Narrative:

This series of incidents occurred on oct xx 1996. The first was while on ILS final approach to runway 19R at santa ana, ca. I was flying with a pilot who had been hired by my company to perform first officer duties for 1 day. We were in the new model astra spx. During the course of concluding our second leg of 5 short flts planned for the day, he became argumentative. He soon became aggressive, and his attitude escalated to the point that he initiated a verbal outburst toward me. This lasted for over a min and included several uses of profanity and calling me names, all in a loud voice. He said that I was a lousy pilot, that he had always hated flying with me, and that he would never fly with me again. This was done with 3 passenger on board. The passenger could hear normal conversation from the cockpit, as well as the shouting. The passenger included a regional sales manager from my company and 2 representatives of one of my company's customers. I said firmly, but as calmly as I could, 'let's talk about this on the ground.' I had to say this 6 times before he finally stopped shouting at me, and began to focus on his duties at hand. After landing and after our passenger had left the cabin, I climbed out the seat and waited for him I said, 'let's talk.' he said he didn't want to talk to me. I said, 'I want to talk to you.' we proceeded to walk in front of the aircraft 50 ft and I tried to have a conversation with him. He began to shout obscenities at me again and to call me names. I just let him go on for a couple of mins. Finally I said 'I want you to listen to me for 60 seconds, and you tell me when my 60 seconds starts.' after another outburst he said, 'okay,' and became silent. I said, 'what you just did in that cockpit was 100 times worse than anything that you think I may be wrong about.' he became silent, looked at me hard and walked away. He later came up to me and said he was sorry. He said that he was just tired and grumpy. I said that he seemed to have some unresolved issues that were bothering him and that I would be available to talk them out with him, but not in the cockpit. On a subsequent flight an hour later, he copied our clearance from burbank, ca, back to santa ana. As I completed programming the FMS, I asked him to review what was in the FMS and displayed on the multi-function display and to confirm that it was accurate and complete. He said that it was. As we completed the elmoo 5 departure from burbank, approaching the elmoo transition fix, the autoplt commanded a right turn toward santa ana, following the FMS programming. The socal approach controller came on the air and told us to turn left to 50 degree heading, and he continued to give us vectors to ILS final approach into santa ana. The controller asked us to call a phone number when on the ground. I called the controller and was informed as to the seriousness of the mistake which had occurred. The right turn would have put us in direct conflict with the downwind traffic into lax. I sincerely apologized for the error, and told the controller that I had a communications problem with the rental pilot that was with me that day. He suggested that my company take immediate steps to correct the problem. I assured him that we would. He declined to issue a violation against my license, though I sensed it was a very close call for him. The rental pilot in this case used to work for my company. He was senior to me when I came to work for the company, 3 months prior to his departure. That was 10 months prior to this incident. Perhaps he had difficulty understanding what his role was in this particular situation, however, nothing can excuse his loss of self control and composure in the cockpit. This was made even more dangerous and damaging because we were on final instrument approach, in the WX, with customers on board. One of the lessons that can be gleaned from this is that we pilots need to take a moment to think about what our role is for a given day, if we find ourselves dealing with an unusual situation. We must insist on good cockpit communications and coordination, regardless of who is there with us. And I'm afraid we must also consider the possibility that the pilot that we think is there to help us, may not have that objective.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HEADING TRACK POS DEV DURING A GROSS NAV ERROR IN A CORPORATE ACFT.

