Narrative:

On climb out from iah, passing 6000 ft, accelerating, extremely loud bang, followed by intense vibration in airframe and noise level in cockpit increased to the point where communication between crew members became very difficult. I initially did not know what had happened, but first officer said 'birds.' I declared emergency, and asked for immediate return to iah. I told first officer to slow aircraft down, as we were at 280 KTS, participating in iah's test to allow speeds more than 250 KTS below 10000 ft. We turned toward airport, and started trying to ascertain what problems we had. The noise level in cockpit was so severe, communication with fellow crew members and checklist reading was near impossible. (I did get so to make PA to passenger.) it became apparent that we had lost engine #1, and all of first officer's pitot static instruments. First officer continued flying using my instruments and I worked the checklists with so's. It is important to note that one of the most important factors that led to the timely and successful conclusion to this emergency was that we had 2 so's as we had a check so giving IOE to a new hire. Having the two of them to run checklists and accomplish all that had to be done, plus keeping the cabin aware of our situation, allowed more freedom for my copilot and me to concentrate on getting the aircraft safely on the ground. The most important thing to me was to get the airplane immediately on the ground. As I did not know if the remaining engines had ingested any birds or foreign object damage. (I suspected from the noise, which was later confirmed, that we had lost the radome. In fact, #2 engine also had foreign object damage, but was not found until postflt.) I took control of the aircraft on final, after the first officer had configured it, and made the landing. I must stress that the environment in the cockpit was very difficult, and had we only been 3 in the cockpit, I seriously doubt we would have completed all of the checklists (which we did). As there was no way, with the known and unknown condition of the aircraft, that I needed more than 3 gear down and locked to land. After having emergency equipment check aircraft we taxied to gate. Postflt revealed most of radome gone. Radar antenna gone, #1 engine gutted, #2 engine foreign object damaged, severe impact damage to right wing leading edge in several areas and goose feathers. In my opinion, a test to increase speeds above 250 KTS in areas of known bird activity (another air carrier had similar event within 30 days) is not safe. Supplemental information from acn 390515: on departure from iah, passing approximately 6000 ft in climb and accelerating, we hit what appeared to be a flock of large white birds. I saw a 'flash' of white objects followed immediately by the loud 'bang' of multiple hits. The aircraft began to vibrate or shudder and the noise level in cockpit was extremely loud. With volume all the way up I could barely make out radio xmissions. At first, I could not hear the so at all and communications with the captain were difficult. A second 'shudder' occurred which I now believe was part of the radome and/or the radar antenna separating from the aircraft. The vibration and noise level improved at this time (also as we slowed the aircraft). The noise level in the cockpit made normal crew coordination and checklist discipline extremely difficult. The #1 engine was running, but at a reduced level with oscillating indications. I attempted to accelerate the engine and it vibrated excessively. We decided to shut the engine down (#2 and #3 engine indications were normal). I was still flying the aircraft but had no accurate airspeed indications. I was referencing the captain's airspeed indicator across the cockpit. The captain coordinated the engine shutdown procedures with the so's while I descended, slowed and turned toward iah runway 14L. Iah issued us a 'no airspeed limit' clearance on climb out in accordance with a test program allowing speeds above 250 KTS below 10000 ft. Our flight plan included a note stating our airline would participate in this program. My plan was to accelerate to 300 KTS for the climb out (we had departed late). I believe we were at approximately 280 KTS when we hit the birds. Although I don't believe this procedure was responsible forthis incident in any way, the extra airspeed certainly did not help. This was the first and last time I will accept higher airspds at low altitudes. Should we be 'testing' higher airspds in an area of known bird activity? Callback conversation with reporter of acn 390448 revealed the following information: the reporter is a captain for a major air carrier and he flies the B727-200 and his aircraft suffered extensive damage during a night multiple bird strike incident during a high speed departure from iah. He said that the geese struck the #1 engine in the intake breaking some of the compressor blades and causing such violent vibrations that the engine cowling doors unlatched and they came open in-flight causing additional aerodynamic problems. The #2 engine was also severely damaged and had to be replaced by maintenance. The #3 engine pylon was struck and penetrated damaging some of the internal equipment requiring the strut to be replaced. The radome was penetrated and finally departed as did the radar antenna. Also the forward pressure bulkhead behind the radome was perforated. The leading edges of both wings were damaged with the right wing's inboard kruger flap penetrated through and into the interior of the wing itself. The inboard slat on the right wing was also perforated through and into the wing. He said that the pitot tube for the first officer was torn from the aircraft rendering his airspeed indicator unusable. The captain feels that the fact that the aircraft was fairly light at the time (134000 pounds) and that they had an extra, highly experienced, so on board was very helpful in returning safely. He emphasized that he thinks that the low altitude, high-speed, departure test program was not a good idea, in his opinion, because of the amount of large birds at this time of yr near iah. He said that his landing lights were on, but his radar was off. This week when he flies the same flight he will leave his radar on in the hope that any crossing birds will sense his approaching aircraft and he will not exceed 250 KTS to give them more avoidance time. The captain also said that he has heard of another air carrier having multiple bird strikes during a high-speed departure from iah recently.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B727 FLC HIT A FLOCK OF GEESE AT 6000 FT DURING A HIGH SPD DEP FROM IAH. THE ACFT SUFFERED MAJOR DAMAGE TO THE LEADING EDGES, THE ENGS AND LOST THE RADOME AND THE RADAR ANTENNA. THEY SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG AND RETURNED TO IAH.

