Narrative:

I departed runway 16R at XX10 GMT and contacted rno departure control on 119.2. Radar contact was established and 10000 ft was confirmed as my assigned altitude. At the rno 3 DME fix, a left turn was initiated direct to the fmg VOR. Upon leaving class C airspace, I accelerated to an initial climb speed of 250 KIAS. At approximately mid-point during the turn, ATC issued a heading of 280 degrees and advised to report sighting traffic in the turn at approximately 1 - 2 O'clock. As I was leveling at 10000 ft MSL and still turning left, another airline's B737 was observed just east of the fmg VOR on a westerly heading, approximately 1000 ft above my altitude. I would estimate the aircraft's distance at 5 NM and at approximately the same speed at which I was flying. The aircraft was reported in sight after which I was instructed to maintain visual separation, keeping the aircraft off my right and to continue climb to 15000 ft. This aircraft was on a different frequency and I had no idea what clearance it had been issued, nor was I advised of its expected flight path. I could only assume that it would maintain its existing course and altitude. Assuming this, it appeared to me that if I continued the turn to 280 degrees and also initiated a climb, I would place my aircraft on a direct collision course with the B737. I therefore stopped my climb, shallowed my turn and advised ATC that I did not think this was going to work -- or words to that effect. Things began happening rapidly at this point and I do not remember exactly what was said or in exactly what order. I do remember ATC again instructing me to turn to a westerly heading yet at the same time to maintain visual separation with the B737. I also recall the comment that as soon as I had acknowledged having the other aircraft in sight, that it had been cleared to descend. This fact was of immediate concern since my aircraft still appeared to be on a collision course with the B737 and was getting closer by the min. Still not knowing where the B737 was going and realizing that ATC was providing no separation whatsoever, I directed my full attention to avoiding the other aircraft. Being in VFR conditions and having the terrain below me in sight, I began a slow descent in order to increase separation between my aircraft and the B737 -- which I estimate was now at approximately 2 NM and still slightly above. At this point, I observed the B737 begin a right turn to the northeast. This gave me the opportunity to continue a left turn to the west, which I did. I advised ATC that I was now clear of the traffic and asked if a climb to 15000 ft was still appropriate. This was confirmed and a heading was assigned to intercept J92 nwbound. From this point, the flight proceeded without further incident. On the way to portland, my first officer and I tried to recreate what had happened on this departure. While at no time was my aircraft in imminent danger of a collision nor was a TCASII alert ever activated, I feel the ATC procedures currently used in the reno area are extremely poor. These procedures place departing and arriving high performance aircraft on converging courses with minimum altitude separation on different frequencys over high terrain in often turbulent flight conditions. Combine this with the use of visual separation and a clear potential for conflict is created. In this particular situation, several recommendations come to mind, any of which would have reduced the anxiety level in my cockpit and probably in approach control's radar room. Visual separation should not be used for aircraft climbing through the altitude of another aircraft while on a converging course. ATC should not assign a heading and instructions to maintain visual separation all at the same time. Aircraft being vectored in close proximity to one another in a terminal area should be on the same frequency. An aircraft instructed to maintain visual separation with another aircraft should be advised of the expected flight path of the other aircraft. In the future, I will think twice before acknowledging visual contact with an aircraft on a potentially conflicting course.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD83 ACFT ON CLB WAS GIVEN TA BY DEP CTLR. FLC OBSERVED TFC AND CTLR THEN CLRED THEM TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION AND CLB. RPTR CAPT DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE OTHER ACFT WAS CLRED TO DO SINCE THEY WERE ON DIFFERENT FREQ AND CONSEQUENTLY RPTR HAD TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION AND FAULTS ATC FOR PUTTING TFC SEPARATION RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE FLC.

