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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 400904 |
Time | |
Date | 199804 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lhr |
State Reference | FO |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 400904 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Situations | |
Airport | procedure or policy : unspecified |
Narrative:
All of the following events occurred in the presence of and with the full knowledge of an FAA air carrier inspector, new york regional office. Upon arrival at lhr operations, the first officer and I exited the bus and went to the back of the bus to retrieve our baggage and kit bags. The bus driver insisted that we leave the bags on the bus as he would return to pick us up after he dropped off our flight attendants. We left our bags on the bus. After about 20 mins of waiting for him to return, we were informed that he left the airport with our bags -- bags which had been already screened by security. He then re-entered the airport, approximately 1 hour later with our bags now in violation of clear security measures. The bags had been opened, and were not where we left them in the bus. The first officer and I finally reboarded the bus when it returned, and inspected our bags -- completely tearing them apart to make sure that nothing had been put in them, or had been taken from them. The driver was completely aloof, disinterested, and not at all apologetic that he had delayed our flight almost 1 hour. Since this constituted a clear breach of security, I am compelled to debrief it. However, if the usual practice of ignoring debriefs is followed, I fully expect that I will receive no response or reasonable excuse why this is allowed to happen. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the crew bus driver was a contract bus driver of third world origin. The driver normally drops the flight crew off at operations, then takes the cabin attendants over to the aircraft, coming back for the cockpit crew when they are ready to go to the aircraft. The bus normally does not leave the area. In this instance the driver had received a call from his dispatcher while at the aircraft with the flight attendants and left the airport, forgetting about the crew bags on board. The captain said that the bags were originally placed in the side or rear baggage compartment but when the bus finally returned over 1 hour later, the bags were sitting on the front passenger seats. The zipper of the captain's bag was open. When the captain attempted to get answers to this problem the driver just said, 'I don't know,' although he had admitted that he had brought the bags up from the baggage compartment. When asked if he normally left his bags on board, the captain said no, but didn't see a problem when the driver suggested he leave them with him. The captain carries his commercial chart material in a shoulder bag so he didn't need his flight kit. The new york based aci at first laughed over this, at first saying the situation was ridiculous, but then stated that he would 'do something' about it. The security point is near the entrance to lhr and is a tunnel like area that checks the contents of crew buses, catering vehicles and the like. Not passenger vehicles. The reporter would like to see a policy created or stated that would prohibit flcs from leaving their bags in the company of anyone else. The air carrier policy manual does not contain this restrictive message. So far as he knows, the company is not doing anything about this security breach. He said the implications or potential for breaching security can be very serious.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLC OF AN AIRBUS A300 COMPLAINED ABOUT A BREACH OF ARPT SECURITY AT A FOREIGN ARPT BECAUSE THEIR BAGGAGE HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF THE ARPT ON CREW BUS AND THEN RETURNED 1 HR LATER SHOWING SIGNS OF BEING OPENED AND PUT IN ANOTHER LOCATION IN THE BUS. AN FAA ACR INSPECTOR OF A REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS OFFICE WAS A WITNESS TO THIS ENTIRE INCIDENT.
