Narrative:

On taxi out for departure, I asked the first officer to start the right engine. He introduced the fuel at the appropriate time and announced we had a 'flasher' -- an impending hot start, which is not an unusual occurrence with these engines. The starter was disengaged at 35% N2, the egt topped out at 451 degrees C, below the ground start limitation of 475 degrees C, and the engine started to cool as it continued to accelerate. However, the engine hung at 43% and the egt was starting to creep back upward. I announced that we had a hung start and advanced the throttle. While waiting for it to accelerate, the egt approached the limit. I ordered the first officer to shut it down but he was occupied and it reached 500 degrees C before I could shut off the fuel. The engine never accelerated past 43%. We checked the hung start procedure in our manual and confirmed that we had handled the problem properly but we were aware that we had exceeded a ground start temperature limit. I contacted maintenance on their frequency. I described the event, including the exceedence, and asked him what he wanted me to do. At this time, I fully expected to be returning to the gate. The operator on that frequency then replied that we should attempt another start. When we started to configure the aircraft for a second start attempt, I noticed that the right supply switch for the air-conditioning pack was in the automatic position and so I queried the first officer why it was there. He responded that he was completing the after start checklist when the problem occurred. We discussed the proper procedure which is to wait until the engine is stable before opening this bleed source. I did not, at this time, mention that according to company procedure, the pilot activating the fuel lever is responsible for monitoring the engine until stable at 50%. We then received another communication from maintenance, and this one was from a different voice, instructing us to turn off the engine driven generator, hydraulic pump and turn on the engine anti- ice for that engine, prior to the start. We complied, engaged the starter, and spun the engine while the egt cooled from 256 degrees C to below 100 degrees C. It was a normal start and the egt never even flashed. I advised maintenance of the normal start and stable operation of the engine and they cleared us to go. All engine indications were normal for the remaining taxi and flight to savannah. What was unknown to me at the time, and available only in company maintenance manuals, was that a ground start temperature of 500 degrees C requires an inspection by maintenance personnel before being released to service. Upon arriving at the gate, I felt an obligation to inform the next crew about the problem in atl. I was satisfied that I had met all requirements for my flight after receiving approval from maintenance, and instructed the first officer to make an information only entry in the logbook. I also saw the out going captain in the terminal and related the entire incident to him, including the radio exchange with maintenance. In retrospect, I feel that a few things could be changed to avoid a situation like this in the future. 1) I think we need to stress the importance of waiting until the engine is stable before beginning the after start checklist. The first officer was fairly junior in base, still on reserve and perhaps felt pressured to rush the procedure. His job performance with me during the previous 8 legs did not, however, indicate any deficiencies. 2) the logic in the MD88 which 'flashes' the egt for an impending hot start has always been inaccurate, and delivers a false alarm perhaps 95% of the time. 3) there should be an entry in the pilots operating manual not to attempt a second start if there has been an exceedence. We accomplished the hung start checklist for the MD88 and then were taken to the manual aborted start checklist. Nowhere is there a warning not to attempt another start if engine limitations were exceeded. Such a warning does exists in the automatic-aborted checklist for the MD90. 4) I obviously received some bad information from the radio operator on maintenance frequency. Whoever mans this position should be a qualified mechanic and not just an 'operator,' as I now suspect he was. 5) I should have entered the 'mechanics' initials, authority/authorized andtime of contact, per company procedures to validate the communications we had with maintenance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88 ACFT DURING TAXI FOR TKOF. WHILE STARTING THE R ENG, WHEN THE FUEL WAS INTRODUCED A 'FLASHER' (IMPENDING HOT START) WAS NOTED AND THE ENG THEN HUNG AT 43% WITH THE EGT INCREASING. CAPT RPTR TOLD THE FO TO SHUT THE ENG DOWN, BUT THE FO WAS DISTRACTED BY THE CHKLIST. CAPT SHUT IT DOWN WHEN EGT REACHED 500 DEGS C, CONTACTED MAINT WHO ADVISED PROC TO USE FOR RESTART WHICH WAS SUCCESSFUL. HOWEVER, MAINT CLRED THE ACFT TO CONTINUE ON THE FLT WHEN THE ENG SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSPECTED.

