Narrative:

Flight from bos to msp. Company procedures: captain, first officer start and monitor engines, so observes. First officer monitors and talks to ground control, captain monitors and talks to pushback crew. At pushback, instructed first officer to get clearance. Called bos ground, cleared to push -- push starts. Ground calls: 'hold push.' first officer informs captain -- captain informs tug driver. Then, within 15 seconds, ground calls: 'continue push.' captain informs tug driver. During this process, first engine being started. Pushback finished, tug driver informs captain: 'set brakes.' captain complies, informs tug: 'brakes set, cleared to disconnect.' second engine in process of being started and monitored by all 3 crew members. Ground calls: 'continue push to taxiway left.' first officer informs captain, captain has already released push crew. Captain asks: 'why?' -- for first officer to ask ground. So sees second engine exceeding start temperature, but since captain has hand on start lever, assumes captain (and first officer) monitoring. First officer asks ground 'why?' ground says: 'txwys closed -- on NOTAMS.' but closures not on NOTAMS -- but instead on ATIS. Captain upset he did not know (first officer wrote down ATIS) and so stated. First officer upset because he felt responsible. Captain asked first officer to get phone number to call. Taxi instructions being given. First officer asks for phone number -- ground never supplies. On taxi, captain becomes fixated on getting phone number. First officer directed by ground to contact tower. Third engine being started. Before even calling tower, taxi instructions given by tower to cross approach end of active runway. Captain hears clearance, first officer does not. Captain still muttering about phone number, and asks first officer to confirm crossing clearance. First officer says no, not cleared but can't check due to chatter on tower frequency. Aircraft has been taxied by captain into critical area and stopped since first officer cannot confirm crossing clearance. Causes aircraft on final to make missed approach. Company procedures require too much interaction. Ground control appeared to blame crew for pushing into closed area -- but following instructions -- captain too concerned about being blamed and violated. Captain made too big an issue of this. Then all crew members started focusing on issue rather than job. Workload so heavy that one more item caused process to disintegrate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF WDB HAS CONFUSION ON PUSHBACK WITH CONTRADICTING INSTRUCTIONS FROM GND WHILE COMPLETING ENG START AND CHKLISTS. ON TAXI THEY TAXI INTO CRITICAL AREA AND FORCE A MISSED APCH.

Narrative: FLT FROM BOS TO MSP. COMPANY PROCS: CAPT, FO START AND MONITOR ENGS, SO OBSERVES. FO MONITORS AND TALKS TO GND CTL, CAPT MONITORS AND TALKS TO PUSHBACK CREW. AT PUSHBACK, INSTRUCTED FO TO GET CLRNC. CALLED BOS GND, CLRED TO PUSH -- PUSH STARTS. GND CALLS: 'HOLD PUSH.' FO INFORMS CAPT -- CAPT INFORMS TUG DRIVER. THEN, WITHIN 15 SECONDS, GND CALLS: 'CONTINUE PUSH.' CAPT INFORMS TUG DRIVER. DURING THIS PROCESS, FIRST ENG BEING STARTED. PUSHBACK FINISHED, TUG DRIVER INFORMS CAPT: 'SET BRAKES.' CAPT COMPLIES, INFORMS TUG: 'BRAKES SET, CLRED TO DISCONNECT.' SECOND ENG IN PROCESS OF BEING STARTED AND MONITORED BY ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS. GND CALLS: 'CONTINUE PUSH TO TXWY L.' FO INFORMS CAPT, CAPT HAS ALREADY RELEASED PUSH CREW. CAPT ASKS: 'WHY?' -- FOR FO TO ASK GND. SO SEES SECOND ENG EXCEEDING START TEMP, BUT SINCE CAPT HAS HAND ON START LEVER, ASSUMES CAPT (AND FO) MONITORING. FO ASKS GND 'WHY?' GND SAYS: 'TXWYS CLOSED -- ON NOTAMS.' BUT CLOSURES NOT ON NOTAMS -- BUT INSTEAD ON ATIS. CAPT UPSET HE DID NOT KNOW (FO WROTE DOWN ATIS) AND SO STATED. FO UPSET BECAUSE HE FELT RESPONSIBLE. CAPT ASKED FO TO GET PHONE NUMBER TO CALL. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS BEING GIVEN. FO ASKS FOR PHONE NUMBER -- GND NEVER SUPPLIES. ON TAXI, CAPT BECOMES FIXATED ON GETTING PHONE NUMBER. FO DIRECTED BY GND TO CONTACT TWR. THIRD ENG BEING STARTED. BEFORE EVEN CALLING TWR, TAXI INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY TWR TO CROSS APCH END OF ACTIVE RWY. CAPT HEARS CLRNC, FO DOES NOT. CAPT STILL MUTTERING ABOUT PHONE NUMBER, AND ASKS FO TO CONFIRM XING CLRNC. FO SAYS NO, NOT CLRED BUT CAN'T CHK DUE TO CHATTER ON TWR FREQ. ACFT HAS BEEN TAXIED BY CAPT INTO CRITICAL AREA AND STOPPED SINCE FO CANNOT CONFIRM XING CLRNC. CAUSES ACFT ON FINAL TO MAKE MISSED APCH. COMPANY PROCS REQUIRE TOO MUCH INTERACTION. GND CTL APPEARED TO BLAME CREW FOR PUSHING INTO CLOSED AREA -- BUT FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS -- CAPT TOO CONCERNED ABOUT BEING BLAMED AND VIOLATED. CAPT MADE TOO BIG AN ISSUE OF THIS. THEN ALL CREW MEMBERS STARTED FOCUSING ON ISSUE RATHER THAN JOB. WORKLOAD SO HVY THAT ONE MORE ITEM CAUSED PROCESS TO DISINTEGRATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.