Narrative: ON CLBOUT FROM IAH, PASSING 6000 FT, ACCELERATING, EXTREMELY LOUD BANG, FOLLOWED BY INTENSE VIBRATION IN AIRFRAME AND NOISE LEVEL IN COCKPIT INCREASED TO THE POINT WHERE COM BTWN CREW MEMBERS BECAME VERY DIFFICULT. I INITIALLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT HAD HAPPENED, BUT FO SAID 'BIRDS.' I DECLARED EMER, AND ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE RETURN TO IAH. I TOLD FO TO SLOW ACFT DOWN, AS WE WERE AT 280 KTS, PARTICIPATING IN IAH'S TEST TO ALLOW SPDS MORE THAN 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. WE TURNED TOWARD ARPT, AND STARTED TRYING TO ASCERTAIN WHAT PROBS WE HAD. THE NOISE LEVEL IN COCKPIT WAS SO SEVERE, COM WITH FELLOW CREW MEMBERS AND CHKLIST READING WAS NEAR IMPOSSIBLE. (I DID GET SO TO MAKE PA TO PAX.) IT BECAME APPARENT THAT WE HAD LOST ENG #1, AND ALL OF FO'S PITOT STATIC INSTS. FO CONTINUED FLYING USING MY INSTS AND I WORKED THE CHKLISTS WITH SO'S. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS THAT LED TO THE TIMELY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THIS EMER WAS THAT WE HAD 2 SO'S AS WE HAD A CHK SO GIVING IOE TO A NEW HIRE. HAVING THE TWO OF THEM TO RUN CHKLISTS AND ACCOMPLISH ALL THAT HAD TO BE DONE, PLUS KEEPING THE CABIN AWARE OF OUR SIT, ALLOWED MORE FREEDOM FOR MY COPLT AND ME TO CONCENTRATE ON GETTING THE ACFT SAFELY ON THE GND. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING TO ME WAS TO GET THE AIRPLANE IMMEDIATELY ON THE GND. AS I DID NOT KNOW IF THE REMAINING ENGS HAD INGESTED ANY BIRDS OR FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE. (I SUSPECTED FROM THE NOISE, WHICH WAS LATER CONFIRMED, THAT WE HAD LOST THE RADOME. IN FACT, #2 ENG ALSO HAD FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE, BUT WAS NOT FOUND UNTIL POSTFLT.) I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT ON FINAL, AFTER THE FO HAD CONFIGURED IT, AND MADE THE LNDG. I MUST STRESS THAT THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE COCKPIT WAS VERY DIFFICULT, AND HAD WE ONLY BEEN 3 IN THE COCKPIT, I SERIOUSLY DOUBT WE WOULD HAVE COMPLETED ALL OF THE CHKLISTS (WHICH WE DID). AS THERE WAS NO WAY, WITH THE KNOWN AND UNKNOWN CONDITION OF THE ACFT, THAT I NEEDED MORE THAN 3 GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED TO LAND. AFTER HAVING EMER EQUIP CHK ACFT WE TAXIED TO GATE. POSTFLT REVEALED MOST OF RADOME GONE. RADAR ANTENNA GONE, #1 ENG GUTTED, #2 ENG FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGED, SEVERE IMPACT DAMAGE TO R WING LEADING EDGE IN SEVERAL AREAS AND GOOSE FEATHERS. IN MY OPINION, A TEST TO INCREASE SPDS ABOVE 250 KTS IN AREAS OF KNOWN BIRD ACTIVITY (ANOTHER ACR HAD SIMILAR EVENT WITHIN 30 DAYS) IS NOT SAFE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 390515: ON DEP FROM IAH, PASSING APPROX 6000 FT IN CLB AND ACCELERATING, WE HIT WHAT APPEARED TO BE A FLOCK OF LARGE WHITE BIRDS. I SAW A 'FLASH' OF WHITE OBJECTS FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY THE LOUD 'BANG' OF MULTIPLE HITS. THE ACFT BEGAN TO VIBRATE OR SHUDDER AND THE NOISE LEVEL IN COCKPIT WAS EXTREMELY LOUD. WITH VOLUME ALL THE WAY UP I COULD BARELY MAKE OUT RADIO XMISSIONS. AT FIRST, I COULD NOT HEAR THE SO AT ALL AND COMS WITH THE CAPT WERE DIFFICULT. A SECOND 'SHUDDER' OCCURRED WHICH I NOW BELIEVE WAS PART OF THE RADOME AND/OR THE RADAR ANTENNA SEPARATING FROM THE ACFT. THE VIBRATION AND NOISE LEVEL IMPROVED AT THIS TIME (ALSO AS WE SLOWED THE ACFT). THE NOISE LEVEL IN THE COCKPIT MADE NORMAL CREW COORD AND CHKLIST DISCIPLINE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. THE #1 ENG WAS RUNNING, BUT AT A REDUCED LEVEL WITH OSCILLATING INDICATIONS. I ATTEMPTED TO ACCELERATE THE ENG AND IT VIBRATED EXCESSIVELY. WE DECIDED TO SHUT THE ENG DOWN (#2 AND #3 ENG INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL). I WAS STILL FLYING THE ACFT BUT HAD NO ACCURATE AIRSPD INDICATIONS. I WAS REFING THE CAPT'S AIRSPD INDICATOR ACROSS THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT COORDINATED THE ENG SHUTDOWN PROCS WITH THE SO'S WHILE I DSNDED, SLOWED AND TURNED TOWARD IAH RWY 14L. IAH ISSUED US A 'NO AIRSPD LIMIT' CLRNC ON CLBOUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH A TEST PROGRAM ALLOWING SPDS ABOVE 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. OUR FLT PLAN INCLUDED A NOTE STATING OUR AIRLINE WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THIS PROGRAM. MY PLAN WAS TO ACCELERATE TO 300 KTS FOR THE CLBOUT (WE HAD DEPARTED LATE). I BELIEVE WE WERE AT APPROX 280 KTS WHEN WE HIT THE BIRDS. ALTHOUGH I DON'T BELIEVE THIS PROC WAS RESPONSIBLE FORTHIS INCIDENT IN ANY WAY, THE EXTRA AIRSPD CERTAINLY DID NOT HELP. THIS WAS THE FIRST AND LAST TIME I WILL ACCEPT HIGHER AIRSPDS AT LOW ALTS. SHOULD WE BE 'TESTING' HIGHER AIRSPDS IN AN AREA OF KNOWN BIRD ACTIVITY? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 390448 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS A CAPT FOR A MAJOR ACR AND HE FLIES THE B727-200 AND HIS ACFT SUFFERED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE DURING A NIGHT MULTIPLE BIRD STRIKE INCIDENT DURING A HIGH SPD DEP FROM IAH. HE SAID THAT THE GEESE STRUCK THE #1 ENG IN THE INTAKE BREAKING SOME OF THE COMPRESSOR BLADES AND CAUSING SUCH VIOLENT VIBRATIONS THAT THE ENG COWLING DOORS UNLATCHED AND THEY CAME OPEN INFLT CAUSING ADDITIONAL AERODYNAMIC PROBS. THE #2 ENG WAS ALSO SEVERELY DAMAGED AND HAD TO BE REPLACED BY MAINT. THE #3 ENG PYLON WAS STRUCK AND PENETRATED DAMAGING SOME OF THE INTERNAL EQUIP REQUIRING THE STRUT TO BE REPLACED. THE RADOME WAS PENETRATED AND FINALLY DEPARTED AS DID THE RADAR ANTENNA. ALSO THE FORWARD PRESSURE BULKHEAD BEHIND THE RADOME WAS PERFORATED. THE LEADING EDGES OF BOTH WINGS WERE DAMAGED WITH THE R WING'S INBOARD KRUGER FLAP PENETRATED THROUGH AND INTO THE INTERIOR OF THE WING ITSELF. THE INBOARD SLAT ON THE R WING WAS ALSO PERFORATED THROUGH AND INTO THE WING. HE SAID THAT THE PITOT TUBE FOR THE FO WAS TORN FROM THE ACFT RENDERING HIS AIRSPD INDICATOR UNUSABLE. THE CAPT FEELS THAT THE FACT THAT THE ACFT WAS FAIRLY LIGHT AT THE TIME (134000 LBS) AND THAT THEY HAD AN EXTRA, HIGHLY EXPERIENCED, SO ON BOARD WAS VERY HELPFUL IN RETURNING SAFELY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE THINKS THAT THE LOW ALT, HIGH-SPD, DEP TEST PROGRAM WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA, IN HIS OPINION, BECAUSE OF THE AMOUNT OF LARGE BIRDS AT THIS TIME OF YR NEAR IAH. HE SAID THAT HIS LNDG LIGHTS WERE ON, BUT HIS RADAR WAS OFF. THIS WK WHEN HE FLIES THE SAME FLT HE WILL LEAVE HIS RADAR ON IN THE HOPE THAT ANY XING BIRDS WILL SENSE HIS APCHING ACFT AND HE WILL NOT EXCEED 250 KTS TO GIVE THEM MORE AVOIDANCE TIME. THE CAPT ALSO SAID THAT HE HAS HEARD OF ANOTHER ACR HAVING MULTIPLE BIRD STRIKES DURING A HIGH-SPD DEP FROM IAH RECENTLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.