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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 792910 |
Time | |
Date | 200806 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | msl single value : 1000 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : zzz.tracon tower : zzz.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A319 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 350 |
ASRS Report | 792910 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | performance deficiency : installation performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : inspection |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Maintenance Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
Maintenance chose to defer the number 1 spoilers. The procedure was accomplished by contract maintenance in ZZZ1. Captain and I discussed the deferral and agreed that safety was not compromised. After receiving all the necessary paperwork we departed. All phases of flight were normal until we were on approach in ZZZ. Initially I was the PF. I disconnected the autoplt and autothrust somewhere before the final approach fix. The aircraft began to drift to the left a very; very; small amount. In reflection; I noticed it but thought nothing of it as it could have been caused by pilot input. Approximately 2 miles before the final approach fix I called for 'gear down; final descent check.' captain complied. At approximately 1000 ft I called for 'flaps full.' almost immediately after captain selected flaps full; the aircraft began to shake violently. Captain wondered if we had possibly lost an engine. That was not the case. He told me that he was going to select flaps to 3 to see if the shaking would stop. The shaking continued. At this point we were somewhere inside 1000 ft and captain wanted to take control of the aircraft. I transferred the control of the aircraft to him. I asked him if he wanted to go around. As he was formulating his decision he realized that it was taking a lot of power to maintain GS. He again asked me if we had both engines running. I told him 'yes.' we never deviated more than 1 to 1 ? Dots below the GS as our performance was severely deteriorated. I again asked him if he wanted to go around. He replied with something like 'no; we have the runway made and I'm not sure a go around will work.' captain landed the aircraft without further incident. We did not declare an emergency because of our workload and time available before touchdown. Captain did an outstanding job controlling the aircraft and managing his cockpit. After arriving at the gate we debriefed the incident; wrote up the problem; and notified maintenance. As I left the aircraft I did notice that a spoiler was in the up position. Did a spoiler deploy in flight?callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated the problem began when they were taxiing the airbus A319 out from their departure station and got an ECAM spoiler fault. Per maintenance control; they returned to the gate after resetting circuit breakers did not remove the spoiler fault message. Both inboard #1 left and right ground spoilers were deferred per MEL and locked out by the contract maintenance service. Reporter stated everything appeared normal during final approach; until they selected full flaps down. That's when the violent shaking of the aircraft began. Even though flaps were raised back up to 3 degrees; the shaking continued. Reporter stated company maintenance mechanics later informed him they found the left #1 inboard ground spoiler was not secured in the down position; which was required per the MEL deferral procedure; prior to leaving their last station. Not properly securing the inboard ground spoiler in the down position allowed for that spoiler to float; causing the shaking effect on the aircraft.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN AIRBUS A319 PLT RPTS THE ACFT SHAKING VIOLENTLY IMMEDIATELY AFTER FULL FLAPS WERE SELECTED AT APPROX 1000 FT. MAINT LATER FOUND THE LEFT INBOARD GROUND SPOILER NOT SECURED.
Narrative: MAINT CHOSE TO DEFER THE NUMBER 1 SPOILERS. THE PROC WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY CONTRACT MAINT IN ZZZ1. CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE DEFERRAL AND AGREED THAT SAFETY WAS NOT COMPROMISED. AFTER RECEIVING ALL THE NECESSARY PAPERWORK WE DEPARTED. ALL PHASES OF FLT WERE NORMAL UNTIL WE WERE ON APCH IN ZZZ. INITIALLY I WAS THE PF. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHRUST SOMEWHERE BEFORE THE FINAL APCH FIX. THE ACFT BEGAN TO DRIFT TO THE L A VERY; VERY; SMALL AMOUNT. IN REFLECTION; I NOTICED IT BUT THOUGHT NOTHING OF IT AS IT COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY PLT INPUT. APPROX 2 MILES BEFORE THE FINAL APCH FIX I CALLED FOR 'GEAR DOWN; FINAL DSCNT CHECK.' CAPT COMPLIED. AT APPROX 1000 FT I CALLED FOR 'FLAPS FULL.' ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER CAPT SELECTED FLAPS FULL; THE ACFT BEGAN TO SHAKE VIOLENTLY. CAPT WONDERED IF WE HAD POSSIBLY LOST AN ENGINE. THAT WAS NOT THE CASE. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS GOING TO SELECT FLAPS TO 3 TO SEE IF THE SHAKING WOULD STOP. THE SHAKING CONTINUED. AT THIS POINT WE WERE SOMEWHERE INSIDE 1000 FT AND CAPT WANTED TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT. I TRANSFERRED THE CTL OF THE ACFT TO HIM. I ASKED HIM IF HE WANTED TO GO AROUND. AS HE WAS FORMULATING HIS DECISION HE REALIZED THAT IT WAS TAKING A LOT OF POWER TO MAINTAIN GS. HE AGAIN ASKED ME IF WE HAD BOTH ENGINES RUNNING. I TOLD HIM 'YES.' WE NEVER DEVIATED MORE THAN 1 TO 1 ? DOTS BELOW THE GS AS OUR PERFORMANCE WAS SEVERELY DETERIORATED. I AGAIN ASKED HIM IF HE WANTED TO GO AROUND. HE REPLIED WITH SOMETHING LIKE 'NO; WE HAVE THE RWY MADE AND I'M NOT SURE A GO AROUND WILL WORK.' CAPT LANDED THE ACFT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER BECAUSE OF OUR WORKLOAD AND TIME AVAILABLE BEFORE TOUCHDOWN. CAPT DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB CONTROLLING THE ACFT AND MANAGING HIS COCKPIT. AFTER ARRIVING AT THE GATE WE DEBRIEFED THE INCIDENT; WROTE UP THE PROBLEM; AND NOTIFIED MAINT. AS I LEFT THE ACFT I DID NOTICE THAT A SPOILER WAS IN THE UP POSITION. DID A SPOILER DEPLOY IN FLT?CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THE PROBLEM BEGAN WHEN THEY WERE TAXIING THE AIRBUS A319 OUT FROM THEIR DEP STATION AND GOT AN ECAM SPOILER FAULT. PER MAINT CTL; THEY RETURNED TO THE GATE AFTER RESETTING CIRCUIT BREAKERS DID NOT REMOVE THE SPOILER FAULT MESSAGE. BOTH INBOARD #1 LEFT AND RIGHT GND SPOILERS WERE DEFERRED PER MEL AND LOCKED OUT BY THE CONTRACT MAINT SERVICE. RPTR STATED EVERYTHING APPEARED NORMAL DURING FINAL APCH; UNTIL THEY SELECTED FULL FLAPS DOWN. THAT'S WHEN THE VIOLENT SHAKING OF THE ACFT BEGAN. EVEN THOUGH FLAPS WERE RAISED BACK UP TO 3 DEGS; THE SHAKING CONTINUED. RPTR STATED COMPANY MAINT MECHANICS LATER INFORMED HIM THEY FOUND THE LEFT #1 INBOARD GND SPOILER WAS NOT SECURED IN THE DOWN POSITION; WHICH WAS REQUIRED PER THE MEL DEFERRAL PROC; PRIOR TO LEAVING THEIR LAST STATION. NOT PROPERLY SECURING THE INBOARD GND SPOILER IN THE DOWN POSITION ALLOWED FOR THAT SPOILER TO FLOAT; CAUSING THE SHAKING EFFECT ON THE ACFT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.