Narrative: ON TAXI OUT FOR DEP, I ASKED THE FO TO START THE R ENG. HE INTRODUCED THE FUEL AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND ANNOUNCED WE HAD A 'FLASHER' -- AN IMPENDING HOT START, WHICH IS NOT AN UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE WITH THESE ENGS. THE STARTER WAS DISENGAGED AT 35% N2, THE EGT TOPPED OUT AT 451 DEGS C, BELOW THE GND START LIMITATION OF 475 DEGS C, AND THE ENG STARTED TO COOL AS IT CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE. HOWEVER, THE ENG HUNG AT 43% AND THE EGT WAS STARTING TO CREEP BACK UPWARD. I ANNOUNCED THAT WE HAD A HUNG START AND ADVANCED THE THROTTLE. WHILE WAITING FOR IT TO ACCELERATE, THE EGT APCHED THE LIMIT. I ORDERED THE FO TO SHUT IT DOWN BUT HE WAS OCCUPIED AND IT REACHED 500 DEGS C BEFORE I COULD SHUT OFF THE FUEL. THE ENG NEVER ACCELERATED PAST 43%. WE CHKED THE HUNG START PROC IN OUR MANUAL AND CONFIRMED THAT WE HAD HANDLED THE PROB PROPERLY BUT WE WERE AWARE THAT WE HAD EXCEEDED A GND START TEMP LIMIT. I CONTACTED MAINT ON THEIR FREQ. I DESCRIBED THE EVENT, INCLUDING THE EXCEEDENCE, AND ASKED HIM WHAT HE WANTED ME TO DO. AT THIS TIME, I FULLY EXPECTED TO BE RETURNING TO THE GATE. THE OPERATOR ON THAT FREQ THEN REPLIED THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT ANOTHER START. WHEN WE STARTED TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR A SECOND START ATTEMPT, I NOTICED THAT THE R SUPPLY SWITCH FOR THE AIR-CONDITIONING PACK WAS IN THE AUTO POS AND SO I QUERIED THE FO WHY IT WAS THERE. HE RESPONDED THAT HE WAS COMPLETING THE AFTER START CHKLIST WHEN THE PROB OCCURRED. WE DISCUSSED THE PROPER PROC WHICH IS TO WAIT UNTIL THE ENG IS STABLE BEFORE OPENING THIS BLEED SOURCE. I DID NOT, AT THIS TIME, MENTION THAT ACCORDING TO COMPANY PROC, THE PLT ACTIVATING THE FUEL LEVER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING THE ENG UNTIL STABLE AT 50%. WE THEN RECEIVED ANOTHER COM FROM MAINT, AND THIS ONE WAS FROM A DIFFERENT VOICE, INSTRUCTING US TO TURN OFF THE ENG DRIVEN GENERATOR, HYD PUMP AND TURN ON THE ENG ANTI- ICE FOR THAT ENG, PRIOR TO THE START. WE COMPLIED, ENGAGED THE STARTER, AND SPUN THE ENG WHILE THE EGT COOLED FROM 256 DEGS C TO BELOW 100 DEGS C. IT WAS A NORMAL START AND THE EGT NEVER EVEN FLASHED. I ADVISED MAINT OF THE NORMAL START AND STABLE OP OF THE ENG AND THEY CLRED US TO GO. ALL ENG INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL FOR THE REMAINING TAXI AND FLT TO SAVANNAH. WHAT WAS UNKNOWN TO ME AT THE TIME, AND AVAILABLE ONLY IN COMPANY MAINT MANUALS, WAS THAT A GND START TEMP OF 500 DEGS C REQUIRES AN INSPECTION BY MAINT PERSONNEL BEFORE BEING RELEASED TO SVC. UPON ARRIVING AT THE GATE, I FELT AN OBLIGATION TO INFORM THE NEXT CREW ABOUT THE PROB IN ATL. I WAS SATISFIED THAT I HAD MET ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR MY FLT AFTER RECEIVING APPROVAL FROM MAINT, AND INSTRUCTED THE FO TO MAKE AN INFO ONLY ENTRY IN THE LOGBOOK. I ALSO SAW THE OUT GOING CAPT IN THE TERMINAL AND RELATED THE ENTIRE INCIDENT TO HIM, INCLUDING THE RADIO EXCHANGE WITH MAINT. IN RETROSPECT, I FEEL THAT A FEW THINGS COULD BE CHANGED TO AVOID A SIT LIKE THIS IN THE FUTURE. 1) I THINK WE NEED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF WAITING UNTIL THE ENG IS STABLE BEFORE BEGINNING THE AFTER START CHKLIST. THE FO WAS FAIRLY JUNIOR IN BASE, STILL ON RESERVE AND PERHAPS FELT PRESSURED TO RUSH THE PROC. HIS JOB PERFORMANCE WITH ME DURING THE PREVIOUS 8 LEGS DID NOT, HOWEVER, INDICATE ANY DEFICIENCIES. 2) THE LOGIC IN THE MD88 WHICH 'FLASHES' THE EGT FOR AN IMPENDING HOT START HAS ALWAYS BEEN INACCURATE, AND DELIVERS A FALSE ALARM PERHAPS 95% OF THE TIME. 3) THERE SHOULD BE AN ENTRY IN THE PLTS OPERATING MANUAL NOT TO ATTEMPT A SECOND START IF THERE HAS BEEN AN EXCEEDENCE. WE ACCOMPLISHED THE HUNG START CHKLIST FOR THE MD88 AND THEN WERE TAKEN TO THE MANUAL ABORTED START CHKLIST. NOWHERE IS THERE A WARNING NOT TO ATTEMPT ANOTHER START IF ENG LIMITATIONS WERE EXCEEDED. SUCH A WARNING DOES EXISTS IN THE AUTO-ABORTED CHKLIST FOR THE MD90. 4) I OBVIOUSLY RECEIVED SOME BAD INFO FROM THE RADIO OPERATOR ON MAINT FREQ. WHOEVER MANS THIS POS SHOULD BE A QUALIFIED MECH AND NOT JUST AN 'OPERATOR,' AS I NOW SUSPECT HE WAS. 5) I SHOULD HAVE ENTERED THE 'MECHS' INITIALS, AUTH ANDTIME OF CONTACT, PER COMPANY PROCS TO VALIDATE THE COMS WE HAD WITH MAINT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.