Narrative:

During cruise flight xx from jfk to iad, and while recording the engine health data, a presence of smoke was observed in the cockpit and cabin. The cause of the smoke was not known at this time. In an abundance of caution, an emergency was declared with ZNY. The emergency procedures for 'smoke or fire flight deck or cabin' were complied with and the cabin pressurization was dumped to clear the cabin. At the time of the incident, the aircraft was located at 16000 ft 25 NM west of lrp on V143. With iad less 38 NM (6.5 mins) a decision was made to land on runway 1L. After an uneventful landing on runway 1L with 19 souls on board (2 crew, 16 passenger, and 1 lap child) the aircraft was evacuate/evacuationed on taxiway Y6 (the first high speed). A few individuals spoke with emergency medical technicians at the scene, however, to the best of my knowledge there were no injuries. The departure and the flight up to the event previously noted was routine and uneventful. After an initial investigation the blower fan for the freon air conditioning was believed to be the cause of the smoke. There are a couple of safety concerns for future abnormalities of this nature. The first relates to the use of the oxygen mask microphone for communications. The mask microphone was acceptable for inter- cockpit communications. The communications when transmitting over the radio with ATC, however, were almost unreadable. Eventually the ARTCC controller handed us off to dulles approach and wished us good luck, but mentioned he could not understand our souls on board and fuel remaining call. This poor communication also caused problems when speaking with dulles approach for our requested runway. Dulles understood something other than what we did and it took 2-3 xmissions for clarification. The second problem had to do with the emergency checklist for smoke in the cockpit and cabin. Some of the circuit breakers referred to on the checklist have collars to identify them and others do not. It makes it very difficult to assign PF and PNF duties when more than 1 person is required to locate the circuit breakers on various panels. The smoke checklist is 3 pages long and the need to xfer controls 3-4 times makes the situation more difficult to complete in the required timely manner. The problems have already been submitted to the training department. Training has stated that the checklist is being revised and they would look at how the new checklist would affect the previously mentioned concerns.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BA3201 FLYING THROUGH ZNY AIRSPACE HAS SMOKE ENTER THE COCKPIT AND CABIN. THE CABIN WAS DEPRESSURIZED AND AN EMER WAS DECLARED FOLLOWED BY EVAC AFTER THE ACFT LANDED AT IAD, DC.

Narrative: DURING CRUISE FLT XX FROM JFK TO IAD, AND WHILE RECORDING THE ENG HEALTH DATA, A PRESENCE OF SMOKE WAS OBSERVED IN THE COCKPIT AND CABIN. THE CAUSE OF THE SMOKE WAS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME. IN AN ABUNDANCE OF CAUTION, AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH ZNY. THE EMER PROCS FOR 'SMOKE OR FIRE FLT DECK OR CABIN' WERE COMPLIED WITH AND THE CABIN PRESSURIZATION WAS DUMPED TO CLR THE CABIN. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, THE ACFT WAS LOCATED AT 16000 FT 25 NM W OF LRP ON V143. WITH IAD LESS 38 NM (6.5 MINS) A DECISION WAS MADE TO LAND ON RWY 1L. AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG ON RWY 1L WITH 19 SOULS ON BOARD (2 CREW, 16 PAX, AND 1 LAP CHILD) THE ACFT WAS EVACED ON TXWY Y6 (THE FIRST HIGH SPD). A FEW INDIVIDUALS SPOKE WITH EMER MEDICAL TECHNICIANS AT THE SCENE, HOWEVER, TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THE DEP AND THE FLT UP TO THE EVENT PREVIOUSLY NOTED WAS ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL. AFTER AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION THE BLOWER FAN FOR THE FREON AIR CONDITIONING WAS BELIEVED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE SMOKE. THERE ARE A COUPLE OF SAFETY CONCERNS FOR FUTURE ABNORMALITIES OF THIS NATURE. THE FIRST RELATES TO THE USE OF THE OXYGEN MASK MICROPHONE FOR COMS. THE MASK MICROPHONE WAS ACCEPTABLE FOR INTER- COCKPIT COMS. THE COMS WHEN XMITTING OVER THE RADIO WITH ATC, HOWEVER, WERE ALMOST UNREADABLE. EVENTUALLY THE ARTCC CTLR HANDED US OFF TO DULLES APCH AND WISHED US GOOD LUCK, BUT MENTIONED HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND OUR SOULS ON BOARD AND FUEL REMAINING CALL. THIS POOR COM ALSO CAUSED PROBS WHEN SPEAKING WITH DULLES APCH FOR OUR REQUESTED RWY. DULLES UNDERSTOOD SOMETHING OTHER THAN WHAT WE DID AND IT TOOK 2-3 XMISSIONS FOR CLARIFICATION. THE SECOND PROB HAD TO DO WITH THE EMER CHKLIST FOR SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AND CABIN. SOME OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS REFERRED TO ON THE CHKLIST HAVE COLLARS TO IDENT THEM AND OTHERS DO NOT. IT MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT TO ASSIGN PF AND PNF DUTIES WHEN MORE THAN 1 PERSON IS REQUIRED TO LOCATE THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON VARIOUS PANELS. THE SMOKE CHKLIST IS 3 PAGES LONG AND THE NEED TO XFER CTLS 3-4 TIMES MAKES THE SIT MORE DIFFICULT TO COMPLETE IN THE REQUIRED TIMELY MANNER. THE PROBS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE TRAINING DEPT. TRAINING HAS STATED THAT THE CHKLIST IS BEING REVISED AND THEY WOULD LOOK AT HOW THE NEW CHKLIST WOULD AFFECT THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED CONCERNS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.