Narrative:

Landed runway 22L, ewr cleared taxiway north stopped taxiway P. Told tower we were going to XXX park. Tower cleared to taxi right turn taxiway P. Approaching taxiway east, tower told us to keep taxi speed up to cross runway 11 on taxiway P and the aircraft on runway 22L would hold position, caution jet blast. About this time, the engineer said he hadn't been able to contact our ground handler. The first officer made a comment and I heard, on the radio at the same time, what I thought was my call sign. Air carrier a to cross at next taxiway and the aircraft was holding in position. I was approaching taxiway G that crossed runway 22R. I turned left and crossed runway 22R. Before I could answer tower and I had already initiated the turn, I heard an air carrier B acknowledge to cross. I looked left (down runway 22R) and then realized that I had misheard the air carrier a versus air carrier B. I relayed my concern to the tower that I had misinterpreted his instructions. The few seconds of cockpit versus radio chatter helped cause the situation. The similarity of air carrier a and air carrier B has always been a problem since we began service using the call sign. I didn't realize that the first officer hadn't heard the clearance that I thought was for us. He was checking the airport chart for our parking at a remote area and had his head down momentarily when I began the turn at taxiway G to cross runway 22R. This is an example of multiple small instances of how some of the cockpit duties and normal sequences of rechking, parking, txwys, etc, can sometimes lead to a lack of all crew members aware 100% of the time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 FLC HEARS TAXI CLRNC FOR ACFT WITH SIMILAR SOUNDING A/N AND TURNS TO CROSS RWY WITH CLRNC INTENDED FOR ANOTHER ACFT.

Narrative: LANDED RWY 22L, EWR CLRED TXWY N STOPPED TXWY P. TOLD TWR WE WERE GOING TO XXX PARK. TWR CLRED TO TAXI R TURN TXWY P. APCHING TXWY E, TWR TOLD US TO KEEP TAXI SPD UP TO CROSS RWY 11 ON TXWY P AND THE ACFT ON RWY 22L WOULD HOLD POS, CAUTION JET BLAST. ABOUT THIS TIME, THE ENGINEER SAID HE HADN'T BEEN ABLE TO CONTACT OUR GND HANDLER. THE FO MADE A COMMENT AND I HEARD, ON THE RADIO AT THE SAME TIME, WHAT I THOUGHT WAS MY CALL SIGN. ACR A TO CROSS AT NEXT TXWY AND THE ACFT WAS HOLDING IN POS. I WAS APCHING TXWY G THAT CROSSED RWY 22R. I TURNED L AND CROSSED RWY 22R. BEFORE I COULD ANSWER TWR AND I HAD ALREADY INITIATED THE TURN, I HEARD AN ACR B ACKNOWLEDGE TO CROSS. I LOOKED L (DOWN RWY 22R) AND THEN REALIZED THAT I HAD MISHEARD THE ACR A VERSUS ACR B. I RELAYED MY CONCERN TO THE TWR THAT I HAD MISINTERPRETED HIS INSTRUCTIONS. THE FEW SECONDS OF COCKPIT VERSUS RADIO CHATTER HELPED CAUSE THE SIT. THE SIMILARITY OF ACR A AND ACR B HAS ALWAYS BEEN A PROB SINCE WE BEGAN SVC USING THE CALL SIGN. I DIDN'T REALIZE THAT THE FO HADN'T HEARD THE CLRNC THAT I THOUGHT WAS FOR US. HE WAS CHKING THE ARPT CHART FOR OUR PARKING AT A REMOTE AREA AND HAD HIS HEAD DOWN MOMENTARILY WHEN I BEGAN THE TURN AT TXWY G TO CROSS RWY 22R. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF MULTIPLE SMALL INSTANCES OF HOW SOME OF THE COCKPIT DUTIES AND NORMAL SEQUENCES OF RECHKING, PARKING, TXWYS, ETC, CAN SOMETIMES LEAD TO A LACK OF ALL CREW MEMBERS AWARE 100% OF THE TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.