Narrative:

My flight was cleared into position and hold on runway 14 at anc, pending departure of an air carrier B737 on runway 24L. About 1-2 mins after the air carrier jet took off, my flight was cleared for takeoff. The ATC clearance was to fly the knick 5 SID, which requires a right turn to 190 degrees at 400 ft MSL. The first officer was flying the aircraft. At approximately 250-300 ft MSL (about 150-200 ft AGL) we saw what appeared to be a beaver with floats ahead and very slightly right of our 12 O'clock position and at approximately 500 ft MSL the float plane appeared to be just outside the airport boundary when we first saw it, and was turning from (presumably) a parallel course of runway 24L towards a northwest heading of approximately 300-320 degrees. The float plane remained stationary in our windscreen perspective. Due to the probability that we would have collided with the float plane had we continued the knick 5 procedure, the first officer initiated a shallow left turn to about 15 degrees bank in order to pass to the left of and behind the float plane. Just about the time that the evasive action was taken, the tower called out traffic at our 12 O'clock position (presumably the first aircraft that we were evading). At this point, my flight was still in a 15 degree left bank and had been leveled at approximately 300 ft MSL, any further climb would have taken us through the float plane's altitude. The first officer and so both had continuous visual contact with the float plane, and estimate missing it by 1/4 mi horizontally and 100-200 ft vertically. Almost immediately after the evasive action was initiated, I looked to my forward left for any other traffic conflicts. I spotted a second float plane very close to us that was in trail of the first float plane and appeared to be flying the same flight path. I announced to the crew that there was another conflict and that I was assuming control of the aircraft. I reclred my aircraft further left to approximately 45-50 degrees bank and made a level turn at approximately 300 ft MSL to approximately heading of 070 degrees. The landing gear handle had already been raised after liftoff, but the flaps remained at the takeoff confign of 20 degrees. My crew estimates that we missed the second float plane by 500-1000 ft horizontally and 100-200 ft vertically. After several seconds had passed and it was clear that we had avoided a collision, I was concerned that there might be additional conflicts. We did not see any further traffic, so I initiated a shallow climb, rolling the aircraft to the right in order to avoid the mountains to the east of the airport. About that time, the tower called a TA for a large aircraft on a left base for one of the runways 24. I did not immediately see the aircraft, therefore, I steepened the bank to approximately 45 degrees to the right due to my sense that it was expedient to evacuate/evacuation the area as soon as possible. During that turn, the tower assigned a heading of 200 degrees. I then saw the aircraft on base, and shallowed the bank angle to 25-30 degrees and assumed a normal climb profile, raising the flaps and accelerating on profile. Control was then passed back to the first officer. I then questioned the tower controller as to why the 2 conflicting aircraft were there. The controller responded something to the effect of 'we had a coordination problem and the 2 aircraft were supposed to be departing to the south, and I (the controller) was not aware that they were going to go to the west.' I speculate that the 2 aircraft had taken off from lake hood, departing to the east, then turning crosswind to heading 140 degrees, then turning to heading 240 degrees, and then finally to heading 320 degrees to proceed across the inlet to point mckenzie. Whether the float planes did not follow instructions from the lake hood tower controller and/or timely information was not passed from the lake hood controller to the anc tower controller is unknown to me. I try to make a habit of (among other things) to look forward, left and right for traffic prior to initiating the takeoff roll. I suppose that we were locked into watching the air carrier jet departure which was known traffic for us. When one mentally crosses off a habit item as having been accomplished, it is difficult to attend to that item again. Obviously, sometimes there are other potential conflicts unknown to the parties involved that can quickly become a significant factor. Supplemental information from acn 407489: adding to the 'potential midair' problem (not just at anc, but at every airport), is the fact that our aircraft (and other freighters) are not equipped with TCASII. The potential for a midair involving a heavy jet is not lessened simply because there are no passenger aboard. If we expect to fly in a somewhat 'safe environment,' it should be mandatory that all large aircraft be equipped with TCASII. Callback conversation with reporter acn 407476 revealed the following information: anc airport is very busy in the summertime. Tower controllers at anc and lake hood, even though housed in a common cabin attendant, were operated as separate facilities, using separate frequencys. Lake hood issued departing traffic departure directions (ie, fly southeast) rather than departure headings. No coordination between the 2 facilities resulted in this near midair collision. Reporter now things that the 2 facilities have been combined and now use a common frequency. Lake hood traffic is now issued departure headings. This was the reporter's second very close call with other aircraft. He very strongly believes that all cargo aircraft should be required to be equipped with TCASII. This was the reporter's closest in-flight encounter with another aircraft. Maneuvering a heavy aircraft at this low an altitude, with bank angles this extreme, we were just plain lucky.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF CREW WAS FORCED TO BANK APPROX 50 DEGS AT ABOUT 200 FT AGL TO AVOID COLLISION WITH 2 OTHER ACFT.

