Narrative:

As previously briefed, copilot started right engine by himself. While still taxiing across runway 3/21, the copilot informed me he was stopping the start procedure because he forgot to turn on the ignition. I glanced up at the ignition and confirmed that it was in the off position. The copilot pulled out the pom, reviewed it, and then informed he was going to start the right engine. I confirmed the rotation had stopped, and the copilot attempted to restart. As I stopped taxiing short of the pad at runway 36, the copilot indicated he had a hot start. I looked at the egt and saw 675 degrees. I noted the copilot was shutting down the engine and that the egt was decreasing. We discussed our options and determined we must return to the gate for maintenance. The copilot called the company. I noted egt at 232 degrees. I assumed a high quartering tailwind was causing the egt to remain high. I motored the engine for 30 seconds and the egt dropped to 85 degrees. I got clearance to return to the gate area and did a 180 degree to proceed north on taxiway J. Prior to crossing runway 3/21 on taxiway J, the tower called indicating other aircraft noted smoke and flames coming from the right engine. I stopped the aircraft prior to reaching runway 3/21. I asked the tower if the fire was out. They said they couldn't see it, but had received calls from numerous landing and taxiing aircraft that the right engine had smoke and flames coming from it. We told the tower to send for the fire department. We discussed the need to evacuate/evacuation, and decided to prepare the aircraft for evacuate/evacuation, but not to initiate the evacuate/evacuation at this time. The copilot called to flight attendant, 1ST class, that we had possible engine fire and to prepare for an orderly evacuate/evacuation. We started the evacuate/evacuation checklist by configuring the aircraft. Because of the possibility of a continuing fire somewhere in the right engine, we elected to pull the fire handle to insure all system to the right engine were shut off. By this time, the fire department was seen responding to the aircraft, and we determined the use of the fire bottle was not necessary. We still had no cockpit indications of fire, but the tower indicated we still had smoke and fire. I attempted to contact the fire department on both ground control and tower frequencys, but was unsuccessful. I called the tower for the frequency that the fire department was on, but the tower said they were coordinating that now. We decided it was time to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft and completed the remaining items on the evacuate/evacuation checklist. We determined that with only 49 passenger on board, we could perform a timely evacuate/evacuation by using only the 1L door. This would keep the passenger away from the fire department activity at the rear of the aircraft. The copilot made a PA for an orderly, controled evacuate/evacuation out the left side of the aircraft, out the 1L door. We then informed the tower that we had started evacuate/evacuation and were leaving the cockpit. The fire department arrived on the scene. Soon after this, the fire department directed the flight attendant to stop the evacuate/evacuation process. Several passenger (8-10) evacuate/evacuationed before they were stopped. The copilot returned to the cockpit while I proceeded to the 1L door to communicate with the fire department. They indicated the fire was contained, and they did not want any more passenger to evacuate/evacuation. When the fire was finally out, the fire department lowered the rear stairs. By then, we had coordinated for the evacuate/evacuationed passenger to reboard the aircraft while we were towed back to the gate. Maintenance arrived with a tug. We informed them that we could not start the APU (low battery voltage). They attempted to start the APU but were unsuccessful. We still had power for the intercom and some residual brake pressure, so maintenance started towing to gate. The first tug died. A new tug removed the old tug and then pulled us back to gate. We arrived at gate and deplaned all passenger.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88 ACFT ON RAMP IN PREPARATION FOR TKOF, FO STARTED REMAINING ENG BUT FORGOT TO TURN ON THE IGNITION. FLC WAITED FOR ENG TO STOP ROTATION AND AGAIN ATTEMPTED START. EGT READ VERY HIGH AND FLC SHUT DOWN ENG AS RPTS FROM OTHER ACFT NOTED FLAME AND SMOKE COMING FROM THE ENG. FLC COMMENCED EVAC, BUT THE FIRE DEPT STOPPED IT AFTER JUST A FEW PAX HAD DEPLANED.

