Narrative:

I was acting as a first officer on a DHC6 twin otter on a flight which arrived at gcn at XX59Z. As we taxied to the gate, our operations requested that we hold south of our ramp because a parking space was not yet available. I called ground control to advise them and they approved our request. We stopped south of our company ramp in a transient parking area east of some construction cones, well off the taxiway. After a few mins, a pilot brought out some people to a single-engine aircraft parked east of us. The captain said he was going to move up a little to give them room. We taxied slowly northwest (angling toward the taxiway). I stated that I would give ground control a call before we returned to the taxiway, and the captain agreed. As we were coming to a halt, our operations called with a parking assignment. The captain gave me a new 'in' time to copy. When I looked up from copying the 'in' time, I realized that we were moving again. I immediately advised the captain that we needed to call ground for a taxi clearance, but he did not respond. At that moment I caught a glimpse through the forward passenger windows of an aircraft taxiing north on the taxiway to our left. I shouted, 'stop!' and stepped on the brakes. We came to a stop at the edge of the taxiway and the aircraft, a twin-engine reciprocating, passed in front of us without incident. I then requested a clearance and we proceeded to parking. All of this happened very fast. When I first looked up from copying the new 'in' time, it took me a moment to realize that we were moving and that we were so close to the edge of the taxiway. If I had it to do again, I would have immediately applied the brakes upon becoming aware that we were moving rather than verbally reminding the captain that we needed at taxi clearance. We had agreed that one was needed, and there was no reason for us to begin moving until one had been received. The captain with whom I was paired for this trip tends to conduct the flight as though he is flying single-pilot, paying little attention to input from the first officer and often failing to keep the first officer briefed and 'in the loop.' this style of command runs counter to the CRM training I received during my qualification as first officer, and I believe this occurrence is an example of how safety is compromised by such a style. I have learned from this experience that I will have to sharpen my own monitoring of the flight when I am paired with such a captain.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF A TWIN OTTER, DHC6 (DH6), STARTED TAXIING AGAIN AFTER GND HOLDING FOR A GATE AFTER LNDG WITHOUT CLRNC CAUSING A CONFLICT WITH A PIPER PA31 TAXIING IN FRONT OF THEIR ACFT.

Narrative: I WAS ACTING AS A FO ON A DHC6 TWIN OTTER ON A FLT WHICH ARRIVED AT GCN AT XX59Z. AS WE TAXIED TO THE GATE, OUR OPS REQUESTED THAT WE HOLD S OF OUR RAMP BECAUSE A PARKING SPACE WAS NOT YET AVAILABLE. I CALLED GND CTL TO ADVISE THEM AND THEY APPROVED OUR REQUEST. WE STOPPED S OF OUR COMPANY RAMP IN A TRANSIENT PARKING AREA E OF SOME CONSTRUCTION CONES, WELL OFF THE TXWY. AFTER A FEW MINS, A PLT BROUGHT OUT SOME PEOPLE TO A SINGLE-ENG ACFT PARKED E OF US. THE CAPT SAID HE WAS GOING TO MOVE UP A LITTLE TO GIVE THEM ROOM. WE TAXIED SLOWLY NW (ANGLING TOWARD THE TXWY). I STATED THAT I WOULD GIVE GND CTL A CALL BEFORE WE RETURNED TO THE TXWY, AND THE CAPT AGREED. AS WE WERE COMING TO A HALT, OUR OPS CALLED WITH A PARKING ASSIGNMENT. THE CAPT GAVE ME A NEW 'IN' TIME TO COPY. WHEN I LOOKED UP FROM COPYING THE 'IN' TIME, I REALIZED THAT WE WERE MOVING AGAIN. I IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THE CAPT THAT WE NEEDED TO CALL GND FOR A TAXI CLRNC, BUT HE DID NOT RESPOND. AT THAT MOMENT I CAUGHT A GLIMPSE THROUGH THE FORWARD PAX WINDOWS OF AN ACFT TAXIING N ON THE TXWY TO OUR L. I SHOUTED, 'STOP!' AND STEPPED ON THE BRAKES. WE CAME TO A STOP AT THE EDGE OF THE TXWY AND THE ACFT, A TWIN-ENG RECIPROCATING, PASSED IN FRONT OF US WITHOUT INCIDENT. I THEN REQUESTED A CLRNC AND WE PROCEEDED TO PARKING. ALL OF THIS HAPPENED VERY FAST. WHEN I FIRST LOOKED UP FROM COPYING THE NEW 'IN' TIME, IT TOOK ME A MOMENT TO REALIZE THAT WE WERE MOVING AND THAT WE WERE SO CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF THE TXWY. IF I HAD IT TO DO AGAIN, I WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY APPLIED THE BRAKES UPON BECOMING AWARE THAT WE WERE MOVING RATHER THAN VERBALLY REMINDING THE CAPT THAT WE NEEDED AT TAXI CLRNC. WE HAD AGREED THAT ONE WAS NEEDED, AND THERE WAS NO REASON FOR US TO BEGIN MOVING UNTIL ONE HAD BEEN RECEIVED. THE CAPT WITH WHOM I WAS PAIRED FOR THIS TRIP TENDS TO CONDUCT THE FLT AS THOUGH HE IS FLYING SINGLE-PLT, PAYING LITTLE ATTN TO INPUT FROM THE FO AND OFTEN FAILING TO KEEP THE FO BRIEFED AND 'IN THE LOOP.' THIS STYLE OF COMMAND RUNS COUNTER TO THE CRM TRAINING I RECEIVED DURING MY QUALIFICATION AS FO, AND I BELIEVE THIS OCCURRENCE IS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW SAFETY IS COMPROMISED BY SUCH A STYLE. I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS EXPERIENCE THAT I WILL HAVE TO SHARPEN MY OWN MONITORING OF THE FLT WHEN I AM PAIRED WITH SUCH A CAPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.