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Attributes | |
ACN | 376474 |
Time | |
Date | 199708 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : osh |
State Reference | WI |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 1500 agl bound upper : 1500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : osh |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial |
Route In Use | departure other enroute : on vectors |
Flight Plan | None |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial climbout : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | departure other enroute : on vectors |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 50 flight time total : 4200 flight time type : 3000 |
ASRS Report | 376424 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took evasive action |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 0 vertical : 500 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Airport |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation other |
Narrative:
I have flown to this event every year, except one, for at least 25 yrs. The event sponsor and particularly the controllers do a superb job. However, there is one area that has bothered me from a safety standpoint for several yrs. My experience on departure recently refreshed that concern and prompts this report. Standard VFR departure procedures call for monitoring a special departure frequency manned by the flagmen on the runway at point of departure. Planes are guided into position on the r- and l-hand side of the runway and alternatively cleared for takeoff. VFR departure instructions for the main runway in use (runway 27) read 'maintain runway heading until clear of class D airspace, and proceed on course. Do not re-enter class D airspace. Monitor frequency 121.75.' we were cleared for takeoff when the aircraft ahead of us on the right side of the runway rotated. It was slow and a poor climber. By the time we reached the end of the runway we were above him and closing even though our airspeed was below vx. It was not possible to safely fly in trail at his altitude. We moved to the side and kept him in sight. We were well above him as we were about to pass, at which point he made an abrupt 90 degree turn and went underneath us. We were still well within class D airspace. While the above situation did not present a hazard, it is easy to visualize circumstances where safety could be compromised. Potential problems as I see them are these: 1) VFR aircraft do not know and/or abide by departure procedures. The 3 aircraft that departed ahead of me all turned 90 degrees from runway heading well before clearing class D airspace. A) departure instructions are buried in fine print. Departure instructions after the event are not the same as those before. Reference to departures in the handout given to each plane as it lands are in small print, incomplete and misleading (copy of handout enclosed). My interpretation of the departure language for runway 27 in the handout would be to stay below 500 ft AGL until clear of class D airspace, but with the right to proceed in any direction consistent with normal departure procedures. The only difference between departures prior to the event and after the event would be the requirement to monitor 128.75 after the event. Even though the words 'review NOTAM' appear in parenthesis, it doesn't undo the potential danger created by at least 1 logical interpretation of the instructions. B) arriving pilots have a lot of adrenaline flowing and are super careful. They are also carefully monitored and controled from fisk by controllers. Departures are a lot more relaxed. Pilots may or may not remember the details of the NOTAM departure information. They probably don't have the original text available and their notes may be erroneous. C) unless a pilot is absolutely certain of the instructions, he or she is inclined to follow the procedures used by the aircraft ahead. 2) VFR arrs are closely monitored and directed from fisk until landing. On departure there is no monitor or direction, other than for takeoff clearance, that I am aware of. 3) approaching aircraft have many more options available for traffic avoidance in terms of speed, climb/descent capability and visual contact. Departing aircraft are much more limited in climb, have very little room for descent and aircraft climb angle tends to block forward visibility (particularly in a cherokee 6). Add a setting sun over the nose and the problems increase. May I suggest the following: 1) hand out departure information on a separate flyer along with the welcoming bulletin when the pilot lands. The departure flyer should be in easy to read block letters and in high contrast colors. The information on the flyer should be limited to that directly related to aircraft safety. 2) most pilots, unless they are thoroughly familiar with the area, cannot accurately determine the boundaries of class D airspace. However, if a highly visible landmark is used in conjunction with class D airspace an additional margin of safety should be attainable. For example, 'maintain runway heading until crossing the 4 lane highway 1/2 mi west of runway 27, then depart class D airspace on a heading of 230 degrees clockwise through 040 degrees. Do not re-enter class D airspace.' I suspect part of the reason for the present instruction to maintain runway heading is to make it easier for a pilot to know where to look for other aircraft. However, flying in trail produces problems because of the wide discrepancies in aircraft performance. Contemplated advantages of the proposed instructions are as follows: 1) runway heading will be maintained during the most critical part of departure, namely sizing up the performance of the aircraft ahead and determining how best to maintain separation. 2) there is no question as to when runway heading requirements cease. From that point aircraft will diverge, increasing the margin of safety. 3) no turns are made until clear of the immediate airport environs. 4) aircraft density per cubic volume of airspace will be substantially reduced.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PA32 PLT DEPARTED EVENT AND EXPERIENCES A PROB AND A POSSIBLE NMAC WITH THE DEP TFC AHEAD. HAS SUGGESTIONS FOR A BETTER DEP PROC DURING HIGH DENSITY TFC TIMES.
