Narrative:

The crew of CL601 was cleared for takeoff from sfo. The takeoff was aborted when the aircraft failed to positively respond to control input. The exterior preflight and walkaround of the aircraft was completed with no abnormalities noted. All checklist items were accomplished per the pilot checklist with no abnormalities noted. All control response during preflight appeared normal. Takeoff numbers were computed based on information provided by the sfo ATIS. Those numbers were based on a fuel load of 16500 pounds, no passenger, performance takeoff confign, dry runway conditions. Trim was set to the high side of the takeoff position per the aircraft operations manual. Power was smoothly applied and positively brought up to 89.2%. Spool up time appeared normal and without incident. Aircraft acceleration was normal and without incident. The first officer called 'rotate.' the yoke was moved rearward in a smooth, positive manner with only minor response from the aircraft. With the yoke in the full aft travel position, the aircraft remained on the runway with no further response. With 'serious question of the capability of the aircraft to sustain flight,' the takeoff was aborted. The abort was accomplished in accordance with standard practice manual. The captain called the abort, applied maximum braking, deployed full reversers and the first officer deployed the ground spoilers. Stopping was accomplished without incident, the aircraft stopped so as to require power to taxi up to the next available turnoff. The runway was cleared without incident or requiring any delay of sfo's traffic. All takeoff numbers were rechked and confirmed to be correct and in compliance with normal procedures. While the aircraft was parked, and not under motion at any time, the fuse plugs melted resulting in flat tires. Inspection by the maintenance staff indicated no further damage. Prior to further flight, the aircraft was inspected and released by base maintenance. On the second takeoff from sfo, the aircraft again required full travel to the rear stops control in order for the airplane to become airborne. Immediately after takeoff, full forward trim down, 'stiff arm,' was required to get the nose down. This was the second incident of this type with this aircraft. The first occurred on a maximum weight departure from washington national airport bound for overseas. Having frown many challengers, this airplane seems to require a great deal of nose down trim work after takeoff, more so than most CL601-3A's. This has been noted since july/95. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter has been an instructor pilot on the challenger for several yrs and has flown it worldwide. His current first officer is new to the aircraft and jet aviation causing the reporter to continuously be an instructor. The control problem was in the equipping of the aircraft. After the sfo incident, it was weighed in at 1300 pounds over the basic operating weight. Equipment additions were built up tires, jacks, a complete set of commercial aeronautical charts, etc. Galley dishes were found to be 200 pounds heavier than estimated. This list has been pared down and the aircraft realistically weighed with crew in position with their luggage and a minimum amount of equipment and spares that the flight crew can easily use. The reporter states that the only fault that he can find with the aircraft is the elevator trim indicating system. This has several ranges that have been confusing to the reporter and several other operators.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MDT CAPT HAD HIS TKOF ABORTED AS HE COULD NOT LIFT THE NOSE AT VR.