Narrative: ALL OF THE FOLLOWING EVENTS OCCURRED IN THE PRESENCE OF AND WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE OF AN FAA ACR INSPECTOR, NEW YORK REGIONAL OFFICE. UPON ARR AT LHR OPS, THE FO AND I EXITED THE BUS AND WENT TO THE BACK OF THE BUS TO RETRIEVE OUR BAGGAGE AND KIT BAGS. THE BUS DRIVER INSISTED THAT WE LEAVE THE BAGS ON THE BUS AS HE WOULD RETURN TO PICK US UP AFTER HE DROPPED OFF OUR FLT ATTENDANTS. WE LEFT OUR BAGS ON THE BUS. AFTER ABOUT 20 MINS OF WAITING FOR HIM TO RETURN, WE WERE INFORMED THAT HE LEFT THE ARPT WITH OUR BAGS -- BAGS WHICH HAD BEEN ALREADY SCREENED BY SECURITY. HE THEN RE-ENTERED THE ARPT, APPROX 1 HR LATER WITH OUR BAGS NOW IN VIOLATION OF CLR SECURITY MEASURES. THE BAGS HAD BEEN OPENED, AND WERE NOT WHERE WE LEFT THEM IN THE BUS. THE FO AND I FINALLY REBOARDED THE BUS WHEN IT RETURNED, AND INSPECTED OUR BAGS -- COMPLETELY TEARING THEM APART TO MAKE SURE THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN PUT IN THEM, OR HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THEM. THE DRIVER WAS COMPLETELY ALOOF, DISINTERESTED, AND NOT AT ALL APOLOGETIC THAT HE HAD DELAYED OUR FLT ALMOST 1 HR. SINCE THIS CONSTITUTED A CLR BREACH OF SECURITY, I AM COMPELLED TO DEBRIEF IT. HOWEVER, IF THE USUAL PRACTICE OF IGNORING DEBRIEFS IS FOLLOWED, I FULLY EXPECT THAT I WILL RECEIVE NO RESPONSE OR REASONABLE EXCUSE WHY THIS IS ALLOWED TO HAPPEN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE CREW BUS DRIVER WAS A CONTRACT BUS DRIVER OF THIRD WORLD ORIGIN. THE DRIVER NORMALLY DROPS THE FLC OFF AT OPS, THEN TAKES THE CABIN ATTENDANTS OVER TO THE ACFT, COMING BACK FOR THE COCKPIT CREW WHEN THEY ARE READY TO GO TO THE ACFT. THE BUS NORMALLY DOES NOT LEAVE THE AREA. IN THIS INSTANCE THE DRIVER HAD RECEIVED A CALL FROM HIS DISPATCHER WHILE AT THE ACFT WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND LEFT THE ARPT, FORGETTING ABOUT THE CREW BAGS ON BOARD. THE CAPT SAID THAT THE BAGS WERE ORIGINALLY PLACED IN THE SIDE OR REAR BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT BUT WHEN THE BUS FINALLY RETURNED OVER 1 HR LATER, THE BAGS WERE SITTING ON THE FRONT PAX SEATS. THE ZIPPER OF THE CAPT'S BAG WAS OPEN. WHEN THE CAPT ATTEMPTED TO GET ANSWERS TO THIS PROB THE DRIVER JUST SAID, 'I DON'T KNOW,' ALTHOUGH HE HAD ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BROUGHT THE BAGS UP FROM THE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT. WHEN ASKED IF HE NORMALLY LEFT HIS BAGS ON BOARD, THE CAPT SAID NO, BUT DIDN'T SEE A PROB WHEN THE DRIVER SUGGESTED HE LEAVE THEM WITH HIM. THE CAPT CARRIES HIS COMMERCIAL CHART MATERIAL IN A SHOULDER BAG SO HE DIDN'T NEED HIS FLT KIT. THE NEW YORK BASED ACI AT FIRST LAUGHED OVER THIS, AT FIRST SAYING THE SIT WAS RIDICULOUS, BUT THEN STATED THAT HE WOULD 'DO SOMETHING' ABOUT IT. THE SECURITY POINT IS NEAR THE ENTRANCE TO LHR AND IS A TUNNEL LIKE AREA THAT CHKS THE CONTENTS OF CREW BUSES, CATERING VEHICLES AND THE LIKE. NOT PAX VEHICLES. THE RPTR WOULD LIKE TO SEE A POLICY CREATED OR STATED THAT WOULD PROHIBIT FLCS FROM LEAVING THEIR BAGS IN THE COMPANY OF ANYONE ELSE. THE ACR POLICY MANUAL DOES NOT CONTAIN THIS RESTRICTIVE MESSAGE. SO FAR AS HE KNOWS, THE COMPANY IS NOT DOING ANYTHING ABOUT THIS SECURITY BREACH. HE SAID THE IMPLICATIONS OR POTENTIAL FOR BREACHING SECURITY CAN BE VERY SERIOUS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.