Narrative:

19 seat air carrier with 2 crew and 10 passenger was cruising en route to ft lauderdale international airport at 16500 ft on a DVFR flight plan with visibility over 10 mi. We were monitoring ZMA but not communicating with controller. Flight was smooth. About 60 mi before penetrating the ADIZ, we picked up a code of XXXX from miami flight service for customs identify as is routine procedure. About 40 mi from penetration, while still in bahamian airspace, our TCASII showed no other traffic in our area. Then the TCASII sounded a traffic alert and showed a target in our immediate vicinity and at our altitude. The first officer was PF. He reacted with a violent pull-up that caused the passenger to become very distressed. The TCASII target stayed with us. I instructed the first officer to level the aircraft. I then called the center controller to confirm my suspicions that the target was a united states customs service aircraft on an intercept. Against ATC policy, the controller verified that the target was a customs aircraft. Knowing that customs monitors the frequency, I asked him to back off or I would have dispatch contact all the local media to meet us upon landing. The aircraft departed. This situation is similar to the 4 near-misses that grounded the military in jan 1997. Other commuter acrs operating to the islands have had the same situation. Private pilots have been scared to the point of needing medical assistance for their passenger. The controllers hate these intercept operations because there is no coordination to prevent a mid-air collision. Controllers are not fond of the bells and alarms that these operations set off. These distractions impinge on safety. (Customs routinely cruises their citation jets at 400 KTS low level.) prevention of these sits will not happen until customs is held accountable for them. Because customs aircraft are public service, the FAA is extremely limited in its recourse. Rule changes are needed to make customs adhere to solutions. When intercepting acrs equipped with TCASII, customs should turn off their xponders when target is acquired visually. Customs does not need to be 10 ft from target to read the 12 inch high registration numbers that are required. (Additionally, our aircraft have the airline's name in 12 inch letters on both sides, visible from 1/4 mi.) better coordination with ATC would ease the controller's tensions. A recourse for the FAA to bring enforcement action against the customs service pilots would bring immediate cooperation from this group of 'cowboys with taxpayer toys.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC BTWN A FAIRCHILD SWEARINGEN SA227AC SCHEDULED ACR AND A CESSNA CITATION OPERATED BY THE GOV ON AN INTERCEPT MANEUVER TO RPTR. RPTR TOOK EVASIVE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII RA WHICH ALARMED THE PAX. RPTR ADVISED ARTCC THAT HE WAS GOING TO BRING 'MEDIA' PUBLIC ATTN TO THIS MATTER IF THE TCASII INTRUDER DID NOT 'BACK OFF!' IT DID!

Narrative: 19 SEAT ACR WITH 2 CREW AND 10 PAX WAS CRUISING ENRTE TO FT LAUDERDALE INTL ARPT AT 16500 FT ON A DVFR FLT PLAN WITH VISIBILITY OVER 10 MI. WE WERE MONITORING ZMA BUT NOT COMMUNICATING WITH CTLR. FLT WAS SMOOTH. ABOUT 60 MI BEFORE PENETRATING THE ADIZ, WE PICKED UP A CODE OF XXXX FROM MIAMI FLT SVC FOR CUSTOMS IDENT AS IS ROUTINE PROC. ABOUT 40 MI FROM PENETRATION, WHILE STILL IN BAHAMIAN AIRSPACE, OUR TCASII SHOWED NO OTHER TFC IN OUR AREA. THEN THE TCASII SOUNDED A TFC ALERT AND SHOWED A TARGET IN OUR IMMEDIATE VICINITY AND AT OUR ALT. THE FO WAS PF. HE REACTED WITH A VIOLENT PULL-UP THAT CAUSED THE PAX TO BECOME VERY DISTRESSED. THE TCASII TARGET STAYED WITH US. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO LEVEL THE ACFT. I THEN CALLED THE CTR CTLR TO CONFIRM MY SUSPICIONS THAT THE TARGET WAS A UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SVC ACFT ON AN INTERCEPT. AGAINST ATC POLICY, THE CTLR VERIFIED THAT THE TARGET WAS A CUSTOMS ACFT. KNOWING THAT CUSTOMS MONITORS THE FREQ, I ASKED HIM TO BACK OFF OR I WOULD HAVE DISPATCH CONTACT ALL THE LCL MEDIA TO MEET US UPON LNDG. THE ACFT DEPARTED. THIS SIT IS SIMILAR TO THE 4 NEAR-MISSES THAT GROUNDED THE MIL IN JAN 1997. OTHER COMMUTER ACRS OPERATING TO THE ISLANDS HAVE HAD THE SAME SIT. PVT PLTS HAVE BEEN SCARED TO THE POINT OF NEEDING MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THEIR PAX. THE CTLRS HATE THESE INTERCEPT OPS BECAUSE THERE IS NO COORD TO PREVENT A MID-AIR COLLISION. CTLRS ARE NOT FOND OF THE BELLS AND ALARMS THAT THESE OPS SET OFF. THESE DISTRACTIONS IMPINGE ON SAFETY. (CUSTOMS ROUTINELY CRUISES THEIR CITATION JETS AT 400 KTS LOW LEVEL.) PREVENTION OF THESE SITS WILL NOT HAPPEN UNTIL CUSTOMS IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEM. BECAUSE CUSTOMS ACFT ARE PUBLIC SVC, THE FAA IS EXTREMELY LIMITED IN ITS RECOURSE. RULE CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO MAKE CUSTOMS ADHERE TO SOLUTIONS. WHEN INTERCEPTING ACRS EQUIPPED WITH TCASII, CUSTOMS SHOULD TURN OFF THEIR XPONDERS WHEN TARGET IS ACQUIRED VISUALLY. CUSTOMS DOES NOT NEED TO BE 10 FT FROM TARGET TO READ THE 12 INCH HIGH REGISTRATION NUMBERS THAT ARE REQUIRED. (ADDITIONALLY, OUR ACFT HAVE THE AIRLINE'S NAME IN 12 INCH LETTERS ON BOTH SIDES, VISIBLE FROM 1/4 MI.) BETTER COORD WITH ATC WOULD EASE THE CTLR'S TENSIONS. A RECOURSE FOR THE FAA TO BRING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST THE CUSTOMS SVC PLTS WOULD BRING IMMEDIATE COOPERATION FROM THIS GROUP OF 'COWBOYS WITH TAXPAYER TOYS.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.