Narrative:

Facts relating to the incident: flight was due out at XA30. Aircraft weight was 180000 pounds at the start of taxi. WX was heavy rain with standing water on the ramp. Night conditions with overcast skies. Lights on the far side of ramp only. Our aircraft was parked in a dark corner of the ramp. There is a road running through the center of the southeast cargo ramp. The southeast cargo ramp is not controled by ATC. There was an air carrier a B727 parked behind us. It was due out before our flight. My air carrier ground supervisor stated to me he was short-handed ramp personnel, and there was only 1 set of stairs on the ramp. At the start of the initial taxi there was a signal man and only 1 ground guide. The problems of the morning began at XA00, after I had completed the paperwork review and proceeded to the aircraft. 1/2 way across the rain-soaked ramp, I noticed there were no stairs at the aircraft. Cargo was being loaded at the time. I returned to the office and asked mr Z, the supervisor, for a set of stairs so I could get to the aircraft and make an on-time departure. Because he was short-handed, mr Z had to move the stairs himself. The rest of my crew was already at the aircraft. The so was finishing his preflight inspection and the first officer was working on the weight and balance form. The stairs finally arrived at XA20. As I approached our aircraft I noticed the air carrier a B727 had all its doors closed, no stairs, and was ready to start up and taxi. I entered the cockpit, accomplished all of my required checks, and waited for the loading to finish. Cargo loading on our aircraft was completed at XA35. Our signal man gave us the signal that it was clear to start all 3 engines. After the start sequence and checklists I started to taxi using all 3 engines. The ground guide gave us taxi signals to go straight ahead followed by a hard left turn. To start moving, I used engines #1 and #3 to 1800 pounds per hour fuel flow and #2 to idle. I used engines #1 and #3 to minimize jet blast because engine #2 is further aft than the pod engines. As soon as the aircraft started to move, I retarded the power on #1 and #3 to idle. I used just a little power on #3 to help continue us around the 180 degree left turn. I pwred away from the corner of the ramp at a low power setting for 2 reasons. First, this is my normal procedure to minimize jet blast. Second, because of the road that ran through the ramp on our taxi route, I did not want to have a lot of momentum and come face to face with a truck on a slick wet ramp. (I was being careful to avoid a repeat of the october denver B727 and bus collision.) I had briefed the crew on the denver incident and requested them to look out for vehicles prior to the start of taxi. I turned on the runway turnoff lights to illuminate the left side of the aircraft's path. The taxi light was not installed on this aircraft. As soon as I was around the 180 degree turn and pointed in the direction of taxi, I saw the air carrier a B727 still parked. It had not left on schedule. The space between the B727 and the DC9 was too close to safely taxi between. I stopped the aircraft and said to the crew 'the space between the B727 and DC9 is too close to taxi between safely.' the crew emphatically concurred. I then flashed the landing lights to attract the attention of the ground crew and have them come to the cockpit. I tried this 2 or 3 times without success. I then shut down the engines. At the time I stopped the aircraft there was only 1 ground guide and the lead signal man to guide us through the gap between the B727 and DC9. When a ramp person came to the cockpit window I told him the area was too small to fit the aircraft through safely and that I would like either the B727 or DC9 to move. He said he would try. A few mins later, the same ramp person said he did not know about the B727 moving because the stairs next to it had hit its wing. It was XA40. At this point, I called dispatch on my cell phone to discuss the delay and the problem with the air carrier a airplane. He advised me that mr Z was unavailable. I was interrupted numerous times by ramp personnel during the phone call. They were standing on a vehicle and talking through the cockpit window. I advised the ramp personnel again that I needed a tug or the other aircraft moved. I told dispatch I would do what I could to move the aircraft safely off the ramp and that I would call back about the B727.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 CARGO ACFT TAXIING FROM RAMP JET BLAST BLEW PORTABLE STAIRS INTO ANOTHER PARKED ACFT RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO ITS WING.

