Narrative:

The primary cause of this event was human factors -- specifically, the hostile cockpit environment created by the chief pilot (PF). His unprofessional behavior began during taxi out, and pervaded the remainder of that leg. Unfortunately for me, this is just one of many times that his negative bias towards my gender, ethnicity and marital status has interfered with safe crew practices. Thankfully, no incident has resulted from his unacceptable attitude. (Note: I was trip captain, PNF.) during pretkof briefing while taxiing for departure, the PF attempted to change the SOP for an emergency action item. He had in excess of 24 hours prior to discuss subject, but never brought it up. His explanation did not sufficiently convince me, and I stated the issue should be decided by entire department. He was immediately enraged and argumentative. I told him that if he, as my chief pilot, was ordering the change then I would comply -- otherwise for him to please respect my decision as trip captain and adhere to SOP. His response was defensive and childish, but he did not order the change. I firmly believe my decision was sound and safe, yet I knew from past experiences with this person that I would suffer recriminations (for exercising the authority/authorized he gave all trip capts in our SOP). As his verbal and non verbal communications continued to be terse and agitated, I felt compelled to ask him to verify that he was working with me as a team. Twice I had to remind him that I was 'heads down' meaning he should be eyes outside, yet he continued to monitor every input I made to afis message system (during cruise). Though we completed all tasks and checklists at appropriate times, the cockpit remained a tense calm. Approximately 1 hour 5 mins after departure, ATC gave us clearance direct wanes, maintain 3000 ft until wanes (IAF), cleared VOR DME a at teb. PF used VNAV for descent, and programmed autoplt to navigation capture once cleared for approach. PF requested 2000 ft in altitude alerter (our SOP once level is to put in next altitude). At 12 DME from teb, ATC questioned our altitude, at which time I looked back inside and saw we were below 3000 ft MSL assigned. The PF never gave any indication he was aware of his deviation prior to ATC call. Though I had been watching numerous targets on TCASII, there was no conflict there or with ATC. The chief pilot made a gross error, and my vigilance for traffic kept me from a thorough cockpit scan. He did return to 3000 ft MSL. Fatigue was not a factor, nor was WX -- except in the sense that it was a clear saturday afternoon in the new york area, one I know to be congested with a variety of aircraft (not all in contact with ATC). I also believe our department needs to revise our policy on setting the altitude alerter when VNAV is/was in use. More importantly, my chief pilot (and others like him) need to recognize -- and correct -- their unwillingness to accept the capabilities of those different from them. In the past yr I've attended both CRM and corporate air safety seminars, as well as CFIT awareness training -- my chief pilot did not, stating he did not need to as he already knew all that. (So did I -- but reminders save lives.) using the implied threat of his position as my supervisor should never be brought to the cockpit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF A CPR LTT JET DSNDED BELOW ASSIGNED APCH ALT PRIOR TO THE OM RESULTING IN ATC INTERVENTION AND RETURN TO ASSIGNED.

