Narrative:

Our third flight was from egnx to eidw. The plan was for a redispatch en route to eidw since our flight plan was from egnx to einn (snn). The WX at dublin was suitable for an approach so we obtained a rerelease through dispatch via operations and landed at dublin at AB44Z. Our final segment, flight from eidw to einn (shannon) was blocked out at AC40Z. As we approached shannon, the WX deteriorated and the RVR was fluctuating above and below minimums. We had abundant fuel to hold before we needed to divert to egpf (glasgow). As we proceeded to get vectored for an approach, the RVR went below minimums. The captain was already informed of how much fuel remaining (for alternate and holding). As we approached the final approach segment, the captain did not verbalize his intentions and just proclaimed to ATC that we needed 550 meters to shoot the approach. I suggested why not request to hold on the localizer just outside the FAF until the RVR goes up and then shoot the approach? ATC soon after called us and offered the same suggestion. The captain finally said let's do that. The first officer was the PF and the captain the PNF. As we held on the localizer for about 20 mins the RVR was good enough for us to shoot the approach and we were cleared for the approach. As we got to the MDA, there were no visual cues to continue and we immediately declared a missed approach. As we headed towards our alternate of glasgow, we had about 17000 pounds of fuel remaining. The only operations I was able to contact was belfast operations once we were high enough. I requested for them to call dispatch and obtain a new alternate since volmet WX for glasgow (AD20Z) was visibility 100 meters, fog, temperature 4 degrees, dewpoint 4 degrees. Eidw on the other hand was 1300 meters, broken, scattered 001, broken 004, broken 030. 12/12, trend 5000 meters, scattered 005. Belfast came back and said dispatch has gone home and operations wanted us to proceed to dublin instead. We were in a holding pattern about 35 mi northwest of dublin at FL210 with just over 15000 pounds of fuel remaining. I gave belfast the 800 phone number of domestic united states dispatch and a few mins later they answered. I asked them to provide us with a rerelease to dublin and a new alternate. The response relayed to us was that he could not calculate the alternate fuel and did not have an alternate for us. I politely stated our urgency and to once again obtain a redispatch to dublin and to obtain a new alternate since the WX at our alternate (glasgow) has gone down. The reply was the same -- they could not figure out anything. The captain listening in on the communication interrupted and used expletives over the radio to belfast radio. I thought it was inappropriate since belfast was merely relaying domestic dispatch response over the radio. Since dispatch was unable to help us, the captain decided to proceed to dublin (our alternate WX was down and knowing that dublin's WX, only 35 mi away, was good enough to shoot the approach). We all mutually agreed. Our fuel status was just under 15000 pounds. As we announced our intentions to ATC, we were told that we were #5 or #6 for the approach. I was still in constant contact with dublin operations. We did not get any further response from domestic dispatch through belfast operations. As we prepared for the approach, the captain decided to take