Narrative: FACTS RELATING TO THE INCIDENT: FLT WAS DUE OUT AT XA30. ACFT WT WAS 180000 LBS AT THE START OF TAXI. WX WAS HVY RAIN WITH STANDING WATER ON THE RAMP. NIGHT CONDITIONS WITH OVCST SKIES. LIGHTS ON THE FAR SIDE OF RAMP ONLY. OUR ACFT WAS PARKED IN A DARK CORNER OF THE RAMP. THERE IS A ROAD RUNNING THROUGH THE CTR OF THE SE CARGO RAMP. THE SE CARGO RAMP IS NOT CTLED BY ATC. THERE WAS AN ACR A B727 PARKED BEHIND US. IT WAS DUE OUT BEFORE OUR FLT. MY ACR GND SUPVR STATED TO ME HE WAS SHORT-HANDED RAMP PERSONNEL, AND THERE WAS ONLY 1 SET OF STAIRS ON THE RAMP. AT THE START OF THE INITIAL TAXI THERE WAS A SIGNAL MAN AND ONLY 1 GND GUIDE. THE PROBS OF THE MORNING BEGAN AT XA00, AFTER I HAD COMPLETED THE PAPERWORK REVIEW AND PROCEEDED TO THE ACFT. 1/2 WAY ACROSS THE RAIN-SOAKED RAMP, I NOTICED THERE WERE NO STAIRS AT THE ACFT. CARGO WAS BEING LOADED AT THE TIME. I RETURNED TO THE OFFICE AND ASKED MR Z, THE SUPVR, FOR A SET OF STAIRS SO I COULD GET TO THE ACFT AND MAKE AN ON-TIME DEP. BECAUSE HE WAS SHORT-HANDED, MR Z HAD TO MOVE THE STAIRS HIMSELF. THE REST OF MY CREW WAS ALREADY AT THE ACFT. THE SO WAS FINISHING HIS PREFLT INSPECTION AND THE FO WAS WORKING ON THE WT AND BAL FORM. THE STAIRS FINALLY ARRIVED AT XA20. AS I APCHED OUR ACFT I NOTICED THE ACR A B727 HAD ALL ITS DOORS CLOSED, NO STAIRS, AND WAS READY TO START UP AND TAXI. I ENTERED THE COCKPIT, ACCOMPLISHED ALL OF MY REQUIRED CHKS, AND WAITED FOR THE LOADING TO FINISH. CARGO LOADING ON OUR ACFT WAS COMPLETED AT XA35. OUR SIGNAL MAN GAVE US THE SIGNAL THAT IT WAS CLR TO START ALL 3 ENGS. AFTER THE START SEQUENCE AND CHKLISTS I STARTED TO TAXI USING ALL 3 ENGS. THE GND GUIDE GAVE US TAXI SIGNALS TO GO STRAIGHT AHEAD FOLLOWED BY A HARD L TURN. TO START MOVING, I USED ENGS #1 AND #3 TO 1800 LBS PER HR FUEL FLOW AND #2 TO IDLE. I USED ENGS #1 AND #3 TO MINIMIZE JET BLAST BECAUSE ENG #2 IS FURTHER AFT THAN THE POD ENGS. AS SOON AS THE ACFT STARTED TO MOVE, I RETARDED THE PWR ON #1 AND #3 TO IDLE. I USED JUST A LITTLE PWR ON #3 TO HELP CONTINUE US AROUND THE 180 DEG L TURN. I PWRED AWAY FROM THE CORNER OF THE RAMP AT A LOW PWR SETTING FOR 2 REASONS. FIRST, THIS IS MY NORMAL PROC TO MINIMIZE JET BLAST. SECOND, BECAUSE OF THE ROAD THAT RAN THROUGH THE RAMP ON OUR TAXI RTE, I DID NOT WANT TO HAVE A LOT OF MOMENTUM AND COME FACE TO FACE WITH A TRUCK ON A SLICK WET RAMP. (I WAS BEING CAREFUL TO AVOID A REPEAT OF THE OCTOBER DENVER B727 AND BUS COLLISION.) I HAD BRIEFED THE CREW ON THE DENVER INCIDENT AND REQUESTED THEM TO LOOK OUT FOR VEHICLES PRIOR TO THE START OF TAXI. I TURNED ON THE RWY TURNOFF LIGHTS TO ILLUMINATE THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT'S PATH. THE TAXI LIGHT WAS NOT INSTALLED ON THIS ACFT. AS SOON AS I WAS AROUND THE 180 DEG TURN AND POINTED IN THE DIRECTION OF TAXI, I SAW THE ACR A B727 STILL PARKED. IT HAD NOT LEFT ON SCHEDULE. THE SPACE BTWN THE B727 AND THE DC9 WAS TOO CLOSE TO SAFELY TAXI BTWN. I STOPPED THE ACFT AND SAID TO THE CREW 'THE SPACE BTWN THE B727 AND DC9 IS TOO CLOSE TO TAXI BTWN SAFELY.' THE CREW EMPHATICALLY CONCURRED. I THEN FLASHED THE LNDG LIGHTS TO ATTRACT THE ATTN OF THE GND CREW AND HAVE THEM COME TO THE COCKPIT. I TRIED THIS 2 OR 3 TIMES WITHOUT SUCCESS. I THEN SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. AT THE TIME I STOPPED THE ACFT THERE WAS ONLY 1 GND GUIDE AND THE LEAD SIGNAL MAN TO GUIDE US THROUGH THE GAP BTWN THE B727 AND DC9. WHEN A RAMP PERSON CAME TO THE COCKPIT WINDOW I TOLD HIM THE AREA WAS TOO SMALL TO FIT THE ACFT THROUGH SAFELY AND THAT I WOULD LIKE EITHER THE B727 OR DC9 TO MOVE. HE SAID HE WOULD TRY. A FEW MINS LATER, THE SAME RAMP PERSON SAID HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE B727 MOVING BECAUSE THE STAIRS NEXT TO IT HAD HIT ITS WING. IT WAS XA40. AT THIS POINT, I CALLED DISPATCH ON MY CELL PHONE TO DISCUSS THE DELAY AND THE PROB WITH THE ACR A AIRPLANE. HE ADVISED ME THAT MR Z WAS UNAVAILABLE. I WAS INTERRUPTED NUMEROUS TIMES BY RAMP PERSONNEL DURING THE PHONE CALL. THEY WERE STANDING ON A VEHICLE AND TALKING THROUGH THE COCKPIT WINDOW. I ADVISED THE RAMP PERSONNEL AGAIN THAT I NEEDED A TUG OR THE OTHER ACFT MOVED. I TOLD DISPATCH I WOULD DO WHAT I COULD TO MOVE THE ACFT SAFELY OFF THE RAMP AND THAT I WOULD CALL BACK ABOUT THE B727.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.