Narrative:

On jul/wed/98, I was flying flight from dfw to ile in aircraft. About 30 mi from act, the flight attendant brought the cockpit crew something to drink. When trying to hand an unopened can of club soda to me, it was dropped on the center console. When it hit, it exploded, spewing the contents over everything. The flight attendant quickly got napkins to clean it up, but some of the contents dripped into the console. VHF #1 began to lose the led numbers and the ACARS began to flicker. I called act on VHF #1 but got no response. VHF #2 was tried, and it was confirmed that VHF #1 was inoperative. Shortly after that, a hydraulic warning light came on. The memory items were done and the QRH was complied with. I called act and advised them that we had spilled soda on the console and could likely lose communication at anytime. I also advised that we had an apparent hydraulic failure, and that ile would not be a suitable place to land, and until we had time to analyze the problem I wanted to hold over the VOR. We were given holding instructions. Before changing frequencys, I reviewed with act what our plans were if we lost communications. At that point, our plans were to land at act if the hydraulic problem could not be corrected. Maintenance operations control center was called and the options were discussed. With barely 5000 ft of runway and one fire truck, ile was definitely out of the question. Act, with just over 6000 ft and 2 fire trucks, wasn't much better. With dfw only 20 mins away, with the support equipment there, the choice was a no-brainer. Making a no flap landing on one of texas' shortest runways was not a pleasant thought. Maintenance operations control center concurred with my safety concerns but also thought it would be easier to fix the plane at dfw. In addition, it would inconvenience the passenger less. Both I and the first officer reviewed the QRH to be sure all items had been covered correctly. It was the first officer's leg, but since the landing had to be with zero flaps, I made the landing. On the rollout in dfw, we exited at a point that would have been beyond the length of act's runway. In hindsight, goingto dfw was the safer option. Maintenance came aboard the aircraft and a complete description of what had happened was relayed to them. Even the soda can was retrieved for evidence. We joked that the radios were probably cleaner now than they have ever been. Club soda has no sugar in it and it makes a good cleaning agent. The maintenance man stated that even then, all of the radios would have to be changed out. We also advised him that the emergency gear extensions handle had been pulled. He stated that would cause some extra work but agreed that going by the QRH procedure was the correct thing to do. I wrote in the maintenance log that the hydraulic light came on in-flight and that the QRH had been fully followed. I then handed it to the maintenance man and asked if there was anything else he needed or wanted in the write-up. He said that he wanted me to add that the emergency extension handle had been pulled. I added that and he said that he didn't need anything else. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that the main concern that directed his actions towards a 'no hydraulics zero flap landing,' was the fact that prior to this event another crew had a hydraulic problem and did not extend the gear with the emergency extension system. On landing, that crew had one gear collapse and the captain was terminated. In this instance, the captain used the emergency gear extension system prior to placing the gear down, as the checklist states. He did not try the flaps to see if they would work since the checklist calls for a no flap landing with 'no hydraulics.' the hydraulic pressure gauge which showed '0' pressure, is on the upper left portion of the same console that suffered the soda can explosion. It is, like the radio frequency display, electrically powered. Reporter now believes that the hydraulic problem was just a false indication. When the mechanic asked for the logbook write-up, he asked the captain to not place into the log the event of the soda can, saying, 'they knew what the problem was and that they will replace the entire console.' by this time, the console was dried out and hydraulic pressure indication was coming back up. The FAA was concerned with the return to dfw instead of landing at waco. This was not an engine failure and 'closest airport' did not apply. Destination and closest airport had but 6000 ft of runway available. The aircraft used 8000 ft of runway on the rollout at dfw. There has been no company feedback to the captain. Supplemental information from acn 407894: we hurried to dry the soda. After a few mins, the hydraulic warning light and chime came on. The main accumulator pressure was falling to zero. The emergency and brake accumulators remained normal. Hydraulic quantity remained the same. We decided to treat the hydraulic problem as a separate problem, not part of the spilled soda problem. We declared an emergency and were cleared direct dfw. We notified company and briefed the flight attendants. We followed the checklist, including pulling the emergency gear handle and not moving the flap handle, therefore a '0' degree flap landing. We cleared the runway and deplaned on the taxiway as recommended by the checklist, to prevent loss of all hydraulics while taxiing on the ramp. Prevention: be very careful while handling liquid over the radio rack or other electronics.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SF340 FLC RETURNS TO DFW AND MAKES A ZERO FLAP LNDG WHEN THEY ASSUME THAT THEY HAVE A LOSS OF HYD PRESSURE. PREVIOUS TO THE DIVERSION, THEY HAD EXPERIENCED A SODA CAN SPILL ON THEIR CTR ELECTRONIC PANEL, WHICH SHORTED OUT SOME CIRCUITS. THE HYD PRESSURE GAUGE FOR THE MAIN ACCUMULATOR HAD FALLEN TO ZERO.

