Narrative:

I was the captain and PF on an air carrier B737 from austin to cincinnati. Arriving in the cvg local area we were told to expect an ILS to runway 9. WX was no factor. Upon handoff to cvg tower we were cleared to land and advised that traffic was landing runway 18R and would hold short of runway 9 (6428 ft available for runway 18R). After we touched down and had begun decelerating, I noticed a company B727 on runway 18R that appeared to be unable to stop prior to runway 9. I increased reverse thrust and braking so as to stop prior to runway 18R. At about that time, the B727 advised the tower they would not be able to hold short. Tower told them to roll through the intersection and for us to hold short of runway 18R which I had already decided to do. I estimate we were at or near taxi speed approximately 500-1000 ft before the intersection. At cvg, a turbojet landing and holding short of runway 9/27 only has 6428 ft of runway available. An aircraft landing on runways 9 or 27 has about 5000 ft of available runway prior to runway 18R/36L. Had I not seen the B727 or worse yet, if we had both executed low altitude gars, a certain disaster would have occurred. In my opinion, intersecting runway operations at some airports are accidents waiting to happen. The airline companies and the FAA must realize that in their quest to maximize airport capacity that the benefit of some operations just don't outweigh the dangers. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter is a captain on the B737-200. He said that since this incident his company has ceased land and hold short operations (lahso) at cvg. This incident, the reporter alleged, occurred because the company B727-200 only had 6428 ft of normal stopping distance available and the other captain admitted to touching down slightly long and fast. The first officer was, apparently, flying the B727 and was fairly new to the aircraft. The reporter said that his point in the report was that this is not an unusual situation and therefore this incident demonstrates the problems of lahso. The reporter spoke to both the chief pilots in cvg and atl about the situation and the company management decided to no longer accept lahso at cvg. The reporter alleged that several other airports are also being considered for the same ban. Supplemental information from acn 395137: at approximately 50 ft the copilot 'rounded' out early causing the airplane to float and consequently land longer down the runway than normal. The nose was held off the ground causing additional runway to be used. Late braking and reverse also contributed to more runway being used. Recognizing the conditions I took control of the aircraft and used maximum reverse and braking. While these events were occurring the tower had cleared a B737 to land runway 9 and the airplane was approaching the intersection. At 80 KTS, I released the reverse, but continued brake in hopes of stopping prior to the intersection of runways 18R and 9. As we were stopping as we approached the intersection the B737 was approximately 1500-2000 ft from us and had slowed to near taxi speed. The tower cleared us to 'go on through the intersection.' I released the heavy braking and added power to continue through the intersection. Nothing abnormal ensued. No injuries or mechanical failures occurred. With a new copilot and 6400 ft of runway available I should have made the landing. But to that point the copilot had been performing satisfactorily, and did so the next 2 legs. I should have recognized the potential to use more runway length sooner and taken control sooner. I was reluctant to go around due to the possibility of the airplane on runway 9 doing the same thing and meeting in the air. I believed I could stop the airplane prior to a conflict. The tower should have protected that intersection in the event of 2 airplanes having any kind of stopping problems, so as not to meet in the center of the runway intxns. The FAA and the acrs should review lahso at the airports that have 7000 ft or less available for lahso operations, since a solid wall is erected for both runways at the intersection of the 2 active runways with no room for error. Supplemental information from acn 395136: previous landing in lex was kind of hard, so I compensated by keeping the airspeed up (above reference) by 10-15 KTS. On landing, stable approach. I visually flewthe flight director to landing. With the crosswind and previous landing, I touched down smoothly about 3000 ft down the runway which left 3400 ft to stop. The #3 engine was slow to go into reverse. I got on the brakes and with poor runway markings, couldn't tell how far down runway 18R the intersection was. Nearing runway 9/27 I applied heavier braking. Contributing factors: relatively new first officer, poor previous landing, long landing relative to runway available, simultaneous lndgs on intersecting runways with no margin for error, aircraft didn't respond as well as it usually does.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B737 FLC RPTS THAT THEY HAD TO BRAKE HARD AND USE MAX REVERSE THRUST DURING ROLLOUT TO HOLD SHORT OF A CROSS RWY THAT A COMPANY B727 HAD LANDED ON. THE B727 WAS UNABLE TO HONOR ITS LAND AND HOLD SHORT COMMITMENT.