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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 391056 |
Time | |
Date | 199801 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : crw |
State Reference | WV |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | other |
Make Model Name | Learjet 35 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | landing other other other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 120 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 2500 |
ASRS Report | 391056 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 3100 |
ASRS Report | 391045 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : declared emergency none taken : anomaly accepted other |
Consequence | faa : investigated Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation other |
Narrative:
On jan/tue/98, in LR35 I was on a part 135 flight from mmu to bna with 3 passenger, and 1 crew member. Approximately 1/2 hour into the flight I noticed the autoplt turning through the next desired course. I disengaged it and manually put the aircraft back on course. While doing so, I noticed control stiffness in the ailerons. I suspected icing of the aileron seals, not uncommon, ran the checklist, retrimmed the aircraft and reconnected the autoplt to the FMS and continued on. About 1 hour into the flight a passenger complained of the smell of smoke. I told him the aircraft had recently come out of maintenance and this was common. A few mins later, he said he saw smoke. I asked the sic (PNF) to have a look at the situation. He did so and reported a light trace of smoke. We both decided to terminate the flight and did so by declaring an emergency and were given vectors by the ATC to crw. We made the landing without incident or harm to anyone or anything. My concern is the fact that my director of maintenance notified me on jan/thu/98, that the teterboro FAA were upset that the aircraft was moved to isp without notification. I'm told that our chief pilot notified our poi, but the maintenance director was not notified. As far as I was concerned, we had written up both discrepancies at crw and had the smoke isolated to the right bleed valve. Maintenance MEL'ed the discrepancy as per the MEL handbook we carry on board. I did ask my director of maintenance if he felt we should have a ferry permit. He felt because it was a deferrable item per the MEL that it was not necessary. We had covered all bases and were legal to take the aircraft to isp for further inspection. In retrospect, I should not have assumed my director of maintenance spoke to our company FAA pmi, instead I should have directly inquired whether or not he had been notified. My chief pilot was not aware that I inquired about a ferry permit and in the future, I will make sure that all parties involved are in the decision making loop. Supplemental information from acn 391045: we break out of the overcast at approximately 2200 ft on the ILS for RWY23 about 7 mi out. As we get closer to the runway I could see all the rescue equipment waiting for us. I ask the tower if the rescue vehicles noticed any smoke from the outside. The control tower tells us that there is no smoke visible outside. The captain and I seeing no visible smoke in the cabin opted to taxi to the FBO with the rescue vehicles following behind. Ground control directs us to taxi to the ramp and shut down both engines and I evacuate/evacuation the aircraft. After 3 hours of talking to our company they wanted the mechanics to find out the cause of the problem with the aircraft. They started work right away and the captain and I left for the hotel. We spoke to the mechanics and explained to them what our maintenance director had just explained to us. They told us that they did not have a problem with signing off our maintenance logbooks since it was in our approved MEL. As the mechanics are finishing up our logbooks we call the FAA at crw and speak to mr X of the FAA. We explained to him in detail what had occurred the previous day and he said we did a fine job of getting the aircraft on the ground. He told us that we did the right thing by declaring an emergency and said he was going to write up his report as an occurrence and not an incident. We also told him that we were flying the aircraft to isp for maintenance and that the mechanics were signing off the logbooks as per MEL. We get our IFR clearance and depart for isp. We land at isp without incident and hand the aircraft over to the mechanic. The captain and I then proceed to the nearest hotel to get some much needed rest. The captain calls my room and proceeds to tell me that he just got a call from our chief pilot. Supposedly the teb FAA is extremely upset because we flew the aircraft over to isp without a ferry permit. We were told that our chief pilot was called in for a meeting with the teb FAA. On jan/fri/98, our chief pilot called both of us into his office for a company meeting. He wanted to know why we departed crw without a ferry permit. We told him that our chief of maintenance specifically told us we did not need one. Supposedlythe FAA said they are going to take some form of action. If we were to do things differently I suppose after speaking to our director of maintenance we should have called the teb FAA and explained our situation to see what they would have said. One would think by doing what the book says and speaking to the people in our company who are in charge of maintenance that we were covered in every detail, but I guess that's not true. Another thing we might have done differently is to have kept our chief pilot more informed to what was going on. Since our director of maintenance told us we did not need a ferry permit and our MEL stated that the right bleed air system could be deferred we did everything we thought was safe and legal.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN LR35 DIVERTS TO CRW BECAUSE OF A BLEED VALVE PROB. THE VALVE IS MEL'ED AND THE ACFT FERRIED TO A MAINT BASE, WITHOUT A FERRY PERMIT. FAA AT TEB IS INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT, SAYING IT WAS NOT LEGAL WITHOUT THE PERMIT.
