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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 399078 |
Time | |
Date | 199804 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Jetstar 1329 (C140) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | other |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | other other : other pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 400 flight time total : 2000 flight time type : 400 |
ASRS Report | 399078 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | Other Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
When I took the job of first officer/flight mechanic with xyz company, the aircraft was in for maintenance at a service center for 3 weeks, completing the inspections required on the maintenance program which I was told was approved for the aircraft by the FAA. After the inspections were up-to-date, in sep/97, we left the country and flew between europe and buenos aires, argentina -- approximately 80-100 hours of flying time. The captain, who is also director of operations for the company, told me to alert him 100 hours in advance of when maintenance was coming due, which I did. At 50 hours in advance, he angrily told me 'I already knew this, we'll do it when we can.' when maintenance was 'due,' I again alerted him of the maintenance due and the strict requirements of not going over but a small percentage. I also told him I would not fly past it, at which time he told me, 'ok, but I would be looking for another job and be left overseas.' we then returned to the USA and took the aircraft to abc for maintenance on the APU since it was acting up and to bring the maintenance program up- to-date. I then had the logbooks shipped from the company office in ZZZ, us. I had already advised the captain/director of operations that the maintenance program was overdue but a logbook research by abc maintenance supervisor revealed that the maintenance program was not approved for the aircraft and that both the 150- and 300-hour inspections on the engines were overdue. Without consent from the director of operations, I told them to do the required inspections. When the director of operations/captain found out of my approval of the inspections, he was very upset since we had really only gone there to get the APU repaired. He said we didn't have time for those inspections, that we had flying to do. I still had them finish the engines, refusing to fly unless they were completed. The airframe also had a 300-hour inspection due in 20 hours, of which I alerted the company. We then left the country with the captain promising that we would get the inspection done in 25-30 hours. They were not completed. The captain began holding my passport, giving me the reason thathe could not afford to have 'me lose it,' although he never had those concerns while the aircraft was within its inspections. When the inspections were overdue 10 hours, I again alerted him to this fact, and he told me that I could stay in country if I wanted to without my passport and go home on my own, if I could. They would get someone else who wouldn't complain when they overflew the inspections by 400 hours before returning to the USA, specifically ZZZ. We finally returned to ZZZ, us, without a crew rest (duty time 34.5 hours without crew rest). I was alerted that not only had we overflown the required inspections by 400 hours, we had also overflown airworthiness directive 91-11-13, which was found to be near catastrophic failure with only a fraction of the fitting remaining intact, the probable loss of the aircraft tail plane, and loss of the aircraft. I informed the captain/director of operations of the findings and was told, 'but it didn't come off and we have to fly when we have to fly.' I did not feel this was an acceptable answer, coupled with 34.5 hours of duty flight time with no crew rest (18-20 hours being routine) and then holding my passport so I couldn't leave. This was not hard to recognize as a very unsafe operation. I put the aircraft maintenance in ZZZ, us, and came home for some rest and 2 days later was told to fly another us trip. When I refused, I was fired, which came just before I could write my letter of resignation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the aircraft was a lockheed jetstar L329 with numerous maintenance items overdue for inspection and correction. The reporter said, in addition to the required time inspections, the routine and non routine maintenance was not accomplished (WX radar inoperative, right auxiliary boost pump leaking and inoperative). The reporter stated after takeoff from foreign airport, the crew experienced an engine fire warning and both fire extinguisher bottles were fired and a return was made to the field. The reporter said a bleed duct had ruptured causing the fire warning andthe captain elected to shut off the engine bleed and continue on to europe with empty fire bottles. The reporter stated after termination an airworthiness directive inspection was accomplished on a tail assembly pivot casting and was found to be cracked 33% through. The reporter said this company has requested the reporter return to their employment several times but he has refused for safety reasons.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A JETSTAR L329 WAS OPERATED IN CONTINUOUS SVC, MAINLY OVER WATER, WITH OVERDUE AIRFRAME, ENG AND AIRWORTHINESS ITEMS NOT INSPECTED OR ACCOMPLISHED.