over the controls as PF since the WX at dublin was starting to deteriorate. Some aircraft ahead on the approach were going missed. The RVR on the opposite end of the runway got better so ATC turned the approach around and the first officer pulled out the new approach plates. The captain simply discarded the old plates from his yoke clip and did not pull out the new one. I suggested he should have his out. He finally asked me to pull it out of the binder for him which I gladly did. Also, as soon as we started our diversion to dublin, I suggested that we may need to declare an emergency since the traffic going into dublin is heavy, WX is deteriorating, and also we did not have an alternate if we missed. The captain had no comment to my suggestion and continued being vectored around. Several times during the approach, I suggested asking ATC foran airport nearby with good enough WX in case of a missed. This was crucial since the captain did not have a plan in case of a missed approach. I again asked the first officer to ask ATC for a nearest suitable airport and he finally asked ATC and the controller came back and stated 'belfast.' just prior to intercepting final, the RVR went above 550 meters (our minimum) and we were cleared for the approach. At minimum, the captain continued despite no visual cues and approximately 50-70 ft below MDA we saw the approach lights and soon later the red side bars and the runway lights and landed. At block-in, we had 10900 pounds total fuel remaining. This may be plenty fuel if we had an alternate airport, but in this case, pretty much the entire ireland, scotland, and england was fogged in and the captain had no contingency plan. The fact that he has busted minimums indicates that his only choice was to land, no matter what! The fact that the captain did not care to have his approach plates out, no briefing to the crews of his intentions in case of a missed approach, not declaring an emergency to obtain priority handling (thereby saving 3000 pounds of fuel) has endangered the crew's lives, the airplane, and its payloads. My concerns here are that we did not receive any help from our flight control and a breakdown in crew coordination due to the captain's lack of situational awareness. We were in a hole with no options planned. As a fellow crew member, we have voiced our concerns by continuously feeding inputs to the captain, but did not receive any feedbacks. The captain, in my opinion, has plummeted in a state of 'denial' and 'resignation' and has blocked out all inputs from his crew members. He failed to use all resources available to him, and we, as fellow crew members, eventually had to be more assertive in our suggestions to the captain. The captain should know when and how to make vital decisions based on all available resources from both inside and outside the cockpit (crew members, instruments, ATC, operations, dispatch, arinc, etc) and to clearly communicate his intentions to the other crew members. I feel that we have all learned a lesson here and that we should study this event and come up with solutions that would prevent this from happening again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC IN A B727-223 FREIGHTER IN FOREIGN AIRSPACE HAS A DIFFICULT TIME GETTING INTO ANY ARPT IN IRELAND DUE TO LOW CEILINGS AND MINIMUM RVR. FUEL BECAME A CONCERN AS THE WX PICTURE GREW MORE OMINOUS. THE SO RPTR TELLS OF THE LACK OF CRM RESPONSE FROM THE CAPT AND THE FAILURE OF THEIR COMPANY DISPATCH OFFICE AND OFFICERS TO PROVIDE ANY SUPPORT IN THE WAY OF WX RPTS AND ADVISORY SVCS.