Narrative: ON JAN/TUE/98, IN LR35 I WAS ON A PART 135 FLT FROM MMU TO BNA WITH 3 PAX, AND 1 CREW MEMBER. APPROX 1/2 HR INTO THE FLT I NOTICED THE AUTOPLT TURNING THROUGH THE NEXT DESIRED COURSE. I DISENGAGED IT AND MANUALLY PUT THE ACFT BACK ON COURSE. WHILE DOING SO, I NOTICED CTL STIFFNESS IN THE AILERONS. I SUSPECTED ICING OF THE AILERON SEALS, NOT UNCOMMON, RAN THE CHKLIST, RETRIMMED THE ACFT AND RECONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO THE FMS AND CONTINUED ON. ABOUT 1 HR INTO THE FLT A PAX COMPLAINED OF THE SMELL OF SMOKE. I TOLD HIM THE ACFT HAD RECENTLY COME OUT OF MAINT AND THIS WAS COMMON. A FEW MINS LATER, HE SAID HE SAW SMOKE. I ASKED THE SIC (PNF) TO HAVE A LOOK AT THE SIT. HE DID SO AND RPTED A LIGHT TRACE OF SMOKE. WE BOTH DECIDED TO TERMINATE THE FLT AND DID SO BY DECLARING AN EMER AND WERE GIVEN VECTORS BY THE ATC TO CRW. WE MADE THE LNDG WITHOUT INCIDENT OR HARM TO ANYONE OR ANYTHING. MY CONCERN IS THE FACT THAT MY DIRECTOR OF MAINT NOTIFIED ME ON JAN/THU/98, THAT THE TETERBORO FAA WERE UPSET THAT THE ACFT WAS MOVED TO ISP WITHOUT NOTIFICATION. I'M TOLD THAT OUR CHIEF PLT NOTIFIED OUR POI, BUT THE MAINT DIRECTOR WAS NOT NOTIFIED. AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED, WE HAD WRITTEN UP BOTH DISCREPANCIES AT CRW AND HAD THE SMOKE ISOLATED TO THE R BLEED VALVE. MAINT MEL'ED THE DISCREPANCY AS PER THE MEL HANDBOOK WE CARRY ON BOARD. I DID ASK MY DIRECTOR OF MAINT IF HE FELT WE SHOULD HAVE A FERRY PERMIT. HE FELT BECAUSE IT WAS A DEFERRABLE ITEM PER THE MEL THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY. WE HAD COVERED ALL BASES AND WERE LEGAL TO TAKE THE ACFT TO ISP FOR FURTHER INSPECTION. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD NOT HAVE ASSUMED MY DIRECTOR OF MAINT SPOKE TO OUR COMPANY FAA PMI, INSTEAD I SHOULD HAVE DIRECTLY INQUIRED WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD BEEN NOTIFIED. MY CHIEF PLT WAS NOT AWARE THAT I INQUIRED ABOUT A FERRY PERMIT AND IN THE FUTURE, I WILL MAKE SURE THAT ALL PARTIES INVOLVED ARE IN THE DECISION MAKING LOOP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 391045: WE BREAK OUT OF THE OVCST AT APPROX 2200 FT ON THE ILS FOR RWY23 ABOUT 7 MI OUT. AS WE GET CLOSER TO THE RWY I COULD SEE ALL THE RESCUE EQUIP WAITING FOR US. I ASK THE TWR IF THE RESCUE VEHICLES NOTICED ANY SMOKE FROM THE OUTSIDE. THE CTL TWR TELLS US THAT THERE IS NO SMOKE VISIBLE OUTSIDE. THE CAPT AND I SEEING NO VISIBLE SMOKE IN THE CABIN OPTED TO TAXI TO THE FBO WITH THE RESCUE VEHICLES FOLLOWING BEHIND. GND CTL DIRECTS US TO TAXI TO THE