Narrative:

I cleared the F15's for a visual overhead approach to edf AFB, with a restr to cross 6.4 DME at 1700 ft. The restr was to ensure compliance with far 93 crossing procedures. A VFR PA28 was flying sbound across the edf runway 5 final at 2200 ft on 'post office arrival' VFR coded route into anc. Both aircraft were switched to the respective towers. The F15's leveled off at 2200 ft for several mi. Anc tower advised that the PA28 did not have the F15's in sight. I tried a 'blind' transmission on 243.0 to issue traffic for the F15's. The PA28 eventually saw the F15's (as recounted by the tower controller) and took immediate evasive action. Although a tragedy was averted this time, the pilot (lead) of the F15 did not comply with the restr. Perhaps the military needs to do a better job of briefing transient pilots as to the importance of adhering to far 93 procedures unless otherwise instructed. In this case, simply complying with the restr would have sufficed. The situation north of anchorage is hazardous enough by itself, and much worse with 400 mph jets screaming through at the wrong altitude.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FLT OF 6 MIL F15'S LNDG AT AN ADJACENT ARPT WAS ISSUED A RESTR TO CROSS THE EDF 6.4 DME AT 1700 FT. A VFR INBOUND PA28 LNDG AT ANC WAS RESTR TO CROSS AT 2200 FT FOR SEPARATION. THE F15'S CROSSED ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT AT 2200 FT RESULTING IN AN NMAC WITH THE PA28.

Narrative: I CLRED THE F15'S FOR A VISUAL OVERHEAD APCH TO EDF AFB, WITH A RESTR TO CROSS 6.4 DME AT 1700 FT. THE RESTR WAS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH FAR 93 XING PROCS. A VFR PA28 WAS FLYING SBOUND ACROSS THE EDF RWY 5 FINAL AT 2200 FT ON 'POST OFFICE ARR' VFR CODED RTE INTO ANC. BOTH ACFT WERE SWITCHED TO THE RESPECTIVE TWRS. THE F15'S LEVELED OFF AT 2200 FT FOR SEVERAL MI. ANC TWR ADVISED THAT THE PA28 DID NOT HAVE THE F15'S IN SIGHT. I TRIED A 'BLIND' XMISSION ON 243.0 TO ISSUE TFC FOR THE F15'S. THE PA28 EVENTUALLY SAW THE F15'S (AS RECOUNTED BY THE TWR CTLR) AND TOOK IMMEDIATE EVASIVE ACTION. ALTHOUGH A TRAGEDY WAS AVERTED THIS TIME, THE PLT (LEAD) OF THE F15 DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE RESTR. PERHAPS THE MIL NEEDS TO DO A BETTER JOB OF BRIEFING TRANSIENT PLTS AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF ADHERING TO FAR 93 PROCS UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED. IN THIS CASE, SIMPLY COMPLYING WITH THE RESTR WOULD HAVE SUFFICED. THE SIT N OF ANCHORAGE IS HAZARDOUS ENOUGH BY ITSELF, AND MUCH WORSE WITH 400 MPH JETS SCREAMING THROUGH AT THE WRONG ALT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.