Narrative: I HAVE FLOWN TO THIS EVENT EVERY YEAR, EXCEPT ONE, FOR AT LEAST 25 YRS. THE EVENT SPONSOR AND PARTICULARLY THE CTLRS DO A SUPERB JOB. HOWEVER, THERE IS ONE AREA THAT HAS BOTHERED ME FROM A SAFETY STANDPOINT FOR SEVERAL YRS. MY EXPERIENCE ON DEP RECENTLY REFRESHED THAT CONCERN AND PROMPTS THIS RPT. STANDARD VFR DEP PROCS CALL FOR MONITORING A SPECIAL DEP FREQ MANNED BY THE FLAGMEN ON THE RWY AT POINT OF DEP. PLANES ARE GUIDED INTO POS ON THE R- AND L-HAND SIDE OF THE RWY AND ALTERNATIVELY CLRED FOR TKOF. VFR DEP INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MAIN RWY IN USE (RWY 27) READ 'MAINTAIN RWY HDG UNTIL CLR OF CLASS D AIRSPACE, AND PROCEED ON COURSE. DO NOT RE-ENTER CLASS D AIRSPACE. MONITOR FREQ 121.75.' WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF WHEN THE ACFT AHEAD OF US ON THE R SIDE OF THE RWY ROTATED. IT WAS SLOW AND A POOR CLIMBER. BY THE TIME WE REACHED THE END OF THE RWY WE WERE ABOVE HIM AND CLOSING EVEN THOUGH OUR AIRSPD WAS BELOW VX. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAFELY FLY IN TRAIL AT HIS ALT. WE MOVED TO THE SIDE AND KEPT HIM IN SIGHT. WE WERE WELL ABOVE HIM AS WE WERE ABOUT TO PASS, AT WHICH POINT HE MADE AN ABRUPT 90 DEG TURN AND WENT UNDERNEATH US. WE WERE STILL WELL WITHIN CLASS D AIRSPACE. WHILE THE ABOVE SIT DID NOT PRESENT A HAZARD, IT IS EASY TO VISUALIZE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE SAFETY COULD BE COMPROMISED. POTENTIAL PROBS AS I SEE THEM ARE THESE: 1) VFR ACFT DO NOT KNOW AND/OR ABIDE BY DEP PROCS. THE 3 ACFT THAT DEPARTED AHEAD OF ME ALL TURNED 90 DEGS FROM RWY HDG WELL BEFORE CLRING CLASS D AIRSPACE. A) DEP INSTRUCTIONS ARE BURIED IN FINE PRINT. DEP INSTRUCTIONS AFTER THE EVENT ARE NOT THE SAME AS THOSE BEFORE. REF TO DEPS IN THE HANDOUT GIVEN TO EACH PLANE AS IT LANDS ARE IN SMALL PRINT, INCOMPLETE AND MISLEADING (COPY OF HANDOUT ENCLOSED). MY INTERP OF THE DEP LANGUAGE FOR RWY 27 IN THE HANDOUT WOULD BE TO STAY BELOW 500 FT AGL UNTIL CLR OF CLASS D AIRSPACE, BUT WITH THE RIGHT TO PROCEED IN ANY DIRECTION CONSISTENT WITH NORMAL DEP PROCS. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BTWN DEPS PRIOR TO THE EVENT AND AFTER THE EVENT WOULD BE THE REQUIREMENT TO MONITOR 128.75 AFTER THE EVENT. EVEN THOUGH THE WORDS 'REVIEW NOTAM' APPEAR IN PARENTHESIS, IT DOESN'T UNDO THE POTENTIAL DANGER CREATED BY AT LEAST 1 LOGICAL INTERP OF THE INSTRUCTIONS. B) ARRIVING PLTS HAVE A LOT OF ADRENALINE FLOWING AND ARE SUPER CAREFUL. THEY ARE ALSO CAREFULLY MONITORED AND CTLED FROM FISK BY CTLRS. DEPS ARE A LOT MORE RELAXED. PLTS MAY OR MAY NOT REMEMBER THE DETAILS OF THE NOTAM DEP INFO. THEY PROBABLY DON'T HAVE THE ORIGINAL TEXT AVAILABLE AND THEIR NOTES MAY BE ERRONEOUS. C) UNLESS A PLT IS ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN OF THE INSTRUCTIONS, HE OR SHE IS INCLINED TO FOLLOW THE PROCS USED BY THE ACFT AHEAD. 