Narrative: AS PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED, COPLT STARTED R ENG BY HIMSELF. WHILE STILL TAXIING ACROSS RWY 3/21, THE COPLT INFORMED ME HE WAS STOPPING THE START PROC BECAUSE HE FORGOT TO TURN ON THE IGNITION. I GLANCED UP AT THE IGNITION AND CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS IN THE OFF POS. THE COPLT PULLED OUT THE POM, REVIEWED IT, AND THEN INFORMED HE WAS GOING TO START THE R ENG. I CONFIRMED THE ROTATION HAD STOPPED, AND THE COPLT ATTEMPTED TO RESTART. AS I STOPPED TAXIING SHORT OF THE PAD AT RWY 36, THE COPLT INDICATED HE HAD A HOT START. I LOOKED AT THE EGT AND SAW 675 DEGS. I NOTED THE COPLT WAS SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG AND THAT THE EGT WAS DECREASING. WE DISCUSSED OUR OPTIONS AND DETERMINED WE MUST RETURN TO THE GATE FOR MAINT. THE COPLT CALLED THE COMPANY. I NOTED EGT AT 232 DEGS. I ASSUMED A HIGH QUARTERING TAILWIND WAS CAUSING THE EGT TO REMAIN HIGH. I MOTORED THE ENG FOR 30 SECONDS AND THE EGT DROPPED TO 85 DEGS. I GOT CLRNC TO RETURN TO THE GATE AREA AND DID A 180 DEG TO PROCEED N ON TXWY J. PRIOR TO XING RWY 3/21 ON TXWY J, THE TWR CALLED INDICATING OTHER ACFT NOTED SMOKE AND FLAMES COMING FROM THE R ENG. I STOPPED THE ACFT PRIOR TO REACHING RWY 3/21. I ASKED THE TWR IF THE FIRE WAS OUT. THEY SAID THEY COULDN'T SEE IT, BUT HAD RECEIVED CALLS FROM NUMEROUS LNDG AND TAXIING ACFT THAT THE R ENG HAD SMOKE AND FLAMES COMING FROM IT. WE TOLD THE TWR TO SEND FOR THE FIRE DEPT. WE DISCUSSED THE NEED TO EVAC, AND DECIDED TO PREPARE THE ACFT FOR EVAC, BUT NOT TO INITIATE THE EVAC AT THIS TIME. THE COPLT CALLED TO FLT ATTENDANT, 1ST CLASS, THAT WE HAD POSSIBLE ENG FIRE AND TO PREPARE FOR AN ORDERLY EVAC. WE STARTED THE EVAC CHKLIST BY CONFIGURING THE ACFT. BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONTINUING FIRE SOMEWHERE IN THE R ENG, WE ELECTED TO PULL THE FIRE HANDLE TO INSURE ALL SYS TO THE R ENG WERE SHUT OFF. BY THIS TIME, THE FIRE DEPT WAS SEEN RESPONDING TO THE ACFT, AND WE DETERMINED THE USE OF THE FIRE BOTTLE WAS NOT NECESSARY. WE STILL HAD NO COCKPIT INDICATIONS OF FIRE, BUT THE TWR INDICATED WE STILL HAD SMOKE AND FIRE. I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE FIRE DEPT ON BOTH GND CTL AND TWR FREQS, BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. I CALLED THE TWR FOR THE FREQ THAT THE FIRE DEPT WAS ON, BUT THE TWR SAID THEY WERE COORDINATING THAT NOW. WE DECIDED IT WAS TIME TO EVAC THE ACFT AND COMPLETED THE REMAINING ITEMS ON THE EVAC CHKLIST. WE DETERMINED THAT WITH ONLY 49 PAX ON BOARD, WE COULD PERFORM A TIMELY EVAC BY USING ONLY THE 1L DOOR. THIS WOULD KEEP THE PAX AWAY FROM THE FIRE DEPT ACTIVITY AT THE REAR OF THE ACFT. THE COPLT MADE A PA FOR AN ORDERLY, CTLED EVAC OUT THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT, OUT THE 1L DOOR. WE THEN INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE HAD STARTED EVAC AND WERE LEAVING THE COCKPIT. THE FIRE DEPT ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. SOON AFTER THIS, THE FIRE DEPT DIRECTED THE FLT ATTENDANT TO STOP THE EVAC PROCESS. SEVERAL PAX (8-10) EVACED BEFORE THEY WERE STOPPED. THE COPLT RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT WHILE I PROCEEDED TO THE 1L DOOR TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE FIRE DEPT. THEY INDICATED THE FIRE WAS CONTAINED, AND THEY DID NOT WANT ANY MORE PAX TO EVAC. WHEN THE FIRE WAS FINALLY OUT, THE FIRE DEPT LOWERED THE REAR STAIRS. BY THEN, WE HAD COORDINATED FOR THE EVACED PAX TO REBOARD THE ACFT WHILE WE WERE TOWED BACK TO THE GATE. MAINT ARRIVED WITH A TUG. WE INFORMED THEM THAT WE COULD NOT START THE APU (LOW BATTERY VOLTAGE). THEY ATTEMPTED TO START THE APU BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. WE STILL HAD PWR FOR THE INTERCOM AND SOME RESIDUAL BRAKE PRESSURE, SO MAINT STARTED TOWING TO GATE. THE FIRST TUG DIED. A NEW TUG REMOVED THE OLD TUG AND THEN PULLED US BACK TO GATE. WE ARRIVED AT GATE AND DEPLANED ALL PAX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.