An air carrier FK10 first officer discovered that the radome hatch was improperly installed and he w...

Attributes
ACN	398323
Time
Date	199804
Day	Wed
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : ord
State Reference	IL
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 5000
Environment
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : ord tower : ord
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Fokker 100
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	Other Other
Flight Phase	climbout : initial ground : preflight other
Route In Use	arrival other departure other
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Qualification	pilot : instrument pilot : commercial
ASRS Report	398323
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
ASRS Report	398324
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact other
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

During the walkaround, I found the lower nose radome access hatch installed backwards, so that the handle could possibly be blown open by the slipstream. I reinstalled the hatch, but was unable to get it completely closed and locked. I then finished the walkaround, intending to call maintenance. However, upon re- entering the aircraft, I allowed myself to become distraction with some other problems and forgot to place the call. After takeoff the aircraft would not pressurize. I remembered the hatch and told the captain. We returned to ord, landing 4000 pounds overweight. Maintenance secured the hatch and the overweight inspection was ok. We then flew to aus without further trouble. I completely accept the full blame for my lapse of attention. But I have several suggestions: 1) I frequently find the radome and avionics hatches installed backwards. Ground crews should know the proper installation. 2) while there are MFDU alert messages for unlocked avionics hatches, there is none for the radome hatch. Perhaps this could be changed. 3) when ground pushback crews disconnect the tow bar, as a backup, they could be instructed to check the radome hatch above the nose gear. Supplemental information from acn 398324: during initial climb out we heard a rush of air that was coming from the nose of the aircraft. We also noticed that the cabin was not pressurizing. I discussed that there might be a panel open. At that time the first officer said that during preflight he found the radome access hatch was put in backwards. At this time, we were level 5000 ft and 200 KTS. We returned to ord with an uneventful 92000 pound, 100 ft sink rate landing. I elected not to burn down to landing weight because of the uncertainty of the hatch staying with us. We talked about how to avoid this and the first officer said he wouldn't touch the hatches anymore and just call maintenance to fix it. Also we need to tell maintenance how to put the hatch in properly. This happens quite often.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FK10 FO DISCOVERED THAT THE RADOME HATCH WAS IMPROPERLY INSTALLED AND HE WAS UNABLE TO INSTALL IT HIMSELF. HE FORGOT TO INFORM MAINT PERSONNEL. THE ACFT WOULD NOT PRESSURIZE AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: DURING THE WALKAROUND, I FOUND THE LOWER NOSE RADOME ACCESS HATCH INSTALLED BACKWARDS, SO THAT THE HANDLE COULD POSSIBLY BE BLOWN OPEN BY THE SLIPSTREAM. I REINSTALLED THE HATCH, BUT WAS UNABLE TO GET IT COMPLETELY CLOSED AND LOCKED. I THEN FINISHED THE WALKAROUND, INTENDING TO CALL MAINT. HOWEVER, UPON RE- ENTERING THE ACFT, I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME DISTR WITH SOME OTHER PROBS AND FORGOT TO PLACE THE CALL. AFTER TKOF THE ACFT WOULD NOT PRESSURIZE. I REMEMBERED THE HATCH AND TOLD THE CAPT. WE RETURNED TO ORD, LNDG 4000 LBS OVERWT. MAINT SECURED THE HATCH AND THE OVERWT INSPECTION WAS OK. WE THEN FLEW TO AUS WITHOUT FURTHER TROUBLE. I COMPLETELY ACCEPT THE FULL BLAME FOR MY LAPSE OF ATTN. BUT I HAVE SEVERAL SUGGESTIONS: 1) I FREQUENTLY FIND THE RADOME AND AVIONICS HATCHES INSTALLED BACKWARDS. GND CREWS SHOULD KNOW THE PROPER INSTALLATION. 2) WHILE THERE ARE MFDU ALERT MESSAGES FOR UNLOCKED AVIONICS HATCHES, THERE IS NONE FOR THE RADOME HATCH. PERHAPS THIS COULD BE CHANGED. 3) WHEN GND PUSHBACK CREWS DISCONNECT THE TOW BAR, AS A BACKUP, THEY COULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CHK THE RADOME HATCH ABOVE THE NOSE GEAR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 398324: DURING INITIAL CLBOUT WE HEARD A RUSH OF AIR THAT WAS COMING FROM THE NOSE OF THE ACFT. WE ALSO NOTICED THAT THE CABIN WAS NOT PRESSURIZING. I DISCUSSED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PANEL OPEN. AT THAT TIME THE FO SAID THAT DURING PREFLT HE FOUND THE RADOME ACCESS HATCH WAS PUT IN BACKWARDS. AT THIS TIME, WE WERE LEVEL 5000 FT AND 200 KTS. WE RETURNED TO ORD WITH AN UNEVENTFUL 92000 LB, 100 FT SINK RATE LNDG. I ELECTED NOT TO BURN DOWN TO LNDG WT BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE HATCH STAYING WITH US. WE TALKED ABOUT HOW TO AVOID THIS AND THE FO SAID HE WOULDN'T TOUCH THE HATCHES ANYMORE AND JUST CALL MAINT TO FIX IT. ALSO WE NEED TO TELL MAINT HOW TO PUT THE HATCH IN PROPERLY. THIS HAPPENS QUITE OFTEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

An air carrier FK10 first officer discovered that the radome hatch was improperly installed and he was unable to install it himself. He forgot to inform maintenance personnel. The aircraft would not pressurize after takeoff.