Narrative: I DEPARTED RWY 16R AT XX10 GMT AND CONTACTED RNO DEP CTL ON 119.2. RADAR CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED AND 10000 FT WAS CONFIRMED AS MY ASSIGNED ALT. AT THE RNO 3 DME FIX, A L TURN WAS INITIATED DIRECT TO THE FMG VOR. UPON LEAVING CLASS C AIRSPACE, I ACCELERATED TO AN INITIAL CLB SPD OF 250 KIAS. AT APPROX MID-POINT DURING THE TURN, ATC ISSUED A HDG OF 280 DEGS AND ADVISED TO RPT SIGHTING TFC IN THE TURN AT APPROX 1 - 2 O'CLOCK. AS I WAS LEVELING AT 10000 FT MSL AND STILL TURNING L, ANOTHER AIRLINE'S B737 WAS OBSERVED JUST E OF THE FMG VOR ON A WESTERLY HDG, APPROX 1000 FT ABOVE MY ALT. I WOULD ESTIMATE THE ACFT'S DISTANCE AT 5 NM AND AT APPROX THE SAME SPD AT WHICH I WAS FLYING. THE ACFT WAS RPTED IN SIGHT AFTER WHICH I WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION, KEEPING THE ACFT OFF MY R AND TO CONTINUE CLB TO 15000 FT. THIS ACFT WAS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ AND I HAD NO IDEA WHAT CLRNC IT HAD BEEN ISSUED, NOR WAS I ADVISED OF ITS EXPECTED FLT PATH. I COULD ONLY ASSUME THAT IT WOULD MAINTAIN ITS EXISTING COURSE AND ALT. ASSUMING THIS, IT APPEARED TO ME THAT IF I CONTINUED THE TURN TO 280 DEGS AND ALSO INITIATED A CLB, I WOULD PLACE MY ACFT ON A DIRECT COLLISION COURSE WITH THE B737. I THEREFORE STOPPED MY CLB, SHALLOWED MY TURN AND ADVISED ATC THAT I DID NOT THINK THIS WAS GOING TO WORK -- OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. THINGS BEGAN HAPPENING RAPIDLY AT THIS POINT AND I DO NOT REMEMBER EXACTLY WHAT WAS SAID OR IN EXACTLY WHAT ORDER. I DO REMEMBER ATC AGAIN INSTRUCTING ME TO TURN TO A WESTERLY HDG YET AT THE SAME TIME TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH THE B737. I ALSO RECALL THE COMMENT THAT AS SOON AS I HAD ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT, THAT IT HAD BEEN CLRED TO DSND. THIS FACT WAS OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN SINCE MY ACFT STILL APPEARED TO BE ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH THE B737 AND WAS GETTING CLOSER BY THE MIN. STILL NOT KNOWING WHERE THE B737 WAS GOING AND REALIZING THAT ATC WAS PROVIDING NO SEPARATION WHATSOEVER, I DIRECTED MY FULL ATTN TO AVOIDING THE OTHER ACFT. BEING IN VFR CONDITIONS AND HAVING THE TERRAIN BELOW ME IN SIGHT, I BEGAN A SLOW DSCNT IN ORDER TO INCREASE SEPARATION BTWN MY ACFT AND THE B737 -- WHICH I ESTIMATE WAS NOW AT APPROX 2 NM AND STILL SLIGHTLY ABOVE. AT THIS POINT, I OBSERVED THE B737 BEGIN A R TURN TO THE NE. THIS GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE A L TURN TO THE W, WHICH I DID. I ADVISED ATC THAT I WAS NOW CLR OF THE TFC AND ASKED IF A CLB TO 15000 FT WAS STILL APPROPRIATE. THIS WAS CONFIRMED AND A HDG WAS ASSIGNED TO INTERCEPT J92 NWBOUND. FROM THIS POINT, THE FLT PROCEEDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. ON THE WAY TO PORTLAND, MY FO AND I TRIED TO RECREATE WHAT HAD HAPPENED ON THIS DEP. WHILE AT NO TIME WAS MY ACFT IN IMMINENT DANGER OF A COLLISION NOR WAS A TCASII ALERT EVER ACTIVATED, I FEEL THE ATC PROCS CURRENTLY USED IN THE RENO AREA ARE EXTREMELY POOR. THESE PROCS PLACE DEPARTING AND ARRIVING HIGH PERFORMANCE ACFT ON CONVERGING COURSES WITH MINIMUM ALT SEPARATION ON DIFFERENT FREQS OVER HIGH TERRAIN IN OFTEN TURBULENT FLT CONDITIONS. COMBINE THIS WITH THE USE OF VISUAL SEPARATION AND A CLR POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT IS CREATED. IN THIS PARTICULAR SIT, SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS COME TO MIND, ANY OF WHICH WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE ANXIETY LEVEL IN MY COCKPIT AND PROBABLY IN APCH CTL'S RADAR ROOM. VISUAL SEPARATION SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR ACFT CLBING THROUGH THE ALT OF ANOTHER ACFT WHILE ON A CONVERGING COURSE. ATC SHOULD NOT ASSIGN A HDG AND INSTRUCTIONS TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION ALL AT THE SAME TIME. ACFT BEING VECTORED IN CLOSE PROX TO ONE ANOTHER IN A TERMINAL AREA SHOULD BE ON THE SAME FREQ. AN ACFT INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH ANOTHER ACFT SHOULD BE ADVISED OF THE EXPECTED FLT PATH OF THE OTHER ACFT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL THINK TWICE BEFORE ACKNOWLEDGING VISUAL CONTACT WITH AN ACFT ON A POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING COURSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.