Narrative: MY FLT WAS CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 14 AT ANC, PENDING DEP OF AN ACR B737 ON RWY 24L. ABOUT 1-2 MINS AFTER THE ACR JET TOOK OFF, MY FLT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. THE ATC CLRNC WAS TO FLY THE KNICK 5 SID, WHICH REQUIRES A R TURN TO 190 DEGS AT 400 FT MSL. THE FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT. AT APPROX 250-300 FT MSL (ABOUT 150-200 FT AGL) WE SAW WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BEAVER WITH FLOATS AHEAD AND VERY SLIGHTLY R OF OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS AND AT APPROX 500 FT MSL THE FLOAT PLANE APPEARED TO BE JUST OUTSIDE THE ARPT BOUNDARY WHEN WE FIRST SAW IT, AND WAS TURNING FROM (PRESUMABLY) A PARALLEL COURSE OF RWY 24L TOWARDS A NW HDG OF APPROX 300-320 DEGS. THE FLOAT PLANE REMAINED STATIONARY IN OUR WINDSCREEN PERSPECTIVE. DUE TO THE PROBABILITY THAT WE WOULD HAVE COLLIDED WITH THE FLOAT PLANE HAD WE CONTINUED THE KNICK 5 PROC, THE FO INITIATED A SHALLOW L TURN TO ABOUT 15 DEGS BANK IN ORDER TO PASS TO THE L OF AND BEHIND THE FLOAT PLANE. JUST ABOUT THE TIME THAT THE EVASIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN, THE TWR CALLED OUT TFC AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS (PRESUMABLY THE FIRST ACFT THAT WE WERE EVADING). AT THIS POINT, MY FLT WAS STILL IN A 15 DEG L BANK AND HAD BEEN LEVELED AT APPROX 300 FT MSL, ANY FURTHER CLB WOULD HAVE TAKEN US THROUGH THE FLOAT PLANE'S ALT. THE FO AND SO BOTH HAD CONTINUOUS VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE FLOAT PLANE, AND ESTIMATE MISSING IT BY 1/4 MI HORIZLY AND 100-200 FT VERTLY. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE EVASIVE ACTION WAS INITIATED, I LOOKED TO MY FORWARD L FOR ANY OTHER TFC CONFLICTS. I SPOTTED A SECOND FLOAT PLANE VERY CLOSE TO US THAT WAS IN TRAIL OF THE FIRST FLOAT PLANE AND APPEARED TO BE FLYING THE SAME FLT PATH. I ANNOUNCED TO THE CREW THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER CONFLICT AND THAT I WAS ASSUMING CTL OF THE ACFT. I RECLRED MY ACFT FURTHER L TO APPROX 45-50 DEGS BANK AND MADE A LEVEL TURN AT APPROX 300 FT MSL TO APPROX HDG OF 070 DEGS. THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE HAD ALREADY BEEN RAISED AFTER LIFTOFF, BUT THE FLAPS REMAINED AT THE TKOF CONFIGN OF 20 DEGS. MY CREW ESTIMATES THAT WE MISSED THE SECOND FLOAT PLANE BY 500-1000 FT HORIZLY AND 100-200 FT VERTLY. AFTER SEVERAL SECONDS HAD PASSED AND IT WAS CLR THAT WE HAD AVOIDED A COLLISION, I WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE MIGHT BE ADDITIONAL CONFLICTS. WE DID NOT SEE ANY FURTHER TFC, SO I INITIATED A SHALLOW CLB, ROLLING THE ACFT TO THE R IN ORDER TO AVOID THE MOUNTAINS TO THE E OF THE ARPT. ABOUT THAT TIME, THE TWR CALLED A TA FOR A LARGE ACFT ON A L BASE FOR ONE OF THE RWYS 24. I DID NOT IMMEDIATELY SEE THE ACFT, THEREFORE, I STEEPENED THE BANK TO APPROX 45 DEGS TO THE R DUE TO MY SENSE THAT IT WAS EXPEDIENT TO EVAC THE