Narrative:

The flight was a L10-500 returning to atl from a european departure city. The crew had been onboard the aircraft for slightly under 12 hours with no duty break or crew rest. The flight approached atl from the northeast on the macey arrival. The first officer was flying. We anticipated and the first officer briefed an approach for runway 26R, which is the normal runway for airplanes on that STAR. After we left the last fix on the arrival and were being vectored for the approach, the controller changed our runway to runway 27L on the south runway complex. The first officer and captain remarked that this was rather unusual and proceeded to change their radios accordingly. The so was diverted taking care of a flight attendant cabin/passenger problem and did not hear the runway change. The approach progressed, and the airplane was proceeded more or less southerly on radar vectors, being given dscnts and headings to provide traffic separation and spacing. As we neared the airport (15 NM, more or less), the controller tried to point out an ATR airplane that was supposed to be our traffic. We did not really have the airplane in visual contact adequately enough to follow him for an approach, which I really don't like to do anyway -- but we did have the airport, which we so stated. Subsequently, the controller gave us a multitude of instructions relating to speed, altitude, heading, and cleared us for a visual approach. We had lost the ATR aircraft in the afternoon haze associated with a spring day and a lowering sun, and were trying to focus on the silhouette of a DC9 which had not been 'called' to us as traffic, but was surely heading for runway 27. By this time the so was in the 'loop' and we were trying to figure out where the ATR was, now the DC9 fitted in the equation, and read checklists, and fly the airplane. As the first officer rolled out of a descending right turn to intercept the localizer, all 3 of us noticed a B737, bigger than life, slightly below us, which had seemingly come out of nowhere. About this time we questioned the controller about the traffic and the controller questioned which runway we were headed for. He then said that we were supposed to be on the north runway complex, and cleared us accordingly. No TCASII advisory or warning ever transpired. Whether the first controller neglected to tell the next controller about the runway assignment -- which I strongly suspect is the case -- or we did not hear a change back to the north runway complex, is mere conjecture. The real culprit here is ATC trying to pack too many visual approachs into too short a time frame, and too many instructions being given to fatigued pilots who have been necessarily strapped to an airplane for a long period of time. I will end on a note that visual approachs following an airplane are not as successful as ATC would have one believe. The controller uses them as an aid to decrease separation, while the hapless pilot -- trying to cooperate -- undertakes to provide separation with no clue as to what the separation really is, or the other aircraft's speed or their rate of closure, all of which is readily available to the controller on his/her radar screen display.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: L1011-500 ACFT ON VISUAL APCH TO ATL WAS INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW TFC WHICH THEY COULDN'T FIND. AFTER FLC SAW ANOTHER ACFT VERY CLOSE THE APCH CTLR INTERVENED AND TOLD THEM THEY WERE SUPPOSE TO BE LNDG ON THE N COMPLEX RWY.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS A L10-500 RETURNING TO ATL FROM A EUROPEAN DEP CITY. THE CREW HAD BEEN ONBOARD THE ACFT FOR SLIGHTLY UNDER 12 HRS WITH NO DUTY BREAK OR CREW REST. THE FLT APCHED ATL FROM THE NE ON THE MACEY ARR. THE FO WAS FLYING. WE ANTICIPATED AND THE FO BRIEFED AN APCH FOR RWY 26R, WHICH IS THE NORMAL RWY FOR AIRPLANES ON THAT STAR. AFTER WE LEFT THE LAST FIX ON THE ARR AND WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE APCH, THE CTLR CHANGED OUR RWY TO RWY 27L ON THE S RWY COMPLEX. THE FO AND CAPT REMARKED THAT THIS WAS RATHER UNUSUAL AND PROCEEDED TO CHANGE THEIR RADIOS ACCORDINGLY. THE SO WAS DIVERTED TAKING CARE OF A FLT ATTENDANT CABIN/PAX PROB AND DID NOT HEAR THE RWY CHANGE. THE APCH PROGRESSED, AND THE AIRPLANE WAS PROCEEDED MORE OR LESS SOUTHERLY ON RADAR VECTORS, BEING GIVEN DSCNTS AND HEADINGS TO PROVIDE TFC SEPARATION AND SPACING. AS WE NEARED THE ARPT (15 NM, MORE OR LESS), THE CTLR TRIED TO POINT OUT AN ATR AIRPLANE THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE OUR TFC. WE DID NOT REALLY HAVE THE AIRPLANE IN VISUAL CONTACT ADEQUATELY ENOUGH TO FOLLOW HIM FOR AN APCH, WHICH I REALLY DON'T LIKE TO DO ANYWAY -- BUT WE DID HAVE THE ARPT, WHICH WE SO STATED. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE CTLR GAVE US A MULTITUDE OF INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO SPD, ALT, HEADING, AND CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH. WE HAD LOST THE ATR ACFT IN THE AFTERNOON HAZE ASSOCIATED WITH A SPRING DAY AND A LOWERING SUN, AND WERE TRYING TO FOCUS ON THE SILHOUETTE OF A DC9 WHICH HAD NOT BEEN 'CALLED' TO US AS TFC, BUT WAS SURELY HEADING FOR RWY 27. BY THIS TIME THE SO WAS IN THE 'LOOP' AND WE WERE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHERE THE ATR WAS, NOW THE DC9 FITTED IN THE EQUATION, AND READ CHKLISTS, AND FLY THE AIRPLANE. AS THE FO ROLLED OUT OF A DSNDING R TURN TO INTERCEPT THE LOC, ALL 3 OF US NOTICED A B737, BIGGER THAN LIFE, SLIGHTLY BELOW US, WHICH HAD SEEMINGLY COME OUT OF NOWHERE. ABOUT THIS TIME WE QUESTIONED THE CTLR ABOUT THE TFC AND THE CTLR QUESTIONED WHICH RWY WE WERE HEADED FOR. HE THEN SAID THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE ON THE N RWY COMPLEX, AND CLRED US ACCORDINGLY. NO TCASII ADVISORY OR WARNING EVER TRANSPIRED. WHETHER THE FIRST CTLR NEGLECTED TO TELL THE NEXT CTLR ABOUT THE RWY ASSIGNMENT -- WHICH I STRONGLY SUSPECT IS THE CASE -- OR WE DID NOT HEAR A CHANGE BACK TO THE N RWY COMPLEX, IS MERE CONJECTURE. THE REAL CULPRIT HERE IS ATC TRYING TO PACK TOO MANY VISUAL APCHS INTO TOO SHORT A TIME FRAME, AND TOO MANY INSTRUCTIONS BEING GIVEN TO FATIGUED PLTS WHO HAVE BEEN NECESSARILY STRAPPED TO AN AIRPLANE FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. I WILL END ON A NOTE THAT VISUAL APCHS FOLLOWING AN AIRPLANE ARE NOT AS SUCCESSFUL AS ATC WOULD HAVE ONE BELIEVE. THE CTLR USES THEM AS AN AID TO DECREASE SEPARATION, WHILE THE HAPLESS PLT -- TRYING TO COOPERATE -- UNDERTAKES TO PROVIDE SEPARATION WITH NO CLUE AS TO WHAT THE SEPARATION REALLY IS, OR THE OTHER ACFT'S SPD OR THEIR RATE OF CLOSURE, ALL OF WHICH IS READILY AVAILABLE TO THE CTLR ON HIS/HER RADAR SCREEN DISPLAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.