Narrative:

Approach backed up by back course approach for runway 17 at azo. On approximately a 3 mi final for runway 17, call was made for 'flaps 40 degrees, before landing check.' when flaps were selected from 30 degrees to 40 degrees, the flaps failed to respond and remained at 30 degrees. We were also shown a 'flaps fail' message on the EFIS warning display. There was no flap asymmetry and the aircraft was under normal control. At this point we elected to abandon the landing to run the abnormal checklist to try to sort the problem out. After completing the checklist, it was apparent that the flaps were going to stay at 30 degrees. We were flying a VFR traffic pattern with the tower, did the checklists, assured ourselves we had sufficient runway and then made a safe, uneventful landing. After deplaning the passenger, we pwred the aircraft down. After a few mins, we repwred and started the APU. We turned on all hydraulic pumps. At this time we operated the flaps several times and were unable to duplicate. No failure message, no defects noted. As there was no failure/defect at that time, no maintenance write-up was made. These types of problems (temporary) seem to happen with computers on advanced/automated aircraft quite frequently. Reset/on/off seems to clear nuisance problems. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: although the aircraft could have landed easily with 30 degrees of flap, the reporter stated they made a go around to do the checklist for flap failure to extend. They completed the abnormal checklist and were still unable to get the flaps to move. They did land using an extra 8 KTS of speed on final approach. After all passenger were deplaned, they took all electrical power off the aircraft, let the aircraft situation unpwred for a few mins, then reapplied electrical power. When electrical power was applied, the flaps worked normally. Reporter states that many flcs carry checklists around with them, telling what circuit breakers to pull in order to turn off and reapply electrical power so an electrical component would begin to respond to control inputs. This is one of the characteristics of aircraft with large demand for electricity. The flight crew never made any logbook write-up regarding the immovable flaps, as they had fixed the aircraft with the electrical shutdown and repwr. Aircraft was a cl-65.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ON APCH INTO AZO, A CL65, FLAPS WILL NOT EXTEND BEYOND THE 30 DEG SETTING.

Narrative: APCH BACKED UP BY BACK COURSE APCH FOR RWY 17 AT AZO. ON APPROX A 3 MI FINAL FOR RWY 17, CALL WAS MADE FOR 'FLAPS 40 DEGS, BEFORE LNDG CHK.' WHEN FLAPS WERE SELECTED FROM 30 DEGS TO 40 DEGS, THE FLAPS FAILED TO RESPOND AND REMAINED AT 30 DEGS. WE WERE ALSO SHOWN A 'FLAPS FAIL' MESSAGE ON THE EFIS WARNING DISPLAY. THERE WAS NO FLAP ASYMMETRY AND THE ACFT WAS UNDER NORMAL CTL. AT THIS POINT WE ELECTED TO ABANDON THE LNDG TO RUN THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST TO TRY TO SORT THE PROB OUT. AFTER COMPLETING THE CHKLIST, IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE FLAPS WERE GOING TO STAY AT 30 DEGS. WE WERE FLYING A VFR TFC PATTERN WITH THE TWR, DID THE CHKLISTS, ASSURED OURSELVES WE HAD SUFFICIENT RWY AND THEN MADE A SAFE, UNEVENTFUL LNDG. AFTER DEPLANING THE PAX, WE PWRED THE ACFT DOWN. AFTER A FEW MINS, WE REPWRED AND STARTED THE APU. WE TURNED ON ALL HYD PUMPS. AT THIS TIME WE OPERATED THE FLAPS SEVERAL TIMES AND WERE UNABLE TO DUPLICATE. NO FAILURE MESSAGE, NO DEFECTS NOTED. AS THERE WAS NO FAILURE/DEFECT AT THAT TIME, NO MAINT WRITE-UP WAS MADE. THESE TYPES OF PROBS (TEMPORARY) SEEM TO HAPPEN WITH COMPUTERS ON ADVANCED/AUTOMATED ACFT QUITE FREQUENTLY. RESET/ON/OFF SEEMS TO CLR NUISANCE PROBS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ALTHOUGH THE ACFT COULD HAVE LANDED EASILY WITH 30 DEGS OF FLAP, THE RPTR STATED THEY MADE A GAR TO DO THE CHKLIST FOR FLAP FAILURE TO EXTEND. THEY COMPLETED THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST AND WERE STILL UNABLE TO GET THE FLAPS TO MOVE. THEY DID LAND USING AN EXTRA 8 KTS OF SPD ON FINAL APCH. AFTER ALL PAX WERE DEPLANED, THEY TOOK ALL ELECTRICAL PWR OFF THE ACFT, LET THE ACFT SIT UNPWRED FOR A FEW MINS, THEN REAPPLIED ELECTRICAL PWR. WHEN ELECTRICAL PWR WAS APPLIED, THE FLAPS WORKED NORMALLY. RPTR STATES THAT MANY FLCS CARRY CHKLISTS AROUND WITH THEM, TELLING WHAT CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO PULL IN ORDER TO TURN OFF AND REAPPLY ELECTRICAL PWR SO AN ELECTRICAL COMPONENT WOULD BEGIN TO RESPOND TO CTL INPUTS. THIS IS ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACFT WITH LARGE DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY. THE FLC NEVER MADE ANY LOGBOOK WRITE-UP REGARDING THE IMMOVABLE FLAPS, AS THEY HAD FIXED THE ACFT WITH THE ELECTRICAL SHUTDOWN AND REPWR. ACFT WAS A CL-65.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.