified accordingly. In my assessment the incident did not result from bad pilot judgement or pilot error. It occurred because the pilot could not directionally control the aircraft effectively with the conventional steering system of the aircraft when the brake malfunction occurred. Knowing that his braking system was not responding properly and unsure or questioning his reverse thrust capabilities the pilot was extremely handicapped with his options under the circumstances. The aircraft did not sustain any structural damage to its fuselage, gear or control surfaces. There was no injury or fatality and although both propellers made ground contact with the embankment it was not sudden stoppage and no significant engine damage is anticipated.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PLT OF A BEECH BE90, KING AIR, LOST CTL OF THE ACFT ON LNDG ROLL RESULTING IN SLIDING SIDEWAYS OFF THE SIDE OF THE RWY. ONLY THE ACFT PROPS SUSTAINED DAMAGE.
Narrative: THE WX CONDITIONS AT EZF ON THE DAY IN QUESTION, WERE A CEILING OF 1400 FT OVCST AND 10 MI VISIBILITY WITH A STRONG SOUTHWESTERLY WIND AROUND 17 KTS GUSTING TO 23 KTS. WE SHOT THE NDB RWY 24 APCH BROKE OUT SOME 4 MI FROM THE ARPT CANCELED THE IFR AND PROCEEDED VFR. THE TOUCHDOWN WAS A TEXT BOOK ONE, 110 FT DOWN FROM THE RWY NUMBERS FULL PROPS AND CONDITION LEVERS WERE BROUGHT UP FOR MAX REVERSE, IF NEEDED, THE TOUCHDOWN WAS WITH FULL FLAPS AND SLIGHTLY BELOW BLUE LINE ABOUT 100-105 KTS. WE WERE SLIGHTLY L OF CTR AND BEGAN TO CORRECT WITH NO BRAKES AND ONLY IN BETA WITH THE PROPS. WHAT WAS A NORMAL TOUCHDOWN AND GND ROLL SOON CHANGED AT ABOUT 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY (ABOUT 2000 FT REMAINING). WHEN I THOUGHT WE WOULD BE COMING TO A STOP IN THE NEXT COUPLE HUNDRED FT, THE ACFT VEERED UNCONTROLLABLY TO THE L AND WITHIN SECONDS WE WERE IN THE GRASS AND SLIDING SIDEWAYS COMING TO A STOP WITHIN LESS THAN 15 SECONDS UP A SMALL EMBANKMENT HAVING STRUCK BOTH PROPS AND TAKING OUT A STEEL CONE THAT OUTLINED THE RWY BOUNDARY. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THIS INCIDENT COMMENCED IN DEC OF 1996 WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE CLEVELAND BRAKES AND WHEELS. DURING THAT YR WITH ALL THE 'DIRECTIONAL STEERING' PROBS WE HAD HAD, AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF WHAT INDEED WOULD BE THE RESPONSE OF THE ACFT WHEN BRAKES AND OR PROP REVERSAL WAS UTILIZED LEFT BOTH PLTS WITH SOME DEG OF SUBCONSCIOUS UNCERTAINTY. FURTHERMORE, THERE WAS AN UNWILLINGNESS PERHAPS TO FULLY IMPLEMENT THOSE SYS ESPECIALLY WHEN THE STEERING CTL PROBS AROSE. IT WAS NOTHING THAT THE PF DID THAT DAY TO INDUCE THE INCIDENT. IT WAS THE INABILITY TO STEER THE ACFT WITH THE CONVENTIONAL STEERING SYS OF THE ACFT AND THE RELUCTANCE TO INPUT FULL BRAKING AND/OR MAX REVERSE THRUST UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES (NOT KNOWING WHAT WOULD ACTUALLY OCCUR AND NOT WANTING TO MAKE A BAD SIT EVEN WORSE) THAT CAUSED THE INCIDENT. DURING THE ABORT AT TEB, I WAS FLYING THE ACFT FROM THE L SEAT. DURING THE LNDG INCIDENT AT EZF, I WAS IN THE R SEAT NOT FLYING, HOWEVER, THE 2 OCCURRENCES SEEMED VERY SIMILAR, THE ONLY DIFFERENCE WAS THAT ONE WAS DURING AN ACCELERATION TO A TKOF AND THE OTHER WAS DURING A DECELERATION FROM A LNDG. SIMPLE PHYSICS WOULD DICTATE THAT IT WAS CLRLY EASIER TO ABORT THE TKOF AND CTL THE SIT THAN IT WAS TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL OF THE ACFT AFTER LNDG. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO PERHAPS HAVE MADE SOME DIFFERENCE, WOULD BE TO HAVE FLOWN THE PLANE AND HAVE PUT IT THROUGH TRIAL RUNS OF UTILIZING FULL REVERSE AND FULL BRAKING SO THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OR RELUCTANCE ON THE PLT'S PART FROM WANTING TO USE THOSE SYS IF NECESSARY KNOWING AND HAVING THE CONFIDENCE THAT THEY WOULD WORK EFFECTIVELY. INSTEAD, WE ACCEPTED THE FINDINGS AND ASSURANCES OF THE MAINT PERSONNEL WITHOUT QUESTION. HOWEVER, THEY HAD CRIED WOLF AT LEAST ON 4 OCCASIONS WITH THE BRAKES AND THREE WITH THE PROP/GOVERNOR IRREGULARITIES. ADDITIONALLY, THERE SHOULD BE A STUDY DONE ON WHETHER OR NOT THIS SORT OF OCCURRENCE IS PERHAPS MORE COMMON THAN KNOWN WITH RESPECT TO OTHER KING AIRS THAT HAVE THE CLEVELAND BRAKE AND WHEEL INSTALLATIONS. I KNOW THAT IN OUR CASE THE BRAKES ARE STILL OF CONCERN AND AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE. WE WILL REFUSE TO FLY THAT ACFT UNTIL THE ENTIRE WHEEL AND BRAKE SYS HAS BEEN INSPECTED AND REPLACED. ADDITIONALLY, OUR APCH WITH OUR ACFT SQUAWK SYS AND FOLLOW UP WILL BE LOOKED AT AND MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY. IN MY ASSESSMENT THE INCIDENT DID NOT RESULT FROM BAD PLT JUDGEMENT OR PLT ERROR. IT OCCURRED BECAUSE THE PLT COULD NOT DIRECTIONALLY CTL THE ACFT EFFECTIVELY WITH THE CONVENTIONAL STEERING SYS OF THE ACFT WHEN THE BRAKE MALFUNCTION OCCURRED. KNOWING THAT HIS BRAKING SYS WAS NOT RESPONDING PROPERLY AND UNSURE OR QUESTIONING HIS REVERSE THRUST CAPABILITIES THE PLT WAS EXTREMELY HANDICAPPED WITH HIS OPTIONS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE ACFT DID NOT SUSTAIN ANY STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO ITS FUSELAGE, GEAR OR CTL SURFACES. THERE WAS NO INJURY OR FATALITY AND ALTHOUGH BOTH PROPS MADE GND CONTACT WITH THE EMBANKMENT IT WAS NOT SUDDEN STOPPAGE AND NO SIGNIFICANT ENG DAMAGE IS ANTICIPATED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.