Narrative:

Flight started approximately XA25. Winds aloft reported at 3 KTS and 6 KTS were light and variable with visibility of +6. Surface winds were out of the east at 3 KTS. Weight and balance charts indicated a payload of approximately 81% with full fuel and a flight time of about 1 hour 15 mins. Briefed passenger and lifted off. About 46 mins into the flight I made a descent from 1600 ft to 100 ft to set up approach to landing. Reviewed landing procedure with passenger. I made ground contact at less than 50 FPM in front of an 8 ft chain link fence topped with barbed wire. I chose to climb over the fence and focused too much on the fence and did not realize the full effect of the left wind shift. (The forecast did call for winds to pick up at XD00, in about 40-45 mins.) I started to burn and climb back up. My new path of flight was closing on a row of power lines at the edge of a tree line. I burned constantly to climb. The balloon had cooled and response was slow. I then decided that contact was possible unless the balloon responded quickly. Not wishing to take a chance and thinking only of the safety of my passenger, I started to pull my red line to drop to the ground to avoid contacting the lines. I shut off my fuel tanks and as soon as the basket was on the ground I instructed the passenger to exit and get away from the basket. I kept the envelope upright to prevent it from being blown into the power lines. My crew was not on site. My only safe choice was to exit the basket. The basket lifted and moved closer to the lines and as it cooled laid over the top of the lines. My crew arrived and I instructed them to keep away from the basket and to notify the power company from the cell phone. The power in the lines was never disrupted. After 8-10 mins, I saw sparks and the envelope started to melt (it took over 30 mins to get the power company on the scene). The load cables overheated and caused severe damage to the envelope. The power was turned off and the envelope was removed from the wires. No one was injured and no property was damaged other than the envelope. Factors that contributed: 1) being distraction by the barbed wire fence. 2) the unexpected wind shift towards the power lines. 3) failure to notice the power lines sooner. At the critical time of deciding to rip instead of climb, I removed my hand from the burner and had to release the line to return to the toggle to shut it off. In my opinion it is poor design to allow a blast valve to stay open when the pilot releases it. This was not a significant factor in this incident but it did allow greater lift when the decision was made to terminate lift. I can think of a few sits where having a blast valve remain full open could be very dangerous. I would suggest that all balloon blast valves (and cattle valves) be spring loaded to return to a closed position. This may also prevent some problems in the setup prior to launch. Factors that aided: 1) making the decision to terminate the burn and rip out knowing that envelope contact would result and cause physical damage to the aircraft but would greatly reduce the risk to passenger. 2) recent and past attendance at the FAA safety meetings.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BALLOON PLT MAKES CONTACT WITH PWR LINES DURING AN ABORTED CLB PROC.

Narrative: FLT STARTED APPROX XA25. WINDS ALOFT RPTED AT 3 KTS AND 6 KTS WERE LIGHT AND VARIABLE WITH VISIBILITY OF +6. SURFACE WINDS WERE OUT OF THE E AT 3 KTS. WT AND BAL CHARTS INDICATED A PAYLOAD OF APPROX 81% WITH FULL FUEL AND A FLT TIME OF ABOUT 1 HR 15 MINS. BRIEFED PAX AND LIFTED OFF. ABOUT 46 MINS INTO THE FLT I MADE A DSCNT FROM 1600 FT TO 100 FT TO SET UP APCH TO LNDG. REVIEWED LNDG PROC WITH PAX. I MADE GND CONTACT AT LESS THAN 50 FPM IN FRONT OF AN 8 FT CHAIN LINK FENCE TOPPED WITH BARBED WIRE. I CHOSE TO CLB OVER THE FENCE AND FOCUSED TOO MUCH ON THE FENCE AND DID NOT REALIZE THE FULL EFFECT OF THE L WIND SHIFT. (THE FORECAST DID CALL FOR WINDS TO PICK UP AT XD00, IN ABOUT 40-45 MINS.) I STARTED TO BURN AND CLB BACK UP. MY NEW PATH OF FLT WAS CLOSING ON A ROW OF PWR LINES AT THE EDGE OF A TREE LINE. I BURNED CONSTANTLY TO CLB. THE BALLOON HAD COOLED AND RESPONSE WAS SLOW. I THEN DECIDED THAT CONTACT WAS POSSIBLE UNLESS THE BALLOON RESPONDED QUICKLY. NOT WISHING TO TAKE A CHANCE AND THINKING ONLY OF THE SAFETY OF MY PAX, I STARTED TO PULL MY RED LINE TO DROP TO THE GND TO AVOID CONTACTING THE LINES. I SHUT OFF MY FUEL TANKS AND AS SOON AS THE BASKET WAS ON THE GND I INSTRUCTED THE PAX TO EXIT AND GET AWAY FROM THE BASKET. I KEPT THE ENVELOPE UPRIGHT TO PREVENT IT FROM BEING BLOWN INTO THE PWR LINES. MY CREW WAS NOT ON SITE. MY ONLY SAFE CHOICE WAS TO EXIT THE BASKET. THE BASKET LIFTED AND MOVED CLOSER TO THE LINES AND AS IT COOLED LAID OVER THE TOP OF THE LINES. MY CREW ARRIVED AND I INSTRUCTED THEM TO KEEP AWAY FROM THE BASKET AND TO NOTIFY THE PWR COMPANY FROM THE CELL PHONE. THE PWR IN THE LINES WAS NEVER DISRUPTED. AFTER 8-10 MINS, I SAW SPARKS AND THE ENVELOPE STARTED TO MELT (IT TOOK OVER 30 MINS TO GET THE PWR COMPANY ON THE SCENE). THE LOAD CABLES OVERHEATED AND CAUSED SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE ENVELOPE. THE PWR WAS TURNED OFF AND THE ENVELOPE WAS REMOVED FROM THE WIRES. NO ONE WAS INJURED AND NO PROPERTY WAS DAMAGED OTHER THAN THE ENVELOPE. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED: 1) BEING DISTR BY THE BARBED WIRE FENCE. 2) THE UNEXPECTED WIND SHIFT TOWARDS THE PWR LINES. 3) FAILURE TO NOTICE THE PWR LINES SOONER. AT THE CRITICAL TIME OF DECIDING TO RIP INSTEAD OF CLB, I REMOVED MY HAND FROM THE BURNER AND HAD TO RELEASE THE LINE TO RETURN TO THE TOGGLE TO SHUT IT OFF. IN MY OPINION IT IS POOR DESIGN TO ALLOW A BLAST VALVE TO STAY OPEN WHEN THE PLT RELEASES IT. THIS WAS NOT A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT BUT IT DID ALLOW GREATER LIFT WHEN THE DECISION WAS MADE TO TERMINATE LIFT. I CAN THINK OF A FEW SITS WHERE HAVING A BLAST VALVE REMAIN FULL OPEN COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT ALL BALLOON BLAST VALVES (AND CATTLE VALVES) BE SPRING LOADED TO RETURN TO A CLOSED POS. THIS MAY ALSO PREVENT SOME PROBS IN THE SETUP PRIOR TO LAUNCH. FACTORS THAT AIDED: 1) MAKING THE DECISION TO TERMINATE THE BURN AND RIP OUT KNOWING THAT ENVELOPE CONTACT WOULD RESULT AND CAUSE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE ACFT BUT WOULD GREATLY REDUCE THE RISK TO PAX. 2) RECENT AND PAST ATTENDANCE AT THE FAA SAFETY MEETINGS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.