RAMP AND SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS AND I EVAC THE ACFT. AFTER 3 HRS OF TALKING TO OUR COMPANY THEY WANTED THE MECHS TO FIND OUT THE CAUSE OF THE PROB WITH THE ACFT. THEY STARTED WORK RIGHT AWAY AND THE CAPT AND I LEFT FOR THE HOTEL. WE SPOKE TO THE MECHS AND EXPLAINED TO THEM WHAT OUR MAINT DIRECTOR HAD JUST EXPLAINED TO US. THEY TOLD US THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE A PROB WITH SIGNING OFF OUR MAINT LOGBOOKS SINCE IT WAS IN OUR APPROVED MEL. AS THE MECHS ARE FINISHING UP OUR LOGBOOKS WE CALL THE FAA AT CRW AND SPEAK TO MR X OF THE FAA. WE EXPLAINED TO HIM IN DETAIL WHAT HAD OCCURRED THE PREVIOUS DAY AND HE SAID WE DID A FINE JOB OF GETTING THE ACFT ON THE GND. HE TOLD US THAT WE DID THE RIGHT THING BY DECLARING AN EMER AND SAID HE WAS GOING TO WRITE UP HIS RPT AS AN OCCURRENCE AND NOT AN INCIDENT. WE ALSO TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE FLYING THE ACFT TO ISP FOR MAINT AND THAT THE MECHS WERE SIGNING OFF THE LOGBOOKS AS PER MEL. WE GET OUR IFR CLRNC AND DEPART FOR ISP. WE LAND AT ISP WITHOUT INCIDENT AND HAND THE ACFT OVER TO THE MECH. THE CAPT AND I THEN PROCEED TO THE NEAREST HOTEL TO GET SOME MUCH NEEDED REST. THE CAPT CALLS MY ROOM AND PROCEEDS TO TELL ME THAT HE JUST GOT A CALL FROM OUR CHIEF PLT. SUPPOSEDLY THE TEB FAA IS EXTREMELY UPSET BECAUSE WE FLEW THE ACFT OVER TO ISP WITHOUT A FERRY PERMIT. WE WERE TOLD THAT OUR CHIEF PLT WAS CALLED IN FOR A MEETING WITH THE TEB FAA. ON JAN/FRI/98, OUR CHIEF PLT CALLED BOTH OF US INTO HIS OFFICE FOR A COMPANY MEETING. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHY WE DEPARTED CRW WITHOUT A FERRY PERMIT. WE TOLD HIM THAT OUR CHIEF OF MAINT SPECIFICALLY TOLD US WE DID NOT NEED ONE. SUPPOSEDLYTHE FAA SAID THEY ARE GOING TO TAKE SOME FORM OF ACTION. IF WE WERE TO DO THINGS DIFFERENTLY I SUPPOSE AFTER SPEAKING TO OUR DIRECTOR OF MAINT WE SHOULD HAVE CALLED THE TEB FAA AND EXPLAINED OUR SIT TO SEE WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE SAID. ONE WOULD THINK BY DOING WHAT THE BOOK SAYS AND SPEAKING TO THE PEOPLE IN OUR COMPANY WHO ARE IN CHARGE OF MAINT THAT WE WERE COVERED IN EVERY DETAIL, BUT I GUESS THAT'S NOT TRUE. ANOTHER THING WE MIGHT HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY IS TO HAVE KEPT OUR CHIEF PLT MORE INFORMED TO WHAT WAS GOING ON. SINCE OUR DIRECTOR OF MAINT TOLD US WE DID NOT NEED A FERRY PERMIT AND OUR MEL STATED THAT THE R BLEED AIR SYS COULD BE DEFERRED WE DID EVERYTHING WE THOUGHT WAS SAFE AND LEGAL.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.