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT AND PF ON AN ACR B737 FROM AUSTIN TO CINCINNATI. ARRIVING IN THE CVG LCL AREA WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT AN ILS TO RWY 9. WX WAS NO FACTOR. UPON HDOF TO CVG TWR WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AND ADVISED THAT TFC WAS LNDG RWY 18R AND WOULD HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9 (6428 FT AVAILABLE FOR RWY 18R). AFTER WE TOUCHED DOWN AND HAD BEGUN DECELERATING, I NOTICED A COMPANY B727 ON RWY 18R THAT APPEARED TO BE UNABLE TO STOP PRIOR TO RWY 9. I INCREASED REVERSE THRUST AND BRAKING SO AS TO STOP PRIOR TO RWY 18R. AT ABOUT THAT TIME, THE B727 ADVISED THE TWR THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD SHORT. TWR TOLD THEM TO ROLL THROUGH THE INTXN AND FOR US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 18R WHICH I HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO DO. I ESTIMATE WE WERE AT OR NEAR TAXI SPD APPROX 500-1000 FT BEFORE THE INTXN. AT CVG, A TURBOJET LNDG AND HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 9/27 ONLY HAS 6428 FT OF RWY AVAILABLE. AN ACFT LNDG ON RWYS 9 OR 27 HAS ABOUT 5000 FT OF AVAILABLE RWY PRIOR TO RWY 18R/36L. HAD I NOT SEEN THE B727 OR WORSE YET, IF WE HAD BOTH EXECUTED LOW ALT GARS, A CERTAIN DISASTER WOULD HAVE OCCURRED. IN MY OPINION, INTERSECTING RWY OPS AT SOME ARPTS ARE ACCIDENTS WAITING TO HAPPEN. THE AIRLINE COMPANIES AND THE FAA MUST REALIZE THAT IN THEIR QUEST TO MAXIMIZE ARPT CAPACITY THAT THE BENEFIT OF SOME OPS JUST DON'T OUTWEIGH THE DANGERS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS A CAPT ON THE B737-200. HE SAID THAT SINCE THIS INCIDENT HIS COMPANY HAS CEASED LAND AND HOLD SHORT OPS (LAHSO) AT CVG. THIS INCIDENT, THE RPTR ALLEGED, OCCURRED BECAUSE THE COMPANY B727-200 ONLY HAD 6428 FT OF NORMAL STOPPING DISTANCE AVAILABLE AND THE OTHER CAPT ADMITTED TO TOUCHING DOWN SLIGHTLY LONG AND FAST. THE FO WAS, APPARENTLY, FLYING THE B727 AND WAS FAIRLY NEW TO THE ACFT. THE RPTR SAID THAT HIS POINT IN THE RPT WAS THAT THIS IS NOT AN UNUSUAL SIT AND THEREFORE THIS INCIDENT DEMONSTRATES THE PROBS OF LAHSO. THE RPTR SPOKE TO BOTH THE CHIEF PLTS IN CVG AND ATL ABOUT THE SIT AND THE COMPANY MGMNT DECIDED TO NO LONGER ACCEPT LAHSO AT CVG. THE RPTR ALLEGED THAT SEVERAL OTHER ARPTS ARE ALSO BEING CONSIDERED FOR THE SAME BAN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 395137: AT APPROX 50 FT THE COPLT 'ROUNDED' OUT EARLY CAUSING THE AIRPLANE TO FLOAT AND CONSEQUENTLY LAND LONGER DOWN THE RWY THAN NORMAL. THE NOSE WAS HELD OFF THE GND CAUSING ADDITIONAL RWY TO BE USED. LATE BRAKING AND REVERSE ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO MORE RWY BEING USED. RECOGNIZING THE CONDITIONS I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND USED MAX REVERSE AND BRAKING. WHILE THESE EVENTS WERE OCCURRING THE TWR HAD CLRED A B737 TO LAND RWY 9 AND THE AIRPLANE WAS APCHING THE INTXN. AT 80 KTS, I RELEASED THE REVERSE, BUT CONTINUED BRAKE IN HOPES OF STOPPING PRIOR TO THE INTXN OF RWYS 18R AND 9. AS WE WERE STOPPING AS WE APCHED THE INTXN THE B737 WAS APPROX 1500-2000 FT FROM US AND HAD SLOWED TO NEAR TAXI SPD. THE TWR CLRED US TO 'GO ON THROUGH THE INTXN.' I RELEASED THE HVY BRAKING AND ADDED PWR TO CONTINUE THROUGH THE INTXN. NOTHING ABNORMAL ENSUED. NO INJURIES OR MECHANICAL FAILURES OCCURRED. WITH A NEW COPLT AND 6400 FT OF RWY AVAILABLE I SHOULD HAVE MADE THE LNDG. BUT TO THAT POINT THE COPLT HAD BEEN PERFORMING SATISFACTORILY, AND DID SO THE NEXT 2 LEGS. I SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THE POTENTIAL TO USE MORE RWY LENGTH SOONER AND TAKEN CTL SOONER. I WAS RELUCTANT TO GAR DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE AIRPLANE ON RWY 9 DOING THE SAME THING AND MEETING IN THE AIR. I BELIEVED I COULD STOP THE AIRPLANE PRIOR TO A CONFLICT. THE TWR SHOULD HAVE PROTECTED THAT INTXN IN THE EVENT OF 2 AIRPLANES HAVING ANY KIND OF STOPPING PROBS, SO AS NOT TO MEET IN THE CTR OF THE RWY INTXNS. THE FAA AND THE ACRS SHOULD REVIEW LAHSO AT THE ARPTS THAT HAVE 7000 FT OR LESS AVAILABLE FOR LAHSO OPS, SINCE A SOLID WALL IS ERECTED FOR BOTH RWYS AT THE INTXN OF THE 2 ACTIVE RWYS WITH NO ROOM FOR ERROR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 395136: PREVIOUS LNDG IN LEX WAS KIND OF HARD, SO I COMPENSATED BY KEEPING THE AIRSPD UP (ABOVE REF) BY 10-15 KTS. ON LNDG, STABLE APCH. I VISUALLY FLEWTHE FLT DIRECTOR TO LNDG. WITH THE XWIND AND PREVIOUS LNDG, I TOUCHED DOWN SMOOTHLY ABOUT 3000 FT DOWN THE RWY WHICH LEFT 3400 FT TO STOP. THE #3 ENG WAS SLOW TO GO INTO REVERSE. I GOT ON THE BRAKES AND WITH POOR RWY MARKINGS, COULDN'T TELL HOW FAR DOWN RWY 18R THE INTXN WAS. NEARING RWY 9/27 I APPLIED HEAVIER BRAKING. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: RELATIVELY NEW FO, POOR PREVIOUS LNDG, LONG LNDG RELATIVE TO RWY AVAILABLE, SIMULTANEOUS LNDGS ON INTERSECTING RWYS WITH NO MARGIN FOR ERROR, ACFT DIDN'T RESPOND AS WELL AS IT USUALLY DOES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.