Narrative:

Pulling up the release for our flight to brl, I noticed the visibility for the destination airport was missing. I notified the captain and he said that is why our flight is being delayed. He was in communication with dispatch and they said the ASOS was not reporting visibility. Dispatch was waiting until they could get a WX report from the local observer before we would be released. We were delayed almost 1 hour before we had the reported visibility. Once we were en route the captain said dispatch told him we would be able to get the WX through company frequencys. 46 mi away, I listen to the ASOS which was still not reporting visibility. I then tried to establish communication with our company through an rco at pia. Twice they responded and I told them what we needed with no further response. We asked ZAU for the visibility and at that time they said they would get back. Due to the congestion on both radio frequencys, I told the captain I was not monitoring the #1 radio so I could better hear company. At this time, we entered the hold at the OM which was OTS. We had to use a xradial to identify the intersection on my side which greatly interfered with my ability to monitor our progress. This fact (OM OTS) was not in our company NOTAMS. As I tried 3 different means of obtaining the visibility on the #2 radio, we were fast approaching bingo fuel. The captain informed me we were cleared for the approach and to announce our position on CTAF. To accomplish this, I had to change #2 radio from company to CTAF to give a position report. I was still waiting to hear back from company. At this time I was not exactly sure if maybe the captain got the visibility from ZAU. I allowed myself to get overloaded with radio work and not monitor the other frequency for situational awareness. I should have asserted myself and my concerns that I did not like this situation. I felt we still had 10 more mins of holding fuel but it is difficult to determine from the right seat, as well as the left seat, because of parallax. Another contributing factor to our confusion is the definition of latest WX observation. Our WX information was less than 1 hour old when we initiated the approach. Once we landed and shut the engines down, we were informed by the ramp agent that she was trying to call us on company radio. We obviously did not hear her because, at that time, we were on CTAF and center frequencys. She told us that company said we should not have landed and the captain was to call dispatch. It then became clear to me neither one of us obtained the proper visibility and that the company felt that the WX packet we had at takeoff was not enough. The captain and I discussed what had happened and I told him I completely disagreed with his decision to shoot the approach. He explained his position based on the fact he would rather shoot the approach at brl rather then divert to our alternate at pia and run into worse WX there and become low on fuel and then have no options. His concerns may have also been tempered by the fact that he was a high minimum captain. Even though an emergency was never declared, I feel that the captain used his emergency authority/authorized to deviation from company procedures to prevent an emergency from taking place. I told the captain I did not agree with his decision and I would have just gone to the alternate. That is one reason why I am sending this report. The second reason is, after all of this took place, I wanted to know if a visibility report had ever been sent in that night. From what we could determine, a report was never sent in after the one that made us legal to takeoff.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EVEN THOUGH THE CAPT OF A BRITISH JETSTREAM BA32 DID NOT HAVE THE LATEST VISIBILITY RPT PRIOR TO MAKING THE APCH, IT WAS EITHER NOW OR GO TO THEIR ALTERNATE THAT ALSO HAD WX CONSIDERATIONS AS WELL AS THE POSSIBILITY OF NOT HAVING SUFFICIENT FUEL IN CASE OF FURTHER DELAYS.