AREA ASAP. DURING THAT TURN, THE TWR ASSIGNED A HDG OF 200 DEGS. I THEN SAW THE ACFT ON BASE, AND SHALLOWED THE BANK ANGLE TO 25-30 DEGS AND ASSUMED A NORMAL CLB PROFILE, RAISING THE FLAPS AND ACCELERATING ON PROFILE. CTL WAS THEN PASSED BACK TO THE FO. I THEN QUESTIONED THE TWR CTLR AS TO WHY THE 2 CONFLICTING ACFT WERE THERE. THE CTLR RESPONDED SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'WE HAD A COORD PROB AND THE 2 ACFT WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DEPARTING TO THE S, AND I (THE CTLR) WAS NOT AWARE THAT THEY WERE GOING TO GO TO THE W.' I SPECULATE THAT THE 2 ACFT HAD TAKEN OFF FROM LAKE HOOD, DEPARTING TO THE E, THEN TURNING XWIND TO HDG 140 DEGS, THEN TURNING TO HDG 240 DEGS, AND THEN FINALLY TO HDG 320 DEGS TO PROCEED ACROSS THE INLET TO POINT MCKENZIE. WHETHER THE FLOAT PLANES DID NOT FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE LAKE HOOD TWR CTLR AND/OR TIMELY INFO WAS NOT PASSED FROM THE LAKE HOOD CTLR TO THE ANC TWR CTLR IS UNKNOWN TO ME. I TRY TO MAKE A HABIT OF (AMONG OTHER THINGS) TO LOOK FORWARD, L AND R FOR TFC PRIOR TO INITIATING THE TKOF ROLL. I SUPPOSE THAT WE WERE LOCKED INTO WATCHING THE ACR JET DEP WHICH WAS KNOWN TFC FOR US. WHEN ONE MENTALLY CROSSES OFF A HABIT ITEM AS HAVING BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ATTEND TO THAT ITEM AGAIN. OBVIOUSLY, SOMETIMES THERE ARE OTHER POTENTIAL CONFLICTS UNKNOWN TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED THAT CAN QUICKLY BECOME A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 407489: ADDING TO THE 'POTENTIAL MIDAIR' PROB (NOT JUST AT ANC, BUT AT EVERY ARPT), IS THE FACT THAT OUR ACFT (AND OTHER FREIGHTERS) ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH TCASII. THE POTENTIAL FOR A MIDAIR INVOLVING A HVY JET IS NOT LESSENED SIMPLY BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PAX ABOARD. IF WE EXPECT TO FLY IN A SOMEWHAT 'SAFE ENVIRONMENT,' IT SHOULD BE MANDATORY THAT ALL LARGE ACFT BE EQUIPPED WITH TCASII. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 407476 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ANC ARPT IS VERY BUSY IN THE SUMMERTIME. TWR CTLRS AT ANC AND LAKE HOOD, EVEN THOUGH HOUSED IN A COMMON CAB, WERE OPERATED AS SEPARATE FACILITIES, USING SEPARATE FREQS. LAKE HOOD ISSUED DEPARTING TFC DEP DIRECTIONS (IE, FLY SE) RATHER THAN DEP HDGS. NO COORD BTWN THE 2 FACILITIES RESULTED IN THIS NMAC. RPTR NOW THINGS THAT THE 2 FACILITIES HAVE BEEN COMBINED AND NOW USE A COMMON FREQ. LAKE HOOD TFC IS NOW ISSUED DEP HDGS. THIS WAS THE RPTR'S SECOND VERY CLOSE CALL WITH OTHER ACFT. HE VERY STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT ALL CARGO ACFT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO BE EQUIPPED WITH TCASII. THIS WAS THE RPTR'S CLOSEST INFLT ENCOUNTER WITH ANOTHER ACFT. MANEUVERING A HVY ACFT AT THIS LOW AN ALT, WITH BANK ANGLES THIS EXTREME, WE WERE JUST PLAIN LUCKY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.