37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 393420 |
Time | |
Date | 199802 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : hpn |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 3000 msl bound upper : 3200 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : n90 |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | departure other departure sid : sid |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 230 flight time total : 10519 flight time type : 3500 |
ASRS Report | 393420 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : overshoot altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Departed hpn on SID, which required immediate turn after takeoff, a leveloff at 3000 ft MSL (2750 ft AGL), and airspeed kept at or below 190 KIAS. All this was briefed prior to departure, especially that 3000 ft MSL would be reached quickly. I was PNF, and after takeoff I made callout for when to start the turn, airspeed, altitude to go, etc. My first officer became more concerned with airspeed control and used increased pitch to keep speed below the 190 KIAS. I became more emphatic with the altitude callouts and tried to coach him to level off at the required 3000 ft MSL. By the time the climb was stopped, we reached 3200 ft MSL before returning to 3000 ft. Contributing factors: the complexity of this SID that required so many things all at once, my first officer fixating on only one of them, and everything happening too fast for me to be able to do much to correct the situation prior to busting the altitude. I started callouts far in advance. The SID was briefed. Inactions: possibly I could've taken the controls from my first officer, but at what point to do that? He was starting corrective action, if I had taken over I would have had a handful to deal with in the transition. I could've pulled the thrust levers back, but the pitch altitude was so great that it would've resulted in a huge airspeed loss. I'm not trying to wriggle out of my PIC responsibility, but there was only so much I could do or say in the short time available, it happened so quick. When you brief something and get acknowledgment, you expect that the other pilot, being a trained, skilled professional, will perform. There's no time or opportunity to undo things or provide training. There seems to be a reluctance on the part of many pilots I've flown with lately, to reduce the thrust when it's necessary. They aren't thinking of the thrust levers as a flight control, which they are. Maybe I should include that in my briefing, but how much 'ground school' should I teach prior to every flight? I'm just frustrated at what can be done on such short notice.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CANADAIR REGIONAL JET ON SID DEP WITH SPD AND ALT RESTR. PF, FO, CONCENTRATING ON AIRSPD CTL FLEW THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT BY 200 FT.
Narrative: DEPARTED HPN ON SID, WHICH REQUIRED IMMEDIATE TURN AFTER TKOF, A LEVELOFF AT 3000 FT MSL (2750 FT AGL), AND AIRSPD KEPT AT OR BELOW 190 KIAS. ALL THIS WAS BRIEFED PRIOR TO DEP, ESPECIALLY THAT 3000 FT MSL WOULD BE REACHED QUICKLY. I WAS PNF, AND AFTER TKOF I MADE CALLOUT FOR WHEN TO START THE TURN, AIRSPD, ALT TO GO, ETC. MY FO BECAME MORE CONCERNED WITH AIRSPD CTL AND USED INCREASED PITCH TO KEEP SPD BELOW THE 190 KIAS. I BECAME MORE EMPHATIC WITH THE ALT CALLOUTS AND TRIED TO COACH HIM TO LEVEL OFF AT THE REQUIRED 3000 FT MSL. BY THE TIME THE CLB WAS STOPPED, WE REACHED 3200 FT MSL BEFORE RETURNING TO 3000 FT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE COMPLEXITY OF THIS SID THAT REQUIRED SO MANY THINGS ALL AT ONCE, MY FO FIXATING ON ONLY ONE OF THEM, AND EVERYTHING HAPPENING TOO FAST FOR ME TO BE ABLE TO DO MUCH TO CORRECT THE SIT PRIOR TO BUSTING THE ALT. I STARTED CALLOUTS FAR IN ADVANCE. THE SID WAS BRIEFED. INACTIONS: POSSIBLY I COULD'VE TAKEN THE CTLS FROM MY FO, BUT AT WHAT POINT TO DO THAT? HE WAS STARTING CORRECTIVE ACTION, IF I HAD TAKEN OVER I WOULD HAVE HAD A HANDFUL TO DEAL WITH IN THE TRANSITION. I COULD'VE PULLED THE THRUST LEVERS BACK, BUT THE PITCH ALT WAS SO GREAT THAT IT WOULD'VE RESULTED IN A HUGE AIRSPD LOSS. I'M NOT TRYING TO WRIGGLE OUT OF MY PIC RESPONSIBILITY, BUT THERE WAS ONLY SO MUCH I COULD DO OR SAY IN THE SHORT TIME AVAILABLE, IT HAPPENED SO QUICK. WHEN YOU BRIEF SOMETHING AND GET ACKNOWLEDGMENT, YOU EXPECT THAT THE OTHER PLT, BEING A TRAINED, SKILLED PROFESSIONAL, WILL PERFORM. THERE'S NO TIME OR OPPORTUNITY TO UNDO THINGS OR PROVIDE TRAINING. THERE SEEMS TO BE A RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF MANY PLTS I'VE FLOWN WITH LATELY, TO REDUCE THE THRUST WHEN IT'S NECESSARY. THEY AREN'T THINKING OF THE THRUST LEVERS AS A FLT CTL, WHICH THEY ARE. MAYBE I SHOULD INCLUDE THAT IN MY BRIEFING, BUT HOW MUCH 'GND SCHOOL' SHOULD I TEACH PRIOR TO EVERY FLT? I'M JUST FRUSTRATED AT WHAT CAN BE DONE ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.