Narrative: PULLING UP THE RELEASE FOR OUR FLT TO BRL, I NOTICED THE VISIBILITY FOR THE DEST ARPT WAS MISSING. I NOTIFIED THE CAPT AND HE SAID THAT IS WHY OUR FLT IS BEING DELAYED. HE WAS IN COM WITH DISPATCH AND THEY SAID THE ASOS WAS NOT RPTING VISIBILITY. DISPATCH WAS WAITING UNTIL THEY COULD GET A WX RPT FROM THE LCL OBSERVER BEFORE WE WOULD BE RELEASED. WE WERE DELAYED ALMOST 1 HR BEFORE WE HAD THE RPTED VISIBILITY. ONCE WE WERE ENRTE THE CAPT SAID DISPATCH TOLD HIM WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GET THE WX THROUGH COMPANY FREQS. 46 MI AWAY, I LISTEN TO THE ASOS WHICH WAS STILL NOT RPTING VISIBILITY. I THEN TRIED TO ESTABLISH COM WITH OUR COMPANY THROUGH AN RCO AT PIA. TWICE THEY RESPONDED AND I TOLD THEM WHAT WE NEEDED WITH NO FURTHER RESPONSE. WE ASKED ZAU FOR THE VISIBILITY AND AT THAT TIME THEY SAID THEY WOULD GET BACK. DUE TO THE CONGESTION ON BOTH RADIO FREQS, I TOLD THE CAPT I WAS NOT MONITORING THE #1 RADIO SO I COULD BETTER HEAR COMPANY. AT THIS TIME, WE ENTERED THE HOLD AT THE OM WHICH WAS OTS. WE HAD TO USE A XRADIAL TO IDENT THE INTXN ON MY SIDE WHICH GREATLY INTERFERED WITH MY ABILITY TO MONITOR OUR PROGRESS. THIS FACT (OM OTS) WAS NOT IN OUR COMPANY NOTAMS. AS I TRIED 3 DIFFERENT MEANS OF OBTAINING THE VISIBILITY ON THE #2 RADIO, WE WERE FAST APCHING BINGO FUEL. THE CAPT INFORMED ME WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND TO ANNOUNCE OUR POS ON CTAF. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, I HAD TO CHANGE #2 RADIO FROM COMPANY TO CTAF TO GIVE A POS RPT. I WAS STILL WAITING TO HEAR BACK FROM COMPANY. AT THIS TIME I WAS NOT EXACTLY SURE IF MAYBE THE CAPT GOT THE VISIBILITY FROM ZAU. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO GET OVERLOADED WITH RADIO WORK AND NOT MONITOR THE OTHER FREQ FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I SHOULD HAVE ASSERTED MYSELF AND MY CONCERNS THAT I DID NOT LIKE THIS SIT. I FELT WE STILL HAD 10 MORE MINS OF HOLDING FUEL BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE FROM THE R SEAT, AS WELL AS THE L SEAT, BECAUSE OF PARALLAX. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO OUR CONFUSION IS THE DEFINITION OF LATEST WX OBSERVATION. OUR WX INFO WAS LESS THAN 1 HR OLD WHEN WE INITIATED THE APCH. ONCE WE LANDED AND SHUT THE ENGS DOWN, WE WERE INFORMED BY THE RAMP AGENT THAT SHE WAS TRYING TO CALL US ON COMPANY RADIO. WE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HEAR HER BECAUSE, AT THAT TIME, WE WERE ON CTAF AND CTR FREQS. SHE TOLD US THAT COMPANY SAID WE SHOULD NOT HAVE LANDED AND THE CAPT WAS TO CALL DISPATCH. IT THEN BECAME CLR TO ME NEITHER ONE OF US OBTAINED THE PROPER VISIBILITY AND THAT THE COMPANY FELT THAT THE WX PACKET WE HAD AT TKOF WAS NOT ENOUGH. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND I TOLD HIM I COMPLETELY DISAGREED WITH HIS DECISION TO SHOOT THE APCH. HE EXPLAINED HIS POS BASED ON THE FACT HE WOULD RATHER SHOOT THE APCH AT BRL RATHER THEN DIVERT TO OUR ALTERNATE AT PIA AND RUN INTO WORSE WX THERE AND BECOME LOW ON FUEL AND THEN HAVE NO OPTIONS. HIS CONCERNS MAY HAVE ALSO BEEN TEMPERED BY THE FACT THAT HE WAS A HIGH MINIMUM CAPT. EVEN THOUGH AN EMER WAS NEVER DECLARED, I FEEL THAT THE CAPT USED HIS EMER AUTH TO DEV FROM COMPANY PROCS TO PREVENT AN EMER FROM TAKING PLACE. I TOLD THE CAPT I DID NOT AGREE WITH HIS DECISION AND I WOULD HAVE JUST GONE TO THE ALTERNATE. THAT IS ONE REASON WHY I AM SENDING THIS RPT. THE SECOND REASON IS, AFTER ALL OF THIS TOOK PLACE, I WANTED TO KNOW IF A VISIBILITY RPT HAD EVER BEEN SENT IN THAT NIGHT. FROM WHAT WE COULD DETERMINE, A RPT WAS NEVER SENT IN AFTER THE ONE THAT MADE US LEGAL TO TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.