Narrative: THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS EVENT WAS HUMAN FACTORS -- SPECIFICALLY, THE HOSTILE COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT CREATED BY THE CHIEF PLT (PF). HIS UNPROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR BEGAN DURING TAXI OUT, AND PERVADED THE REMAINDER OF THAT LEG. UNFORTUNATELY FOR ME, THIS IS JUST ONE OF MANY TIMES THAT HIS NEGATIVE BIAS TOWARDS MY GENDER, ETHNICITY AND MARITAL STATUS HAS INTERFERED WITH SAFE CREW PRACTICES. THANKFULLY, NO INCIDENT HAS RESULTED FROM HIS UNACCEPTABLE ATTITUDE. (NOTE: I WAS TRIP CAPT, PNF.) DURING PRETKOF BRIEFING WHILE TAXIING FOR DEP, THE PF ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE THE SOP FOR AN EMER ACTION ITEM. HE HAD IN EXCESS OF 24 HRS PRIOR TO DISCUSS SUBJECT, BUT NEVER BROUGHT IT UP. HIS EXPLANATION DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONVINCE ME, AND I STATED THE ISSUE SHOULD BE DECIDED BY ENTIRE DEPT. HE WAS IMMEDIATELY ENRAGED AND ARGUMENTATIVE. I TOLD HIM THAT IF HE, AS MY CHIEF PLT, WAS ORDERING THE CHANGE THEN I WOULD COMPLY -- OTHERWISE FOR HIM TO PLEASE RESPECT MY DECISION AS TRIP CAPT AND ADHERE TO SOP. HIS RESPONSE WAS DEFENSIVE AND CHILDISH, BUT HE DID NOT ORDER THE CHANGE. I FIRMLY BELIEVE MY DECISION WAS SOUND AND SAFE, YET I KNEW FROM PAST EXPERIENCES WITH THIS PERSON THAT I WOULD SUFFER RECRIMINATIONS (FOR EXERCISING THE AUTH HE GAVE ALL TRIP CAPTS IN OUR SOP). AS HIS VERBAL AND NON VERBAL COMS CONTINUED TO BE TERSE AND AGITATED, I FELT COMPELLED TO ASK HIM TO VERIFY THAT HE WAS WORKING WITH ME AS A TEAM. TWICE I HAD TO REMIND HIM THAT I WAS 'HEADS DOWN' MEANING HE SHOULD BE EYES OUTSIDE, YET HE CONTINUED TO MONITOR EVERY INPUT I MADE TO AFIS MESSAGE SYS (DURING CRUISE). THOUGH WE COMPLETED ALL TASKS AND CHKLISTS AT APPROPRIATE TIMES, THE COCKPIT REMAINED A TENSE CALM. APPROX 1 HR 5 MINS AFTER DEP, ATC GAVE US CLRNC DIRECT WANES, MAINTAIN 3000 FT UNTIL WANES (IAF), CLRED VOR DME A AT TEB. PF USED VNAV FOR DSCNT, AND PROGRAMMED AUTOPLT TO NAV CAPTURE ONCE CLRED FOR APCH. PF REQUESTED 2000 FT IN ALT ALERTER (OUR SOP ONCE LEVEL IS TO PUT IN NEXT ALT). AT 12 DME FROM TEB, ATC QUESTIONED OUR ALT, AT WHICH TIME I LOOKED BACK INSIDE AND SAW WE WERE BELOW 3000 FT MSL ASSIGNED. THE PF NEVER GAVE ANY INDICATION HE WAS AWARE OF HIS DEV PRIOR TO ATC CALL. THOUGH I HAD BEEN WATCHING NUMEROUS TARGETS ON TCASII, THERE WAS NO CONFLICT THERE OR WITH ATC. THE CHIEF PLT MADE A GROSS ERROR, AND MY VIGILANCE FOR TFC KEPT ME FROM A THOROUGH COCKPIT SCAN. HE DID RETURN TO 3000 FT MSL. FATIGUE WAS NOT A FACTOR, NOR WAS WX -- EXCEPT IN THE SENSE THAT IT WAS A CLR SATURDAY AFTERNOON IN THE NEW YORK AREA, ONE I KNOW TO BE CONGESTED WITH A VARIETY OF ACFT (NOT ALL IN CONTACT WITH ATC). I ALSO BELIEVE OUR DEPT NEEDS TO REVISE OUR POLICY ON SETTING THE ALT ALERTER WHEN VNAV IS/WAS IN USE. MORE IMPORTANTLY, MY CHIEF PLT (AND OTHERS LIKE HIM) NEED TO RECOGNIZE -- AND CORRECT -- THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE CAPABILITIES OF THOSE DIFFERENT FROM THEM. IN THE PAST YR I'VE ATTENDED BOTH CRM AND CORPORATE AIR SAFETY SEMINARS, AS WELL AS CFIT AWARENESS TRAINING -- MY CHIEF PLT DID NOT, STATING HE DID NOT NEED TO AS HE ALREADY KNEW ALL THAT. (SO DID I -- BUT REMINDERS SAVE LIVES.) USING THE IMPLIED THREAT OF HIS POS AS MY SUPVR SHOULD NEVER BE BROUGHT TO THE COCKPIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.