2) VFR ARRS ARE CLOSELY MONITORED AND DIRECTED FROM FISK UNTIL LNDG. ON DEP THERE IS NO MONITOR OR DIRECTION, OTHER THAN FOR TKOF CLRNC, THAT I AM AWARE OF. 3) APCHING ACFT HAVE MANY MORE OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR TFC AVOIDANCE IN TERMS OF SPD, CLB/DSCNT CAPABILITY AND VISUAL CONTACT. DEPARTING ACFT ARE MUCH MORE LIMITED IN CLB, HAVE VERY LITTLE ROOM FOR DSCNT AND ACFT CLB ANGLE TENDS TO BLOCK FORWARD VISIBILITY (PARTICULARLY IN A CHEROKEE 6). ADD A SETTING SUN OVER THE NOSE AND THE PROBS INCREASE. MAY I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING: 1) HAND OUT DEP INFO ON A SEPARATE FLYER ALONG WITH THE WELCOMING BULLETIN WHEN THE PLT LANDS. THE DEP FLYER SHOULD BE IN EASY TO READ BLOCK LETTERS AND IN HIGH CONTRAST COLORS. THE INFO ON THE FLYER SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THAT DIRECTLY RELATED TO ACFT SAFETY. 2) MOST PLTS, UNLESS THEY ARE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA, CANNOT ACCURATELY DETERMINE THE BOUNDARIES OF CLASS D AIRSPACE. HOWEVER, IF A HIGHLY VISIBLE LANDMARK IS USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH CLASS D AIRSPACE AN ADDITIONAL MARGIN OF SAFETY SHOULD BE ATTAINABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, 'MAINTAIN RWY HDG UNTIL XING THE 4 LANE HWY 1/2 MI W OF RWY 27, THEN DEPART CLASS D AIRSPACE ON A HDG OF 230 DEGS CLOCKWISE THROUGH 040 DEGS. DO NOT RE-ENTER CLASS D AIRSPACE.' I SUSPECT PART OF THE REASON FOR THE PRESENT INSTRUCTION TO MAINTAIN RWY HDG IS TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR A PLT TO KNOW WHERE TO LOOK FOR OTHER ACFT. HOWEVER, FLYING IN TRAIL PRODUCES PROBS BECAUSE OF THE WIDE DISCREPANCIES IN ACFT PERFORMANCE. CONTEMPLATED ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) RWY HDG WILL BE MAINTAINED DURING THE MOST CRITICAL PART OF DEP, NAMELY SIZING UP THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ACFT AHEAD AND DETERMINING HOW BEST TO MAINTAIN SEPARATION. 2) THERE IS NO QUESTION AS TO WHEN RWY HDG REQUIREMENTS CEASE. FROM THAT POINT ACFT WILL DIVERGE, INCREASING THE MARGIN OF SAFETY. 3) NO TURNS ARE MADE UNTIL CLR OF THE IMMEDIATE ARPT ENVIRONS. 4) ACFT DENSITY PER CUBIC VOLUME OF AIRSPACE WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.