Narrative:

Short and quick description. I got loaded up during the approach and did not contact tower for landing clearance. It is my responsibility and fault. I had flown with this first officer before (1 yr ago) and gave him the lndgs at the out stations, ie, cvg rather than home base. Day #1 and day #2 he struggled to get stable on approachs due to poor planning for his pattern, speed, and expectation of ATC speed and altitude assignments for building an approach for him. Second landing day #1, I configured aircraft for him as he was foundering during an approach, high, slow gear and flaps up, speed brakes extended, high bank angle and obviously out of ideas. I got it stable. A short discussion followed after landing, but his performance was a task. SOP items like checking switch position during checklists were not done. I did not say much to him and just did the doublechks myself, which contributed to me getting overloaded on day #3. There are a few military pilots on our property who become 'offended' when you correct them for not flying SOP, then their performance degrades further. My union representative and professional standards representative and company personnel want me to let these 'pilots' fly without too much correction, to 'get along.' they have not backed me up when I have had 'clear' problems in the past with this small group. Due to my knowledge of this first officer, generally good skills, I was lax with my usual disciplined by the book SOP cockpit. I knew the trouble he was having on approachs was due to unfamiliarity and continued this as a learning time. I ended up fatigued due to my extra vigilance, and therefore missed a critical item. Conditions deteriorating at the field. Thunderstorms nearby, first officer missed my 'subtle' hint to slow down. I was working radar, thunderstorms 7 mi west of field, first officer high and fast. Approach cleared us to visual runway 18R, first officer 35 degree bank, positioning flaps, hurried approach confign. TA with aircraft runway 18L, as we approached the marker. First officer hand goes to radio (somehow I must have thought he tuned tower) as I read checklist. We were now 'cleared the visual, wind 160 degrees, 12 KTS.' the hook was set. I heard 'cleared the visual' and got the wind as tower always does, but somehow selectively 'heard' cleared to land. As busy as I was with WX, traffic, first officer behind aircraft, seeing him reach for radio (as if he was tuning tower) then hearing our call cleared for the visual and wind, I responded and repeated wind to first officer as he asked. I told him add 10 KTS due possible windshear from thunderstorm. Aircraft stable and at 1000 ft callout first officer confirmed as SOP, we are cleared to land. Normal landing till I went to switch to ground and saw approach control as current frequency! I did not recognize how loaded up I had become. I should have stuck to the way I run my cockpit rather than relax on SOP. Should have clearly discussed my observations with first officer rather than 'feel good clear' to not offend. I do not berate any pilot, this is a group that wants to fly only their way not SOP unless being checked. No conflict occurred as a result of this, however, I have learned a great deal from this event. First officer rather silent and did not recall why he said 'cleared to land.' also he reached for the radio but just rested his hand there -- no reason -- then went back to left hand on throttle. ATC to our recollection never sent us to tower. I will not miss this again. I will not coddle a clear or SOP problem -- I will deal with it directly. Supplemental information from acn 403390: although field was in sight, captain kept TCASII display on WX/traffic in the 40 NM range, so I had no idea where preceding traffic was. I felt like we might be closing on the commuter, so I told the captain I would square the turn to final. As I began the turn to final, we got a TCASII TA for another commuter on final to the parallel runway. Overshot slightly, but rolled out on about a 3.5 - 4 NM final. Incident was caused by slightly elevated workload due to expedited arrival and TCASII alert as we turned final, possibly causing us to miss handoff. I now set my spare airspeed bug at the 12 O'clock position upon hearing landing clearance to prevent a recurrence!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF MLG LANDS WITHOUT CLRNC, THE RESULT OF AN UNSTABLE APCH, WX AND A TCASII ALERT. ERROR DISCOVERED AFTER TURN OFF RWY.