Narrative: OUR THIRD FLT WAS FROM EGNX TO EIDW. THE PLAN WAS FOR A REDISPATCH ENRTE TO EIDW SINCE OUR FLT PLAN WAS FROM EGNX TO EINN (SNN). THE WX AT DUBLIN WAS SUITABLE FOR AN APCH SO WE OBTAINED A RERELEASE THROUGH DISPATCH VIA OPS AND LANDED AT DUBLIN AT AB44Z. OUR FINAL SEGMENT, FLT FROM EIDW TO EINN (SHANNON) WAS BLOCKED OUT AT AC40Z. AS WE APCHED SHANNON, THE WX DETERIORATED AND THE RVR WAS FLUCTUATING ABOVE AND BELOW MINIMUMS. WE HAD ABUNDANT FUEL TO HOLD BEFORE WE NEEDED TO DIVERT TO EGPF (GLASGOW). AS WE PROCEEDED TO GET VECTORED FOR AN APCH, THE RVR WENT BELOW MINIMUMS. THE CAPT WAS ALREADY INFORMED OF HOW MUCH FUEL REMAINING (FOR ALTERNATE AND HOLDING). AS WE APCHED THE FINAL APCH SEGMENT, THE CAPT DID NOT VERBALIZE HIS INTENTIONS AND JUST PROCLAIMED TO ATC THAT WE NEEDED 550 METERS TO SHOOT THE APCH. I SUGGESTED WHY NOT REQUEST TO HOLD ON THE LOC JUST OUTSIDE THE FAF UNTIL THE RVR GOES UP AND THEN SHOOT THE APCH? ATC SOON AFTER CALLED US AND OFFERED THE SAME SUGGESTION. THE CAPT FINALLY SAID LET'S DO THAT. THE FO WAS THE PF AND THE CAPT THE PNF. AS WE HELD ON THE LOC FOR ABOUT 20 MINS THE RVR WAS GOOD ENOUGH FOR US TO SHOOT THE APCH AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. AS WE GOT TO THE MDA, THERE WERE NO VISUAL CUES TO CONTINUE AND WE IMMEDIATELY DECLARED A MISSED APCH. AS WE HEADED TOWARDS OUR ALTERNATE OF GLASGOW, WE HAD ABOUT 17000 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING. THE ONLY OPS I WAS ABLE TO CONTACT WAS BELFAST OPS ONCE WE WERE HIGH ENOUGH. I REQUESTED FOR THEM TO CALL DISPATCH AND OBTAIN A NEW ALTERNATE SINCE VOLMET WX FOR GLASGOW (AD20Z) WAS VISIBILITY 100 METERS, FOG, TEMP 4 DEGS, DEWPOINT 4 DEGS. EIDW ON THE OTHER HAND WAS 1300 METERS, BROKEN, SCATTERED 001, BROKEN 004, BROKEN 030. 12/12, TREND 5000 METERS, SCATTERED 005. BELFAST CAME BACK AND SAID DISPATCH HAS GONE HOME AND OPS WANTED US TO PROCEED TO DUBLIN INSTEAD. WE WERE IN A HOLDING PATTERN ABOUT 35 MI NW OF DUBLIN AT FL210 WITH JUST OVER 15000 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING. I GAVE BELFAST THE 800 PHONE NUMBER OF DOMESTIC UNITED STATES DISPATCH AND A FEW MINS LATER THEY ANSWERED. I ASKED THEM TO PROVIDE US WITH A RERELEASE TO DUBLIN AND A NEW ALTERNATE. THE RESPONSE RELAYED TO US WAS THAT HE COULD NOT CALCULATE THE ALTERNATE FUEL AND DID NOT HAVE AN ALTERNATE FOR US. I POLITELY STATED OUR URGENCY AND TO ONCE AGAIN OBTAIN A REDISPATCH TO DUBLIN AND TO OBTAIN A NEW ALTERNATE SINCE THE WX AT OUR ALTERNATE (GLASGOW) HAS GONE DOWN. THE REPLY WAS THE SAME -- THEY COULD NOT FIGURE OUT ANYTHING. THE CAPT LISTENING IN ON THE COM INTERRUPTED AND USED EXPLETIVES OVER THE RADIO TO BELFAST RADIO. I THOUGHT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE SINCE BELFAST WAS MERELY RELAYING DOMESTIC DISPATCH RESPONSE OVER THE RADIO. SINCE DISPATCH WAS UNABLE TO HELP US, THE CAPT DECIDED TO PROCEED TO DUBLIN (OUR ALTERNATE WX WAS DOWN AND KNOWING THAT DUBLIN'S WX, ONLY 35 MI AWAY, WAS GOOD ENOUGH TO SHOOT THE APCH). WE ALL MUTUALLY AGREED. OUR FUEL STATUS WAS JUST UNDER 15000 LBS. AS WE ANNOUNCED OUR INTENTIONS TO ATC, WE WERE TOLD THAT WE WERE #5 OR #6 FOR THE APCH. I WAS STILL IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH DUBLIN