Narrative: WHEN I TOOK THE JOB OF FO/FLT MECH WITH XYZ COMPANY, THE ACFT WAS IN FOR MAINT AT A SVC CTR FOR 3 WKS, COMPLETING THE INSPECTIONS REQUIRED ON THE MAINT PROGRAM WHICH I WAS TOLD WAS APPROVED FOR THE ACFT BY THE FAA. AFTER THE INSPECTIONS WERE UP-TO-DATE, IN SEP/97, WE LEFT THE COUNTRY AND FLEW BTWN EUROPE AND BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA -- APPROX 80-100 HRS OF FLYING TIME. THE CAPT, WHO IS ALSO DIRECTOR OF OPS FOR THE COMPANY, TOLD ME TO ALERT HIM 100 HRS IN ADVANCE OF WHEN MAINT WAS COMING DUE, WHICH I DID. AT 50 HRS IN ADVANCE, HE ANGRILY TOLD ME 'I ALREADY KNEW THIS, WE'LL DO IT WHEN WE CAN.' WHEN MAINT WAS 'DUE,' I AGAIN ALERTED HIM OF THE MAINT DUE AND THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS OF NOT GOING OVER BUT A SMALL PERCENTAGE. I ALSO TOLD HIM I WOULD NOT FLY PAST IT, AT WHICH TIME HE TOLD ME, 'OK, BUT I WOULD BE LOOKING FOR ANOTHER JOB AND BE LEFT OVERSEAS.' WE THEN RETURNED TO THE USA AND TOOK THE ACFT TO ABC FOR MAINT ON THE APU SINCE IT WAS ACTING UP AND TO BRING THE MAINT PROGRAM UP- TO-DATE. I THEN HAD THE LOGBOOKS SHIPPED FROM THE COMPANY OFFICE IN ZZZ, US. I HAD ALREADY ADVISED THE CAPT/DIRECTOR OF OPS THAT THE MAINT PROGRAM WAS OVERDUE BUT A LOGBOOK RESEARCH BY ABC MAINT SUPVR REVEALED THAT THE MAINT PROGRAM WAS NOT APPROVED FOR THE ACFT AND THAT BOTH THE 150- AND 300-HR INSPECTIONS ON THE ENGS WERE OVERDUE. WITHOUT CONSENT FROM THE DIRECTOR OF OPS, I TOLD THEM TO DO THE REQUIRED INSPECTIONS. WHEN THE DIRECTOR OF OPS/CAPT FOUND OUT OF MY APPROVAL OF THE INSPECTIONS, HE WAS VERY UPSET SINCE WE HAD REALLY ONLY GONE THERE TO GET THE APU REPAIRED. HE SAID WE DIDN'T HAVE TIME FOR THOSE INSPECTIONS, THAT WE HAD FLYING TO DO. I STILL HAD THEM FINISH THE ENGS, REFUSING TO FLY UNLESS THEY WERE COMPLETED. THE AIRFRAME ALSO HAD A 300-HR INSPECTION DUE IN 20 HRS, OF WHICH I ALERTED THE COMPANY. WE THEN LEFT THE COUNTRY WITH THE CAPT PROMISING THAT WE WOULD GET THE INSPECTION DONE IN 25-30 HRS. THEY WERE NOT COMPLETED. THE CAPT BEGAN HOLDING MY PASSPORT, GIVING ME THE REASON THATHE COULD NOT AFFORD TO HAVE 'ME LOSE IT,' ALTHOUGH HE NEVER HAD THOSE CONCERNS WHILE THE ACFT WAS WITHIN ITS INSPECTIONS. WHEN THE INSPECTIONS WERE OVERDUE 10 HRS, I AGAIN ALERTED HIM TO THIS FACT, AND HE TOLD ME THAT I COULD STAY IN COUNTRY IF I WANTED TO WITHOUT MY PASSPORT AND GO HOME ON MY OWN, IF I COULD. THEY WOULD GET SOMEONE ELSE WHO WOULDN'T COMPLAIN WHEN THEY OVERFLEW THE INSPECTIONS BY 400 HRS BEFORE RETURNING TO THE USA, SPECIFICALLY ZZZ. WE FINALLY RETURNED TO ZZZ, US, WITHOUT A CREW REST (DUTY TIME 34.5 HRS WITHOUT CREW REST). I WAS ALERTED THAT NOT ONLY HAD WE OVERFLOWN THE REQUIRED INSPECTIONS BY 400 HRS, WE HAD ALSO OVERFLOWN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE 91-11-13, WHICH WAS FOUND TO BE NEAR CATASTROPHIC FAILURE WITH ONLY A FRACTION OF THE FITTING REMAINING INTACT, THE PROBABLE LOSS OF THE ACFT TAIL PLANE, AND LOSS OF THE ACFT. I INFORMED THE CAPT/DIRECTOR OF OPS OF THE FINDINGS AND WAS TOLD, 'BUT IT DIDN'T COME OFF AND WE HAVE TO FLY WHEN WE HAVE TO FLY.' I DID NOT FEEL THIS WAS AN ACCEPTABLE ANSWER, COUPLED WITH 34.5 HRS OF DUTY FLT TIME WITH NO CREW REST (18-20 HRS BEING ROUTINE) AND THEN HOLDING MY PASSPORT SO I COULDN'T LEAVE. THIS WAS NOT HARD TO RECOGNIZE AS A VERY UNSAFE OP. I PUT THE ACFT MAINT IN ZZZ, US, AND CAME HOME FOR SOME REST AND 2 DAYS LATER WAS TOLD TO FLY ANOTHER US TRIP. WHEN I REFUSED, I WAS FIRED, WHICH CAME JUST BEFORE I COULD WRITE MY LETTER OF RESIGNATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT WAS A LOCKHEED JETSTAR L329 WITH NUMEROUS MAINT ITEMS OVERDUE FOR INSPECTION AND CORRECTION. THE RPTR SAID, IN ADDITION TO THE REQUIRED TIME INSPECTIONS, THE ROUTINE AND NON ROUTINE MAINT WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED (WX RADAR INOP, R AUX BOOST PUMP LEAKING AND INOP). THE RPTR STATED AFTER TKOF FROM FOREIGN ARPT, THE CREW EXPERIENCED AN ENG FIRE WARNING AND BOTH FIRE EXTINGUISHER BOTTLES WERE FIRED AND A RETURN WAS MADE TO THE FIELD. THE RPTR SAID A BLEED DUCT HAD RUPTURED CAUSING THE FIRE WARNING ANDTHE CAPT ELECTED TO SHUT OFF THE ENG BLEED AND CONTINUE ON TO EUROPE WITH EMPTY FIRE BOTTLES. THE RPTR STATED AFTER TERMINATION AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE INSPECTION WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON A TAIL ASSEMBLY PIVOT CASTING AND WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED 33% THROUGH. THE RPTR SAID THIS COMPANY HAS REQUESTED THE RPTR RETURN TO THEIR EMPLOYMENT SEVERAL TIMES BUT HE HAS REFUSED FOR SAFETY REASONS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.