Narrative: SHORT AND QUICK DESCRIPTION. I GOT LOADED UP DURING THE APCH AND DID NOT CONTACT TWR FOR LNDG CLRNC. IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT. I HAD FLOWN WITH THIS FO BEFORE (1 YR AGO) AND GAVE HIM THE LNDGS AT THE OUT STATIONS, IE, CVG RATHER THAN HOME BASE. DAY #1 AND DAY #2 HE STRUGGLED TO GET STABLE ON APCHS DUE TO POOR PLANNING FOR HIS PATTERN, SPD, AND EXPECTATION OF ATC SPD AND ALT ASSIGNMENTS FOR BUILDING AN APCH FOR HIM. SECOND LNDG DAY #1, I CONFIGURED ACFT FOR HIM AS HE WAS FOUNDERING DURING AN APCH, HIGH, SLOW GEAR AND FLAPS UP, SPD BRAKES EXTENDED, HIGH BANK ANGLE AND OBVIOUSLY OUT OF IDEAS. I GOT IT STABLE. A SHORT DISCUSSION FOLLOWED AFTER LNDG, BUT HIS PERFORMANCE WAS A TASK. SOP ITEMS LIKE CHKING SWITCH POS DURING CHKLISTS WERE NOT DONE. I DID NOT SAY MUCH TO HIM AND JUST DID THE DOUBLECHKS MYSELF, WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO ME GETTING OVERLOADED ON DAY #3. THERE ARE A FEW MIL PLTS ON OUR PROPERTY WHO BECOME 'OFFENDED' WHEN YOU CORRECT THEM FOR NOT FLYING SOP, THEN THEIR PERFORMANCE DEGRADES FURTHER. MY UNION REPRESENTATIVE AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REPRESENTATIVE AND COMPANY PERSONNEL WANT ME TO LET THESE 'PLTS' FLY WITHOUT TOO MUCH CORRECTION, TO 'GET ALONG.' THEY HAVE NOT BACKED ME UP WHEN I HAVE HAD 'CLR' PROBS IN THE PAST WITH THIS SMALL GROUP. DUE TO MY KNOWLEDGE OF THIS FO, GENERALLY GOOD SKILLS, I WAS LAX WITH MY USUAL DISCIPLINED BY THE BOOK SOP COCKPIT. I KNEW THE TROUBLE HE WAS HAVING ON APCHS WAS DUE TO UNFAMILIARITY AND CONTINUED THIS AS A LEARNING TIME. I ENDED UP FATIGUED DUE TO MY EXTRA VIGILANCE, AND THEREFORE MISSED A CRITICAL ITEM. CONDITIONS DETERIORATING AT THE FIELD. TSTMS NEARBY, FO MISSED MY 'SUBTLE' HINT TO SLOW DOWN. I WAS WORKING RADAR, TSTMS 7 MI W OF FIELD, FO HIGH AND FAST. APCH CLRED US TO VISUAL RWY 18R, FO 35 DEG BANK, POSITIONING FLAPS, HURRIED APCH CONFIGN. TA WITH ACFT RWY 18L, AS WE APCHED THE MARKER. FO HAND GOES TO RADIO (SOMEHOW I MUST HAVE THOUGHT HE TUNED TWR) AS I READ CHKLIST. WE WERE NOW 'CLRED THE VISUAL, WIND 160 DEGS, 12 KTS.' THE HOOK WAS SET. I HEARD 'CLRED THE VISUAL' AND GOT THE WIND AS TWR ALWAYS DOES, BUT SOMEHOW SELECTIVELY 'HEARD' CLRED TO LAND. AS BUSY AS I WAS WITH WX, TFC, FO BEHIND ACFT, SEEING HIM REACH FOR RADIO (AS IF HE WAS TUNING TWR) THEN HEARING OUR CALL CLRED FOR THE VISUAL AND WIND, I RESPONDED AND REPEATED WIND TO FO AS HE ASKED. I TOLD HIM ADD 10 KTS DUE POSSIBLE WINDSHEAR FROM TSTM. ACFT STABLE AND AT 1000 FT CALLOUT FO CONFIRMED AS SOP, WE ARE CLRED TO LAND. NORMAL LNDG TILL I WENT TO SWITCH TO GND AND SAW APCH CTL AS CURRENT FREQ! I DID NOT RECOGNIZE HOW LOADED UP I HAD BECOME. I SHOULD HAVE STUCK TO THE WAY I RUN MY COCKPIT RATHER THAN RELAX ON SOP. SHOULD HAVE CLRLY DISCUSSED MY OBSERVATIONS WITH FO RATHER THAN 'FEEL GOOD CLR' TO NOT OFFEND. I DO NOT BERATE ANY PLT, THIS IS A GROUP THAT WANTS TO FLY ONLY THEIR WAY NOT SOP UNLESS BEING CHKED. NO CONFLICT OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF THIS, HOWEVER, I HAVE LEARNED A GREAT DEAL FROM THIS EVENT. FO RATHER SILENT AND DID NOT RECALL WHY HE SAID 'CLRED TO LAND.' ALSO HE REACHED FOR THE RADIO BUT JUST RESTED HIS HAND THERE -- NO REASON -- THEN WENT BACK TO L HAND ON THROTTLE. ATC TO OUR RECOLLECTION NEVER SENT US TO TWR. I WILL NOT MISS THIS AGAIN. I WILL NOT CODDLE A CLR OR SOP PROB -- I WILL DEAL WITH IT DIRECTLY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 403390: ALTHOUGH FIELD WAS IN SIGHT, CAPT KEPT TCASII DISPLAY ON WX/TFC IN THE 40 NM RANGE, SO I HAD NO IDEA WHERE PRECEDING TFC WAS. I FELT LIKE WE MIGHT BE CLOSING ON THE COMMUTER, SO I TOLD THE CAPT I WOULD SQUARE THE TURN TO FINAL. AS I BEGAN THE TURN TO FINAL, WE GOT A TCASII TA FOR ANOTHER COMMUTER ON FINAL TO THE PARALLEL RWY. OVERSHOT SLIGHTLY, BUT ROLLED OUT ON ABOUT A 3.5 - 4 NM FINAL. INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY SLIGHTLY ELEVATED WORKLOAD DUE TO EXPEDITED ARR AND TCASII ALERT AS WE TURNED FINAL, POSSIBLY CAUSING US TO MISS HDOF. I NOW SET MY SPARE AIRSPD BUG AT THE 12 O'CLOCK POS UPON HEARING LNDG CLRNC TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.