Narrative:

It is my understanding that in the past at company XXX a small number of ATR42 aircraft have flamed out due to fuel exhaustion even though the fuel quantity indicators indicated fuel on board. Our airline management then began a program of adding 500 pounds of fuel to our flight releases to make sure flameouts would not happen. After a period of time the company stated that they had found a 'fix' and aircraft with a modified fuel system would not need to add the 500 pounds. Within a short period of time, even the 'modified' aircraft were still encountering flameouts so the airline management went back to adding 500 pounds to all ATR42 flight releases. A week ago the enclosed bulletin came out stating that the new solution is to just give us fuel slips after fueling, telling us how many gallons were added. Such a procedure does nothing to tell us how much total fuel is on board. The only way such a fuel slip system could work would be for the fueler to defuel the aircraft and then add our release fuel and common sense will tell you an airline is not going to do that on every leg. I sincerely hope this problem is addressed before we have another flameout. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter had not much else to add to the original report. He did not know the exact number of 'alleged flameouts' he had heard mentioned and could not quote the source. The air carrier is not doing anything to predetermine the exact amount of fuel in the tanks prior to any refueling procedure. This does leave the crews with an uncertainty as to the amount of fuel actually on board after fueling. The ground crew uses the aircraft's totalizer for a 'fuel on board' reading. This totalizer is located by the right gear stub under the wing. The totalizer simply adds the reading of all the fuel gauges on the aircraft. If the gauges are wrong then the totalizer is wrong. Back to square one. The reporter did notify the union safety representative about this problem, but not the FAA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ATR42 CAPT RPT ON THE INACCURACY OF THE FUEL GAUGES AND SOME ALLEGED FLAMEOUTS. AIRLINE HAD BEEN ADDING 500 LBS OF 'POCKET FUEL' TO COVER THIS FAULT BUT NOW HAS COME OUT WITH A FUEL SLIP DELIVERY SYS TO THE CREW. RPTR STATES THAT THIS STILL DOESN'T GIVE THE CREW AN ACCURATE MEASURE OF FUEL ON BOARD.

Narrative: IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT IN THE PAST AT COMPANY XXX A SMALL NUMBER OF ATR42 ACFT HAVE FLAMED OUT DUE TO FUEL EXHAUSTION EVEN THOUGH THE FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS INDICATED FUEL ON BOARD. OUR AIRLINE MGMNT THEN BEGAN A PROGRAM OF ADDING 500 LBS OF FUEL TO OUR FLT RELEASES TO MAKE SURE FLAMEOUTS WOULD NOT HAPPEN. AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME THE COMPANY STATED THAT THEY HAD FOUND A 'FIX' AND ACFT WITH A MODIFIED FUEL SYS WOULD NOT NEED TO ADD THE 500 LBS. WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, EVEN THE 'MODIFIED' ACFT WERE STILL ENCOUNTERING FLAMEOUTS SO THE AIRLINE MGMNT WENT BACK TO ADDING 500 LBS TO ALL ATR42 FLT RELEASES. A WK AGO THE ENCLOSED BULLETIN CAME OUT STATING THAT THE NEW SOLUTION IS TO JUST GIVE US FUEL SLIPS AFTER FUELING, TELLING US HOW MANY GALLONS WERE ADDED. SUCH A PROC DOES NOTHING TO TELL US HOW MUCH TOTAL FUEL IS ON BOARD. THE ONLY WAY SUCH A FUEL SLIP SYS COULD WORK WOULD BE FOR THE FUELER TO DEFUEL THE ACFT AND THEN ADD OUR RELEASE FUEL AND COMMON SENSE WILL TELL YOU AN AIRLINE IS NOT GOING TO DO THAT ON EVERY LEG. I SINCERELY HOPE THIS PROB IS ADDRESSED BEFORE WE HAVE ANOTHER FLAMEOUT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR HAD NOT MUCH ELSE TO ADD TO THE ORIGINAL RPT. HE DID NOT KNOW THE EXACT NUMBER OF 'ALLEGED FLAMEOUTS' HE HAD HEARD MENTIONED AND COULD NOT QUOTE THE SOURCE. THE ACR IS NOT DOING ANYTHING TO PREDETERMINE THE EXACT AMOUNT OF FUEL IN THE TANKS PRIOR TO ANY REFUELING PROC. THIS DOES LEAVE THE CREWS WITH AN UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE AMOUNT OF FUEL ACTUALLY ON BOARD AFTER FUELING. THE GND CREW USES THE ACFT'S TOTALIZER FOR A 'FUEL ON BOARD' READING. THIS TOTALIZER IS LOCATED BY THE R GEAR STUB UNDER THE WING. THE TOTALIZER SIMPLY ADDS THE READING OF ALL THE FUEL GAUGES ON THE ACFT. IF THE GAUGES ARE WRONG THEN THE TOTALIZER IS WRONG. BACK TO SQUARE ONE. THE RPTR DID NOTIFY THE UNION SAFETY REPRESENTATIVE ABOUT THIS PROB, BUT NOT THE FAA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.