Narrative:

During takeoff roll the master caution light illuminated with a doors light. I commanded the abort and took control of the aircraft from the first officer for a successful rejected takeoff. I first noticed the master caution light just after my 80 KT airspeed call, when we xchk airspeed indicators. Seeing no other warning light in front of me, I diverted attention to the first officer's warning light panel, and saw doors illuminated. Looking overhead showed the forward entry door light illuminated, and I commanded abort. We were accelerating through about 110 KTS ground speed (inertial display) when the rejected takeoff automatic braking system applied brakes. Due primarily to our high gross weight (135200 pounds) the brake energy chart recommended a 70 min cooling period. We returned to the gate where maintenance advised us the brakes would have to be changed. We swapped aircraft and continued on, about 2 hours later, uneventfully. Our company flight handbook says rejecting for a door light above 80 KTS 'is not recommended.' in another location the handbook also states 'rejecting for a master caution light above 80 KTS is not recommended.' it is difficult for me now to review my split-second decision process, but I believe I was influenced by the following factors: 1) long dry runway, 2) well below V1 decision speed, 147 KTS, and 3) a flight attendant seated 2-3 ft from the door in question. I feel certain had we been departing from one of the several short runways in our system or a contaminated runway, I would have continued the takeoff. The fact that my decision destroyed 4 sets of costly brakes pains me, especially finding out later the door light was false. I have learned one reason it is not recommended to abort above 80 KTS, brake energy limits. Much faster and we could have melted fuse plugs, blown tires, or worse, had brake fire. To further my understanding of the situation, I plan on meeting with a check airman to discuss their thoughts and philosophies on this topic. Also, I will be more cognizant of my aircraft's gross weight, and think about my options prior to each takeoff roll. I will also use the 80 KT callout as another 'decision speed' during takeoff roll, not just for xchking airspeed indications.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-400 CABIN DOOR WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED DURING TKOF ROLL CAUSING THE CAPT TO TAKE OVER CTL OF THE ACFT FROM THE FO AND ABORT THE TKOF AT AN AIRSPD OF MORE THAN 110 KTS, WHICH IS WELL BELOW DECISION SPD OF 147 KTS. THE ACFT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNED TO THE GATE DUE TO A LENGTHY BRAKE COOL DOWN PERIOD.

Narrative: DURING TKOF ROLL THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED WITH A DOORS LIGHT. I COMMANDED THE ABORT AND TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT FROM THE FO FOR A SUCCESSFUL REJECTED TKOF. I FIRST NOTICED THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT JUST AFTER MY 80 KT AIRSPD CALL, WHEN WE XCHK AIRSPD INDICATORS. SEEING NO OTHER WARNING LIGHT IN FRONT OF ME, I DIVERTED ATTN TO THE FO'S WARNING LIGHT PANEL, AND SAW DOORS ILLUMINATED. LOOKING OVERHEAD SHOWED THE FORWARD ENTRY DOOR LIGHT ILLUMINATED, AND I COMMANDED ABORT. WE WERE ACCELERATING THROUGH ABOUT 110 KTS GND SPD (INERTIAL DISPLAY) WHEN THE RTO AUTOMATIC BRAKING SYS APPLIED BRAKES. DUE PRIMARILY TO OUR HIGH GROSS WT (135200 LBS) THE BRAKE ENERGY CHART RECOMMENDED A 70 MIN COOLING PERIOD. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE WHERE MAINT ADVISED US THE BRAKES WOULD HAVE TO BE CHANGED. WE SWAPPED ACFT AND CONTINUED ON, ABOUT 2 HRS LATER, UNEVENTFULLY. OUR COMPANY FLT HANDBOOK SAYS REJECTING FOR A DOOR LIGHT ABOVE 80 KTS 'IS NOT RECOMMENDED.' IN ANOTHER LOCATION THE HANDBOOK ALSO STATES 'REJECTING FOR A MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ABOVE 80 KTS IS NOT RECOMMENDED.' IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME NOW TO REVIEW MY SPLIT-SECOND DECISION PROCESS, BUT I BELIEVE I WAS INFLUENCED BY THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: 1) LONG DRY RWY, 2) WELL BELOW V1 DECISION SPD, 147 KTS, AND 3) A FLT ATTENDANT SEATED 2-3 FT FROM THE DOOR IN QUESTION. I FEEL CERTAIN HAD WE BEEN DEPARTING FROM ONE OF THE SEVERAL SHORT RWYS IN OUR SYS OR A CONTAMINATED RWY, I WOULD HAVE CONTINUED THE TKOF. THE FACT THAT MY DECISION DESTROYED 4 SETS OF COSTLY BRAKES PAINS ME, ESPECIALLY FINDING OUT LATER THE DOOR LIGHT WAS FALSE. I HAVE LEARNED ONE REASON IT IS NOT RECOMMENDED TO ABORT ABOVE 80 KTS, BRAKE ENERGY LIMITS. MUCH FASTER AND WE COULD HAVE MELTED FUSE PLUGS, BLOWN TIRES, OR WORSE, HAD BRAKE FIRE. TO FURTHER MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIT, I PLAN ON MEETING WITH A CHK AIRMAN TO DISCUSS THEIR THOUGHTS AND PHILOSOPHIES ON THIS TOPIC. ALSO, I WILL BE MORE COGNIZANT OF MY ACFT'S GROSS WT, AND THINK ABOUT MY OPTIONS PRIOR TO EACH TKOF ROLL. I WILL ALSO USE THE 80 KT CALLOUT AS ANOTHER 'DECISION SPD' DURING TKOF ROLL, NOT JUST FOR XCHKING AIRSPD INDICATIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.