Narrative:

After pushback from our gate, the ground crew was told 'clear to disconnect.' not being on the intercom channel, as I, as the first officer, monitor ground during the pushback, I did not hear the response from the tug. After my after start flow, the captain told me to get taxi clearance, which I did. From the right seat I could not see the tug during the push or after the disconnect as he stayed on the left side of the aircraft. The captain called clear left, I responded clear right. The captain called flaps 1 degree (takeoff flaps) which I responded flaps 1 degree. The captain released the parking brake and began to taxi. Shortly after (approximately 10 seconds) a sharp shudder was felt and the captain applied brakes and set the parking brake. The tug was directly in front of the #1 (left) engine. It was reported that the marshaller waved us off. From the right seat I did not see the wave-off as it was below my field of vision. Prevention: I believe this kind of incident could be prevented by enhanced standardization as far as the tug being clearly visible to both crew members prior to taxi after the tow bar is disconnected. Supplemental information from acn 377585: we were cleared to taxi, as I had been waved off with the wands by the wing marshals and no tug on my line of sight. I set the parking brake and I saw both the tug driver about 20 ft or so the l-hand wing, jumping up and down. I asked the first officer to call the company, and asked what was going on. I told the first officer to call the emergency equipment to come by. Then I told the first flight attendant what happened, then I made a PA announcement telling the passenger of the happening. I requested a stair and a bus to have access to get the people off the aircraft. I contacted maintenance control requesting a mechanic to be with the aircraft and to have it towed to the hangar. It doesn't seem to me that they were wearing any rain gear reflective clothing. We had low visibility, raining, it was pitch black. Could be enhanced by developing quality training videos from the cockpit, views from the pilot's point of view, line of sight, that could be instituted throughout the industry as a safety measure to ramp personnel as far as what pilots see and what they cannot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A320 ON PUSHBACK HAS TUG PARKED NEAR THE L ENG BUT OUT OF SIGHT. WHEN CLRED TO TAXI THEY DO SO ONLY TO HAVE THE ENG STRIKE THE TUG.

Narrative: AFTER PUSHBACK FROM OUR GATE, THE GND CREW WAS TOLD 'CLR TO DISCONNECT.' NOT BEING ON THE INTERCOM CHANNEL, AS I, AS THE FO, MONITOR GND DURING THE PUSHBACK, I DID NOT HEAR THE RESPONSE FROM THE TUG. AFTER MY AFTER START FLOW, THE CAPT TOLD ME TO GET TAXI CLRNC, WHICH I DID. FROM THE R SEAT I COULD NOT SEE THE TUG DURING THE PUSH OR AFTER THE DISCONNECT AS HE STAYED ON THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT. THE CAPT CALLED CLR L, I RESPONDED CLR R. THE CAPT CALLED FLAPS 1 DEG (TKOF FLAPS) WHICH I RESPONDED FLAPS 1 DEG. THE CAPT RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND BEGAN TO TAXI. SHORTLY AFTER (APPROX 10 SECONDS) A SHARP SHUDDER WAS FELT AND THE CAPT APPLIED BRAKES AND SET THE PARKING BRAKE. THE TUG WAS DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE #1 (L) ENG. IT WAS RPTED THAT THE MARSHALLER WAVED US OFF. FROM THE R SEAT I DID NOT SEE THE WAVE-OFF AS IT WAS BELOW MY FIELD OF VISION. PREVENTION: I BELIEVE THIS KIND OF INCIDENT COULD BE PREVENTED BY ENHANCED STANDARDIZATION AS FAR AS THE TUG BEING CLRLY VISIBLE TO BOTH CREW MEMBERS PRIOR TO TAXI AFTER THE TOW BAR IS DISCONNECTED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 377585: WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI, AS I HAD BEEN WAVED OFF WITH THE WANDS BY THE WING MARSHALS AND NO TUG ON MY LINE OF SIGHT. I SET THE PARKING BRAKE AND I SAW BOTH THE TUG DRIVER ABOUT 20 FT OR SO THE L-HAND WING, JUMPING UP AND DOWN. I ASKED THE FO TO CALL THE COMPANY, AND ASKED WHAT WAS GOING ON. I TOLD THE FO TO CALL THE EMER EQUIP TO COME BY. THEN I TOLD THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT WHAT HAPPENED, THEN I MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT TELLING THE PAX OF THE HAPPENING. I REQUESTED A STAIR AND A BUS TO HAVE ACCESS TO GET THE PEOPLE OFF THE ACFT. I CONTACTED MAINT CTL REQUESTING A MECH TO BE WITH THE ACFT AND TO HAVE IT TOWED TO THE HANGAR. IT DOESN'T SEEM TO ME THAT THEY WERE WEARING ANY RAIN GEAR REFLECTIVE CLOTHING. WE HAD LOW VISIBILITY, RAINING, IT WAS PITCH BLACK. COULD BE ENHANCED BY DEVELOPING QUALITY TRAINING VIDEOS FROM THE COCKPIT, VIEWS FROM THE PLT'S POINT OF VIEW, LINE OF SIGHT, THAT COULD BE INSTITUTED THROUGHOUT THE INDUSTRY AS A SAFETY MEASURE TO RAMP PERSONNEL AS FAR AS WHAT PLTS SEE AND WHAT THEY CANNOT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.