Narrative: THIS SERIES OF INCIDENTS OCCURRED ON OCT XX 1996. THE FIRST WAS WHILE ON ILS FINAL APCH TO RWY 19R AT SANTA ANA, CA. I WAS FLYING WITH A PLT WHO HAD BEEN HIRED BY MY COMPANY TO PERFORM FO DUTIES FOR 1 DAY. WE WERE IN THE NEW MODEL ASTRA SPX. DURING THE COURSE OF CONCLUDING OUR SECOND LEG OF 5 SHORT FLTS PLANNED FOR THE DAY, HE BECAME ARGUMENTATIVE. HE SOON BECAME AGGRESSIVE, AND HIS ATTITUDE ESCALATED TO THE POINT THAT HE INITIATED A VERBAL OUTBURST TOWARD ME. THIS LASTED FOR OVER A MIN AND INCLUDED SEVERAL USES OF PROFANITY AND CALLING ME NAMES, ALL IN A LOUD VOICE. HE SAID THAT I WAS A LOUSY PLT, THAT HE HAD ALWAYS HATED FLYING WITH ME, AND THAT HE WOULD NEVER FLY WITH ME AGAIN. THIS WAS DONE WITH 3 PAX ON BOARD. THE PAX COULD HEAR NORMAL CONVERSATION FROM THE COCKPIT, AS WELL AS THE SHOUTING. THE PAX INCLUDED A REGIONAL SALES MGR FROM MY COMPANY AND 2 REPRESENTATIVES OF ONE OF MY COMPANY'S CUSTOMERS. I SAID FIRMLY, BUT AS CALMLY AS I COULD, 'LET'S TALK ABOUT THIS ON THE GND.' I HAD TO SAY THIS 6 TIMES BEFORE HE FINALLY STOPPED SHOUTING AT ME, AND BEGAN TO FOCUS ON HIS DUTIES AT HAND. AFTER LNDG AND AFTER OUR PAX HAD LEFT THE CABIN, I CLBED OUT THE SEAT AND WAITED FOR HIM I SAID, 'LET'S TALK.' HE SAID HE DIDN'T WANT TO TALK TO ME. I SAID, 'I WANT TO TALK TO YOU.' WE PROCEEDED TO WALK IN FRONT OF THE ACFT 50 FT AND I TRIED TO HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH HIM. HE BEGAN TO SHOUT OBSCENITIES AT ME AGAIN AND TO CALL ME NAMES. I JUST LET HIM GO ON FOR A COUPLE OF MINS. FINALLY I SAID 'I WANT YOU TO LISTEN TO ME FOR 60 SECONDS, AND YOU TELL ME WHEN MY 60 SECONDS STARTS.' AFTER ANOTHER OUTBURST HE SAID, 'OKAY,' AND BECAME SILENT. I SAID, 'WHAT YOU JUST DID IN THAT COCKPIT WAS 100 TIMES WORSE THAN ANYTHING THAT YOU THINK I MAY BE WRONG ABOUT.' HE BECAME SILENT, LOOKED AT ME HARD AND WALKED AWAY. HE LATER CAME UP TO ME AND SAID HE WAS SORRY. HE SAID THAT HE WAS JUST TIRED AND GRUMPY. I SAID THAT HE SEEMED TO HAVE SOME UNRESOLVED ISSUES THAT WERE BOTHERING HIM AND THAT I WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO TALK THEM OUT WITH HIM, BUT NOT IN THE COCKPIT. ON A SUBSEQUENT FLT AN HR LATER, HE COPIED OUR CLRNC FROM BURBANK, CA, BACK TO SANTA ANA. AS I COMPLETED PROGRAMMING THE FMS, I ASKED HIM TO REVIEW WHAT WAS IN THE FMS AND DISPLAYED ON THE MULTI-FUNCTION DISPLAY AND TO CONFIRM THAT IT WAS ACCURATE AND COMPLETE. HE SAID THAT IT WAS. AS WE COMPLETED THE ELMOO 5 DEP FROM BURBANK, APCHING THE ELMOO TRANSITION FIX, THE AUTOPLT COMMANDED A R TURN TOWARD SANTA ANA, FOLLOWING THE FMS PROGRAMMING. THE SOCAL APCH CTLR CAME ON THE AIR AND TOLD US TO TURN L TO 50 DEG HDG, AND HE CONTINUED TO GIVE US VECTORS TO ILS FINAL APCH INTO SANTA ANA. THE CTLR ASKED US TO CALL A PHONE NUMBER WHEN ON THE GND. I CALLED THE CTLR AND WAS INFORMED AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE MISTAKE WHICH HAD OCCURRED. THE R TURN WOULD HAVE PUT US IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE DOWNWIND TFC INTO LAX. I SINCERELY APOLOGIZED FOR THE ERROR, AND TOLD THE CTLR THAT I HAD A COMS PROB WITH THE RENTAL PLT THAT WAS WITH ME THAT DAY. HE SUGGESTED THAT MY COMPANY TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO CORRECT THE PROB. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WOULD. HE DECLINED TO ISSUE A VIOLATION AGAINST MY LICENSE, THOUGH I SENSED IT WAS A VERY CLOSE CALL FOR HIM. THE RENTAL PLT IN THIS CASE USED TO WORK FOR MY COMPANY. HE WAS SENIOR TO ME WHEN I CAME TO WORK FOR THE COMPANY, 3 MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS DEP. THAT WAS 10 MONTHS PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT. PERHAPS HE HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING WHAT HIS ROLE WAS IN THIS PARTICULAR SIT, HOWEVER, NOTHING CAN EXCUSE HIS LOSS OF SELF CTL AND COMPOSURE IN THE COCKPIT. THIS WAS MADE EVEN MORE DANGEROUS AND DAMAGING BECAUSE WE WERE ON FINAL INST APCH, IN THE WX, WITH CUSTOMERS ON BOARD. ONE OF THE LESSONS THAT CAN BE GLEANED FROM THIS IS THAT WE PLTS NEED TO TAKE A MOMENT TO THINK ABOUT WHAT OUR ROLE IS FOR A GIVEN DAY, IF WE FIND OURSELVES DEALING WITH AN UNUSUAL SIT. WE MUST INSIST ON GOOD COCKPIT COMS AND COORD, REGARDLESS OF WHO IS THERE WITH US. AND I'M AFRAID WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PLT THAT WE THINK IS THERE TO HELP US, MAY NOT HAVE THAT OBJECTIVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.