Narrative: THE CREW OF CL601 WAS CLRED FOR TKOF FROM SFO. THE TKOF WAS ABORTED WHEN THE ACFT FAILED TO POSITIVELY RESPOND TO CTL INPUT. THE EXTERIOR PREFLT AND WALKAROUND OF THE ACFT WAS COMPLETED WITH NO ABNORMALITIES NOTED. ALL CHKLIST ITEMS WERE ACCOMPLISHED PER THE PLT CHKLIST WITH NO ABNORMALITIES NOTED. ALL CTL RESPONSE DURING PREFLT APPEARED NORMAL. TKOF NUMBERS WERE COMPUTED BASED ON INFO PROVIDED BY THE SFO ATIS. THOSE NUMBERS WERE BASED ON A FUEL LOAD OF 16500 LBS, NO PAX, PERFORMANCE TKOF CONFIGN, DRY RWY CONDITIONS. TRIM WAS SET TO THE HIGH SIDE OF THE TKOF POS PER THE ACFT OPS MANUAL. PWR WAS SMOOTHLY APPLIED AND POSITIVELY BROUGHT UP TO 89.2%. SPOOL UP TIME APPEARED NORMAL AND WITHOUT INCIDENT. ACFT ACCELERATION WAS NORMAL AND WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE FO CALLED 'ROTATE.' THE YOKE WAS MOVED REARWARD IN A SMOOTH, POSITIVE MANNER WITH ONLY MINOR RESPONSE FROM THE ACFT. WITH THE YOKE IN THE FULL AFT TRAVEL POS, THE ACFT REMAINED ON THE RWY WITH NO FURTHER RESPONSE. WITH 'SERIOUS QUESTION OF THE CAPABILITY OF THE ACFT TO SUSTAIN FLT,' THE TKOF WAS ABORTED. THE ABORT WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD PRACTICE MANUAL. THE CAPT CALLED THE ABORT, APPLIED MAX BRAKING, DEPLOYED FULL REVERSERS AND THE FO DEPLOYED THE GND SPOILERS. STOPPING WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT INCIDENT, THE ACFT STOPPED SO AS TO REQUIRE PWR TO TAXI UP TO THE NEXT AVAILABLE TURNOFF. THE RWY WAS CLRED WITHOUT INCIDENT OR REQUIRING ANY DELAY OF SFO'S TFC. ALL TKOF NUMBERS WERE RECHKED AND CONFIRMED TO BE CORRECT AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH NORMAL PROCS. WHILE THE ACFT WAS PARKED, AND NOT UNDER MOTION AT ANY TIME, THE FUSE PLUGS MELTED RESULTING IN FLAT TIRES. INSPECTION BY THE MAINT STAFF INDICATED NO FURTHER DAMAGE. PRIOR TO FURTHER FLT, THE ACFT WAS INSPECTED AND RELEASED BY BASE MAINT. ON THE SECOND TKOF FROM SFO, THE ACFT AGAIN REQUIRED FULL TRAVEL TO THE REAR STOPS CTL IN ORDER FOR THE AIRPLANE TO BECOME AIRBORNE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF, FULL FORWARD TRIM DOWN, 'STIFF ARM,' WAS REQUIRED TO GET THE NOSE DOWN. THIS WAS THE SECOND INCIDENT OF THIS TYPE WITH THIS ACFT. THE FIRST OCCURRED ON A MAX WT DEP FROM WASHINGTON NATIONAL ARPT BOUND FOR OVERSEAS. HAVING FROWN MANY CHALLENGERS, THIS AIRPLANE SEEMS TO REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF NOSE DOWN TRIM WORK AFTER TKOF, MORE SO THAN MOST CL601-3A'S. THIS HAS BEEN NOTED SINCE JULY/95. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR HAS BEEN AN INSTRUCTOR PLT ON THE CHALLENGER FOR SEVERAL YRS AND HAS FLOWN IT WORLDWIDE. HIS CURRENT FO IS NEW TO THE ACFT AND JET AVIATION CAUSING THE RPTR TO CONTINUOUSLY BE AN INSTRUCTOR. THE CTL PROB WAS IN THE EQUIPPING OF THE ACFT. AFTER THE SFO INCIDENT, IT WAS WEIGHED IN AT 1300 LBS OVER THE BASIC OPERATING WT. EQUIP ADDITIONS WERE BUILT UP TIRES, JACKS, A COMPLETE SET OF COMMERCIAL AERO CHARTS, ETC. GALLEY DISHES WERE FOUND TO BE 200 LBS HEAVIER THAN ESTIMATED. THIS LIST HAS BEEN PARED DOWN AND THE ACFT REALISTICALLY WEIGHED WITH CREW IN POS WITH THEIR LUGGAGE AND A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF EQUIP AND SPARES THAT THE FLC CAN EASILY USE. THE RPTR STATES THAT THE ONLY FAULT THAT HE CAN FIND WITH THE ACFT IS THE ELEVATOR TRIM INDICATING SYS. THIS HAS SEVERAL RANGES THAT HAVE BEEN CONFUSING TO THE RPTR AND SEVERAL OTHER OPERATORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.