37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 367990 |
Time | |
Date | 199704 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : msp |
State Reference | MN |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air taxi |
Make Model Name | Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 5000 |
ASRS Report | 367990 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 210 flight time total : 2100 |
ASRS Report | 367710 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
The aircraft was loaded with what the crew believed to be 15 bags, while airline management says that there were 16 passenger and 15 bags, thus resulting in an overweight takeoff. The problem was discovered by a ramp person who reported the occurrence to the chief pilot. There is an investigation of the incident, including the crew underway. There was no evasive action of any kind required, the aircraft flew normal for the overweight takeoff (we allegedly were overweight by 50 pounds) and we landed within normal landing weight. Factors that may have contributed to the situation are the following: 1) the ramp agent may have counted the wrong number of passenger, or may have written down the wrong number on the cargo load sheet as compared to the number of ticket stubs the ticket counter had. 2) the crew assumed that the jump seater was in the passenger count, and not listed as a jump seater on the load report because of the fact that he was in plain clothes, and not otherwise identifiable as a jump seater, thus when the ramp person went through the aircraft to count the passenger, the ramp agent counted the jump seater as a regular passenger and listed him as such on the cargo load report, making the crew think that he was already in the passenger count, which according to the company management was not the case. 3) if the company had procedures in which a crew member verified the number of passenger prior to block out and taxi, this would not have happened. Right now the pilots of aircraft with no flight attendant have to take the word of some under paid, over worked, kid, who for the most part could really care less about the proper loading of an aircraft. The bottom line about this whole incident is that the crew believed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that they were operating the flight safely, and within all aircraft limitations and parameters, even though the company says otherwise, and signs point to the fact that there may have been more than the reported 15 passenger. I guess that no one will ever for sure know until procedures are implemented that require the crew to in some way verify what has been reported to them on the cargo load report.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: BE3100 MANIFEST SHOWED 15 PAX AND 15 BAGS. FLC ASSUMED THE PAX COUNT INCLUDED THE JUMP SEAT RIDER. CHIEF PLT LATER ADVISED THE FLT HAD DEPARTED MSP OVER GROSS ACCOUNT 16 PAX ON BOARD.
Narrative: THE ACFT WAS LOADED WITH WHAT THE CREW BELIEVED TO BE 15 BAGS, WHILE AIRLINE MGMNT SAYS THAT THERE WERE 16 PAX AND 15 BAGS, THUS RESULTING IN AN OVERWT TKOF. THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED BY A RAMP PERSON WHO RPTED THE OCCURRENCE TO THE CHIEF PLT. THERE IS AN INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT, INCLUDING THE CREW UNDERWAY. THERE WAS NO EVASIVE ACTION OF ANY KIND REQUIRED, THE ACFT FLEW NORMAL FOR THE OVERWT TKOF (WE ALLEGEDLY WERE OVERWT BY 50 LBS) AND WE LANDED WITHIN NORMAL LNDG WT. FACTORS THAT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SIT ARE THE FOLLOWING: 1) THE RAMP AGENT MAY HAVE COUNTED THE WRONG NUMBER OF PAX, OR MAY HAVE WRITTEN DOWN THE WRONG NUMBER ON THE CARGO LOAD SHEET AS COMPARED TO THE NUMBER OF TICKET STUBS THE TICKET COUNTER HAD. 2) THE CREW ASSUMED THAT THE JUMP SEATER WAS IN THE PAX COUNT, AND NOT LISTED AS A JUMP SEATER ON THE LOAD RPT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT HE WAS IN PLAIN CLOTHES, AND NOT OTHERWISE IDENTIFIABLE AS A JUMP SEATER, THUS WHEN THE RAMP PERSON WENT THROUGH THE ACFT TO COUNT THE PAX, THE RAMP AGENT COUNTED THE JUMP SEATER AS A REGULAR PAX AND LISTED HIM AS SUCH ON THE CARGO LOAD RPT, MAKING THE CREW THINK THAT HE WAS ALREADY IN THE PAX COUNT, WHICH ACCORDING TO THE COMPANY MGMNT WAS NOT THE CASE. 3) IF THE COMPANY HAD PROCS IN WHICH A CREW MEMBER VERIFIED THE NUMBER OF PAX PRIOR TO BLOCK OUT AND TAXI, THIS WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. RIGHT NOW THE PLTS OF ACFT WITH NO FLT ATTENDANT HAVE TO TAKE THE WORD OF SOME UNDER PAID, OVER WORKED, KID, WHO FOR THE MOST PART COULD REALLY CARE LESS ABOUT THE PROPER LOADING OF AN ACFT. THE BOTTOM LINE ABOUT THIS WHOLE INCIDENT IS THAT THE CREW BELIEVED, BEYOND A SHADOW OF A DOUBT, THAT THEY WERE OPERATING THE FLT SAFELY, AND WITHIN ALL ACFT LIMITATIONS AND PARAMETERS, EVEN THOUGH THE COMPANY SAYS OTHERWISE, AND SIGNS POINT TO THE FACT THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN MORE THAN THE RPTED 15 PAX. I GUESS THAT NO ONE WILL EVER FOR SURE KNOW UNTIL PROCS ARE IMPLEMENTED THAT REQUIRE THE CREW TO IN SOME WAY VERIFY WHAT HAS BEEN RPTED TO THEM ON THE CARGO LOAD RPT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.