Narrative:

Flight dfw to lax jul/xa/97, B757. Received OK333 airbill number #1 prior to departure indicating 5 pounds of dry ice in the aft cargo compartment. The aft cargo door was still open after the forward entry door was closed. The aft cargo door was closed at AB36 CDT and the flight departed. The delay message for the flight is coded 5 mins for 46 line maintenance B opn, with a narrative of service. A radio closeout, revision 00, was received via ACARS at AB45 CDT. It indicated 2 restr articles in the aft cargo compartment. Dfw closeout was immediately contacted to determine the discrepancy between the closeout restr article count of 2 and the fact that we had only received 1 OK333. We were told that it would take some time to contact cargo. We were subsequently told that cargo had made a typographical mistake and typed 2 where they intended to type 1. We received an updated radio closeout, revision 01, at AB58 CDT, which showed 1 restr article in the aft cargo compartment. We took off shortly thereafter. On arrival lax, I witnessed 3 boxes unloaded from the aft cargo compartment that had hazmat labels on them. All 3 boxes were addressed to xyz labs. 2 of the 3 boxes had copies of OK333S attached to them. The copies of the OK333 attached to 1 of the boxes matched the OK333 that I had received prior to departure from dfw. I never received an OK333 that matched the copies of the OK333 that was attached to the other box that had copies of an OK333 attached to it. The OK333 attached to the second box only had 2 signatures on it. There was no signature in the 'loaded by' box. The airbill number for the second box was airbill #2. Employee X and 3 other cargo handlers at lax, witnessed the offloading of the 3 boxes with hazmat labels on them. I contacted employee Y concerning the situation. She informed me that her records showed that airbill #2 was on our flight in addition to airbill #1. I subsequently contacted employee Z, the agent in dfw. He recalled that there was discussion concerning our flight and that we were told that the error in the closeout was typographical in nature. In light of the now very obvious serious consequences of mishandling of hazmat, it is reprehensible that the actual hazmat aboard our aircraft was misrepresented to us despite our efforts to attain accurate information. This situation represents a clear violation of the 49 crash fire rescue equipment transportation regulations, chapter I, subchapter C, part 175, section 175.33.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 CREW RECEIVES A HAZMAT LOADING FORM SHOWING ONE RESTR ARTICLE ON BOARD. A LATER CLOSEOUT RPT WAS RECEIVED REGARDING 2 RESTR ARTICLES. CREW MADE AN INQUIRY BUT WERE ASSURED THAT IT WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR AND ONLY 1 ARTICLE WAS ON BOARD. AT DEST ARPT IT WAS FOUND THAT THERE HAD BEEN 3 BOXES LOADED BUT ONLY 1 ARTICLE RPTED TO CREW.

Narrative: FLT DFW TO LAX JUL/XA/97, B757. RECEIVED OK333 AIRBILL NUMBER #1 PRIOR TO DEP INDICATING 5 LBS OF DRY ICE IN THE AFT CARGO COMPARTMENT. THE AFT CARGO DOOR WAS STILL OPEN AFTER THE FORWARD ENTRY DOOR WAS CLOSED. THE AFT CARGO DOOR WAS CLOSED AT AB36 CDT AND THE FLT DEPARTED. THE DELAY MESSAGE FOR THE FLT IS CODED 5 MINS FOR 46 LINE MAINT B OPN, WITH A NARRATIVE OF SVC. A RADIO CLOSEOUT, REVISION 00, WAS RECEIVED VIA ACARS AT AB45 CDT. IT INDICATED 2 RESTR ARTICLES IN THE AFT CARGO COMPARTMENT. DFW CLOSEOUT WAS IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED TO DETERMINE THE DISCREPANCY BTWN THE CLOSEOUT RESTR ARTICLE COUNT OF 2 AND THE FACT THAT WE HAD ONLY RECEIVED 1 OK333. WE WERE TOLD THAT IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO CONTACT CARGO. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THAT CARGO HAD MADE A TYPOGRAPHICAL MISTAKE AND TYPED 2 WHERE THEY INTENDED TO TYPE 1. WE RECEIVED AN UPDATED RADIO CLOSEOUT, REVISION 01, AT AB58 CDT, WHICH SHOWED 1 RESTR ARTICLE IN THE AFT CARGO COMPARTMENT. WE TOOK OFF SHORTLY THEREAFTER. ON ARR LAX, I WITNESSED 3 BOXES UNLOADED FROM THE AFT CARGO COMPARTMENT THAT HAD HAZMAT LABELS ON THEM. ALL 3 BOXES WERE ADDRESSED TO XYZ LABS. 2 OF THE 3 BOXES HAD COPIES OF OK333S ATTACHED TO THEM. THE COPIES OF THE OK333 ATTACHED TO 1 OF THE BOXES MATCHED THE OK333 THAT I HAD RECEIVED PRIOR TO DEP FROM DFW. I NEVER RECEIVED AN OK333 THAT MATCHED THE COPIES OF THE OK333 THAT WAS ATTACHED TO THE OTHER BOX THAT HAD COPIES OF AN OK333 ATTACHED TO IT. THE OK333 ATTACHED TO THE SECOND BOX ONLY HAD 2 SIGNATURES ON IT. THERE WAS NO SIGNATURE IN THE 'LOADED BY' BOX. THE AIRBILL NUMBER FOR THE SECOND BOX WAS AIRBILL #2. EMPLOYEE X AND 3 OTHER CARGO HANDLERS AT LAX, WITNESSED THE OFFLOADING OF THE 3 BOXES WITH HAZMAT LABELS ON THEM. I CONTACTED EMPLOYEE Y CONCERNING THE SIT. SHE INFORMED ME THAT HER RECORDS SHOWED THAT AIRBILL #2 WAS ON OUR FLT IN ADDITION TO AIRBILL #1. I SUBSEQUENTLY CONTACTED EMPLOYEE Z, THE AGENT IN DFW. HE RECALLED THAT THERE WAS DISCUSSION CONCERNING OUR FLT AND THAT WE WERE TOLD THAT THE ERROR IN THE CLOSEOUT WAS TYPOGRAPHICAL IN NATURE. IN LIGHT OF THE NOW VERY OBVIOUS SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF MISHANDLING OF HAZMAT, IT IS REPREHENSIBLE THAT THE ACTUAL HAZMAT ABOARD OUR ACFT WAS MISREPRESENTED TO US DESPITE OUR EFFORTS TO ATTAIN ACCURATE INFO. THIS SIT REPRESENTS A CLR VIOLATION OF THE 49 CFR TRANSPORTATION REGS, CHAPTER I, SUBCHAPTER C, PART 175, SECTION 175.33.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.