Narrative:

After being cleared to taxi on taxiway a from taxiway west to 'hold short of taxiway J.' while holding short of taxiway J we were cleared to 'turn left, cleared to cross, contact tower on 19.1.' as we began to taxi with a left turn on taxiway J, a commuter that had been following us asked 'are we supposed to follow....across runway 4?' ground control response 'yeah (or sure) uh.' at this point we switched to tower. On taxiway J between runways 4L and 4R, tower admonished us with '....runway 4L is what we are using for departure. Turn left on taxiway Y, left on taxiway H, and hold short of runway 4L.' at this point we realized that instead of crossing runway 4L we should have crossed runway 31L on our way to the takeoff point on runway 4L. Contributing: poor markings at the runway 4/31 cross points. There are actually no taxiway J signs at the cross point. Our charts show ka windshield wipers had to be used frequently creating a great deal of noise. Visibility was poor due to rain on windows. Lighting at the intersection is poor, with hold short points for both runways 31L/4L on angles to the runways. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that he had thought more about this incident and concluded that the signs and markings are appropriate since the taxiway does change to another number which was observed and that there are the other runway signs appropriately placed. However, due to the limited forward vision due to rain and windshield wiper movement, the mindset of the usual route to the other runway and the instruction of a left turn, caused him to make this mistake. After thirty three years of flying he did not want a blemish on his record just prior to retirement. He then stated that he was looking over his shoulder for another excuse for this mistake which would help justify that it was not his fault. Callback conversation with reporter acn 401397 revealed the following information: reporter was very helpful as far as he could remember his participation. He was busy completing pre takeoff duties and checklists but could not remember exactly where the runway was they were cleared to, nor did he hear taxi instructions on how to get there. With every detailed question that was asked of him, he was uncertain of an answer. Reporter could not recount much of what was in report. Analyst believes reporter submitted report to protect flight crew. He was aware of very little during the taxi out. He saw no runway signs and did not know to where the flight crew was taxiing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF A B727 FAILED TO FOLLOW THEIR TAXI CLRNC FOR TKOF RESULTING IN AN UNAUTHORIZED CROSSING OF THE ACTIVE RWY. TWR GND CTLR INTERVENED AND REROUTED THE RPTR BACK TO THE INTENDED ROUTE. FORWARD AND SIDE VISION WAS LIMITED DUE TO RAIN AND NIGHTTIME CONDITIONS. IN ADDITION, THE RPTR USED A TAXI ROUTE HE HAD USED SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE FOR ANOTHER RWY.

Narrative: AFTER BEING CLRED TO TAXI ON TXWY A FROM TXWY W TO 'HOLD SHORT OF TXWY J.' WHILE HOLDING SHORT OF TXWY J WE WERE CLRED TO 'TURN L, CLRED TO CROSS, CONTACT TWR ON 19.1.' AS WE BEGAN TO TAXI WITH A L TURN ON TXWY J, A COMMUTER THAT HAD BEEN FOLLOWING US ASKED 'ARE WE SUPPOSED TO FOLLOW....ACROSS RWY 4?' GND CTL RESPONSE 'YEAH (OR SURE) UH.' AT THIS POINT WE SWITCHED TO TWR. ON TXWY J BETWEEN RWYS 4L AND 4R, TWR ADMONISHED US WITH '....RWY 4L IS WHAT WE ARE USING FOR DEP. TURN L ON TXWY Y, L ON TXWY H, AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4L.' AT THIS POINT WE REALIZED THAT INSTEAD OF CROSSING RWY 4L WE SHOULD HAVE CROSSED RWY 31L ON OUR WAY TO THE TKOF POINT ON RWY 4L. CONTRIBUTING: POOR MARKINGS AT THE RWY 4/31 CROSS POINTS. THERE ARE ACTUALLY NO TXWY J SIGNS AT THE CROSS POINT. OUR CHARTS SHOW KA WINDSHIELD WIPERS HAD TO BE USED FREQUENTLY CREATING A GREAT DEAL OF NOISE. VISIBILITY WAS POOR DUE TO RAIN ON WINDOWS. LIGHTING AT THE INTXN IS POOR, WITH HOLD SHORT POINTS FOR BOTH RWYS 31L/4L ON ANGLES TO THE RWYS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT HE HAD THOUGHT MORE ABOUT THIS INCIDENT AND CONCLUDED THAT THE SIGNS AND MARKINGS ARE APPROPRIATE SINCE THE TXWY DOES CHANGE TO ANOTHER NUMBER WHICH WAS OBSERVED AND THAT THERE ARE THE OTHER RWY SIGNS APPROPRIATELY PLACED. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE LIMITED FORWARD VISION DUE TO RAIN AND WINDSHIELD WIPER MOVEMENT, THE MINDSET OF THE USUAL ROUTE TO THE OTHER RWY AND THE INSTRUCTION OF A L TURN, CAUSED HIM TO MAKE THIS MISTAKE. AFTER THIRTY THREE YEARS OF FLYING HE DID NOT WANT A BLEMISH ON HIS RECORD JUST PRIOR TO RETIREMENT. HE THEN STATED THAT HE WAS LOOKING OVER HIS SHOULDER FOR ANOTHER EXCUSE FOR THIS MISTAKE WHICH WOULD HELP JUSTIFY THAT IT WAS NOT HIS FAULT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 401397 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR WAS VERY HELPFUL AS FAR AS HE COULD REMEMBER HIS PARTICIPATION. HE WAS BUSY COMPLETING PRE TKOF DUTIES AND CHKLISTS BUT COULD NOT REMEMBER EXACTLY WHERE THE RWY WAS THEY WERE CLRED TO, NOR DID HE HEAR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO GET THERE. WITH EVERY DETAILED QUESTION THAT WAS ASKED OF HIM, HE WAS UNCERTAIN OF AN ANSWER. RPTR COULD NOT RECOUNT MUCH OF WHAT WAS IN RPT. ANALYST BELIEVES RPTR SUBMITTED RPT TO PROTECT FLC. HE WAS AWARE OF VERY LITTLE DURING THE TAXI OUT. HE SAW NO RWY SIGNS AND DID NOT KNOW TO WHERE THE FLC WAS TAXIING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.