OPS. WE DID NOT GET ANY FURTHER RESPONSE FROM DOMESTIC DISPATCH THROUGH BELFAST OPS. AS WE PREPARED FOR THE APCH, THE CAPT DECIDED TO TAKE OVER THE CTLS AS PF SINCE THE WX AT DUBLIN WAS STARTING TO DETERIORATE. SOME ACFT AHEAD ON THE APCH WERE GOING MISSED. THE RVR ON THE OPPOSITE END OF THE RWY GOT BETTER SO ATC TURNED THE APCH AROUND AND THE FO PULLED OUT THE NEW APCH PLATES. THE CAPT SIMPLY DISCARDED THE OLD PLATES FROM HIS YOKE CLIP AND DID NOT PULL OUT THE NEW ONE. I SUGGESTED HE SHOULD HAVE HIS OUT. HE FINALLY ASKED ME TO PULL IT OUT OF THE BINDER FOR HIM WHICH I GLADLY DID. ALSO, AS SOON AS WE STARTED OUR DIVERSION TO DUBLIN, I SUGGESTED THAT WE MAY NEED TO DECLARE AN EMER SINCE THE TFC GOING INTO DUBLIN IS HVY, WX IS DETERIORATING, AND ALSO WE DID NOT HAVE AN ALTERNATE IF WE MISSED. THE CAPT HAD NO COMMENT TO MY SUGGESTION AND CONTINUED BEING VECTORED AROUND. SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE APCH, I SUGGESTED ASKING ATC FORAN ARPT NEARBY WITH GOOD ENOUGH WX IN CASE OF A MISSED. THIS WAS CRUCIAL SINCE THE CAPT DID NOT HAVE A PLAN IN CASE OF A MISSED APCH. I AGAIN ASKED THE FO TO ASK ATC FOR A NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT AND HE FINALLY ASKED ATC AND THE CTLR CAME BACK AND STATED 'BELFAST.' JUST PRIOR TO INTERCEPTING FINAL, THE RVR WENT ABOVE 550 METERS (OUR MINIMUM) AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. AT MINIMUM, THE CAPT CONTINUED DESPITE NO VISUAL CUES AND APPROX 50-70 FT BELOW MDA WE SAW THE APCH LIGHTS AND SOON LATER THE RED SIDE BARS AND THE RWY LIGHTS AND LANDED. AT BLOCK-IN, WE HAD 10900 LBS TOTAL FUEL REMAINING. THIS MAY BE PLENTY FUEL IF WE HAD AN ALTERNATE ARPT, BUT IN THIS CASE, PRETTY MUCH THE ENTIRE IRELAND, SCOTLAND, AND ENGLAND WAS FOGGED IN AND THE CAPT HAD NO CONTINGENCY PLAN. THE FACT THAT HE HAS BUSTED MINIMUMS INDICATES THAT HIS ONLY CHOICE WAS TO LAND, NO MATTER WHAT! THE FACT THAT THE CAPT DID NOT CARE TO HAVE HIS APCH PLATES OUT, NO BRIEFING TO THE CREWS OF HIS INTENTIONS IN CASE OF A MISSED APCH, NOT DECLARING AN EMER TO OBTAIN PRIORITY HANDLING (THEREBY SAVING 3000 LBS OF FUEL) HAS ENDANGERED THE CREW'S LIVES, THE AIRPLANE, AND ITS PAYLOADS. MY CONCERNS HERE ARE THAT WE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY HELP FROM OUR FLT CTL AND A BREAKDOWN IN CREW COORD DUE TO THE CAPT'S LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. WE WERE IN A HOLE WITH NO OPTIONS PLANNED. AS A FELLOW CREW MEMBER, WE HAVE VOICED OUR CONCERNS BY CONTINUOUSLY FEEDING INPUTS TO THE CAPT, BUT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY FEEDBACKS. THE CAPT, IN MY OPINION, HAS PLUMMETED IN A STATE OF 'DENIAL' AND 'RESIGNATION' AND HAS BLOCKED OUT ALL INPUTS FROM HIS CREW MEMBERS. HE FAILED TO USE ALL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO HIM, AND WE, AS FELLOW CREW MEMBERS, EVENTUALLY HAD TO BE MORE ASSERTIVE IN OUR SUGGESTIONS TO THE CAPT. THE CAPT SHOULD KNOW WHEN AND HOW TO MAKE VITAL DECISIONS BASED ON ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES FROM BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT (CREW MEMBERS, INSTS, ATC, OPS, DISPATCH, ARINC, ETC) AND TO CLRLY COMMUNICATE HIS INTENTIONS TO THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS. I FEEL THAT WE HAVE ALL LEARNED A LESSON HERE AND THAT WE SHOULD STUDY THIS EVENT AND COME UP WITH SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.