Narrative:

Upon arrival bwi, gate X, had left engine shut down as turned into the gate. The left wing clearance monitor was studying her shoes or something on the ground instead of monitoring wing clearance. This caused an extremely slow approach to the gate, since I was very concerned about wingtip clearance on an adjoining jet. As we blocked in bwi ground crew did an exceptional job of chocking the aircraft and applying external power. I selected external power, secured all hydraulic pumps and fuel pumps, and instructed first officer to secure the right engine. I noted his hands moving in vicinity of fuel cutoff and immediately left the flight deck to tell passenger 'good-bye.' at XX03Z, agent came onboard and asked if we could please shut down the right engine. I was stunned. I again instructed the first officer to shut down the engine, which was immediately accomplished. Later, the station manager came onboard to report passenger complaints about slow baggage service. I apologized for the 7 min delay and told her that her ground crew had performed in exemplary fashion, except for the wing walker noted, and told her the bag delay was entirely my fault. Contributing factors: 1) concern about left wing clearance and ruffled feathers over poor procedure. 2) light load and hurrying to get back to tell passenger so long. 3) assumed that first officer had complied with my direction. 4) extremely senior first officer holding a captain's bid. 5) both captain and first officer are living in the '50' neighborhood. First officer was in a rush to attend to a pressing physiologic need and captain not far behind. 6) while safety was never compromised, and the trip up (including the landing) was a thing of beauty and compliance with procedures, the 'trip ain't over until the last item on the checklist is done.' corrective action: 1) I will be less inclined to rush to tell the folks 'so long.' 2) again, I am reminded that we are human and fallible -- I will not assume compliance by the first officer -- no matter how senior. Experience: that factor that allows one to realize that one has made this screw up before. In this case, it was similar only. Supplemental information from acn 385538: right engine was not turned off at gate when flight was complete. Captain went to say good-bye to passenger and copilot had to go to bathroom. After landing checklist was not checked closely enough but engine was shut down by copilot after leaving bathroom. No damages to anything or anybody. Checklist discipline was poor and communication between captain and copilot poor.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 ACFT PARKED, FLC BOTH LEFT COCKPIT WITH R ENG STILL RUNNING. 7 MINS LATER PAX AGENT CAME TO COCKPIT TO REQUEST FLC SHUT DOWN THE R ENG.

Narrative: UPON ARR BWI, GATE X, HAD L ENG SHUT DOWN AS TURNED INTO THE GATE. THE L WING CLRNC MONITOR WAS STUDYING HER SHOES OR SOMETHING ON THE GND INSTEAD OF MONITORING WING CLRNC. THIS CAUSED AN EXTREMELY SLOW APCH TO THE GATE, SINCE I WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT WINGTIP CLRNC ON AN ADJOINING JET. AS WE BLOCKED IN BWI GND CREW DID AN EXCEPTIONAL JOB OF CHOCKING THE ACFT AND APPLYING EXTERNAL PWR. I SELECTED EXTERNAL PWR, SECURED ALL HYD PUMPS AND FUEL PUMPS, AND INSTRUCTED FO TO SECURE THE R ENG. I NOTED HIS HANDS MOVING IN VICINITY OF FUEL CUTOFF AND IMMEDIATELY LEFT THE FLT DECK TO TELL PAX 'GOOD-BYE.' AT XX03Z, AGENT CAME ONBOARD AND ASKED IF WE COULD PLEASE SHUT DOWN THE R ENG. I WAS STUNNED. I AGAIN INSTRUCTED THE FO TO SHUT DOWN THE ENG, WHICH WAS IMMEDIATELY ACCOMPLISHED. LATER, THE STATION MGR CAME ONBOARD TO RPT PAX COMPLAINTS ABOUT SLOW BAGGAGE SVC. I APOLOGIZED FOR THE 7 MIN DELAY AND TOLD HER THAT HER GND CREW HAD PERFORMED IN EXEMPLARY FASHION, EXCEPT FOR THE WING WALKER NOTED, AND TOLD HER THE BAG DELAY WAS ENTIRELY MY FAULT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) CONCERN ABOUT L WING CLRNC AND RUFFLED FEATHERS OVER POOR PROC. 2) LIGHT LOAD AND HURRYING TO GET BACK TO TELL PAX SO LONG. 3) ASSUMED THAT FO HAD COMPLIED WITH MY DIRECTION. 4) EXTREMELY SENIOR FO HOLDING A CAPT'S BID. 5) BOTH CAPT AND FO ARE LIVING IN THE '50' NEIGHBORHOOD. FO WAS IN A RUSH TO ATTEND TO A PRESSING PHYSIOLOGIC NEED AND CAPT NOT FAR BEHIND. 6) WHILE SAFETY WAS NEVER COMPROMISED, AND THE TRIP UP (INCLUDING THE LNDG) WAS A THING OF BEAUTY AND COMPLIANCE WITH PROCS, THE 'TRIP AIN'T OVER UNTIL THE LAST ITEM ON THE CHKLIST IS DONE.' CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1) I WILL BE LESS INCLINED TO RUSH TO TELL THE FOLKS 'SO LONG.' 2) AGAIN, I AM REMINDED THAT WE ARE HUMAN AND FALLIBLE -- I WILL NOT ASSUME COMPLIANCE BY THE FO -- NO MATTER HOW SENIOR. EXPERIENCE: THAT FACTOR THAT ALLOWS ONE TO REALIZE THAT ONE HAS MADE THIS SCREW UP BEFORE. IN THIS CASE, IT WAS SIMILAR ONLY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 385538: R ENG WAS NOT TURNED OFF AT GATE WHEN FLT WAS COMPLETE. CAPT WENT TO SAY GOOD-BYE TO PAX AND COPLT HAD TO GO TO BATHROOM. AFTER LNDG CHKLIST WAS NOT CHKED CLOSELY ENOUGH BUT ENG WAS SHUT DOWN BY COPLT AFTER LEAVING BATHROOM. NO DAMAGES TO ANYTHING OR ANYBODY. CHKLIST DISCIPLINE WAS POOR AND COM BTWN CAPT AND COPLT POOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.