Narrative: ON JUL/WED/98, I WAS FLYING FLT FROM DFW TO ILE IN ACFT. ABOUT 30 MI FROM ACT, THE FLT ATTENDANT BROUGHT THE COCKPIT CREW SOMETHING TO DRINK. WHEN TRYING TO HAND AN UNOPENED CAN OF CLUB SODA TO ME, IT WAS DROPPED ON THE CTR CONSOLE. WHEN IT HIT, IT EXPLODED, SPEWING THE CONTENTS OVER EVERYTHING. THE FLT ATTENDANT QUICKLY GOT NAPKINS TO CLEAN IT UP, BUT SOME OF THE CONTENTS DRIPPED INTO THE CONSOLE. VHF #1 BEGAN TO LOSE THE LED NUMBERS AND THE ACARS BEGAN TO FLICKER. I CALLED ACT ON VHF #1 BUT GOT NO RESPONSE. VHF #2 WAS TRIED, AND IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT VHF #1 WAS INOP. SHORTLY AFTER THAT, A HYD WARNING LIGHT CAME ON. THE MEMORY ITEMS WERE DONE AND THE QRH WAS COMPLIED WITH. I CALLED ACT AND ADVISED THEM THAT WE HAD SPILLED SODA ON THE CONSOLE AND COULD LIKELY LOSE COM AT ANYTIME. I ALSO ADVISED THAT WE HAD AN APPARENT HYD FAILURE, AND THAT ILE WOULD NOT BE A SUITABLE PLACE TO LAND, AND UNTIL WE HAD TIME TO ANALYZE THE PROB I WANTED TO HOLD OVER THE VOR. WE WERE GIVEN HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS. BEFORE CHANGING FREQS, I REVIEWED WITH ACT WHAT OUR PLANS WERE IF WE LOST COMS. AT THAT POINT, OUR PLANS WERE TO LAND AT ACT IF THE HYD PROB COULD NOT BE CORRECTED. MAINT OPS CTL CTR WAS CALLED AND THE OPTIONS WERE DISCUSSED. WITH BARELY 5000 FT OF RWY AND ONE FIRE TRUCK, ILE WAS DEFINITELY OUT OF THE QUESTION. ACT, WITH JUST OVER 6000 FT AND 2 FIRE TRUCKS, WASN'T MUCH BETTER. WITH DFW ONLY 20 MINS AWAY, WITH THE SUPPORT EQUIP THERE, THE CHOICE WAS A NO-BRAINER. MAKING A NO FLAP LNDG ON ONE OF TEXAS' SHORTEST RWYS WAS NOT A PLEASANT THOUGHT. MAINT OPS CTL CTR CONCURRED WITH MY SAFETY CONCERNS BUT ALSO THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO FIX THE PLANE AT DFW. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD INCONVENIENCE THE PAX LESS. BOTH I AND THE FO REVIEWED THE QRH TO BE SURE ALL ITEMS HAD BEEN COVERED CORRECTLY. IT WAS THE FO'S LEG, BUT SINCE THE LNDG HAD TO BE WITH ZERO FLAPS, I MADE THE LNDG. ON THE ROLLOUT IN DFW, WE EXITED AT A POINT THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN BEYOND THE LENGTH OF ACT'S RWY. IN HINDSIGHT, GOINGTO DFW WAS THE SAFER OPTION. MAINT CAME ABOARD THE ACFT AND A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED WAS RELAYED TO THEM. EVEN THE SODA CAN WAS RETRIEVED FOR EVIDENCE. WE JOKED THAT THE RADIOS WERE PROBABLY CLEANER NOW THAN THEY HAVE EVER BEEN. CLUB SODA HAS NO SUGAR IN IT AND IT MAKES A GOOD CLEANING AGENT. THE MAINT MAN STATED THAT EVEN THEN, ALL OF THE RADIOS WOULD HAVE TO BE CHANGED OUT. WE ALSO ADVISED HIM THAT THE EMER GEAR EXTENSIONS HANDLE HAD BEEN PULLED. HE STATED THAT WOULD CAUSE SOME EXTRA WORK BUT AGREED THAT GOING BY THE QRH PROC WAS THE CORRECT THING TO DO. I WROTE IN THE MAINT LOG THAT THE HYD LIGHT CAME ON INFLT AND THAT THE QRH HAD BEEN FULLY FOLLOWED. I THEN HANDED IT TO THE MAINT MAN AND ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE HE NEEDED OR WANTED IN THE WRITE-UP. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED ME TO ADD THAT THE EMER EXTENSION HANDLE HAD BEEN PULLED. I ADDED THAT AND HE SAID THAT HE DIDN'T NEED ANYTHING ELSE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT THE MAIN CONCERN THAT DIRECTED HIS ACTIONS TOWARDS A 'NO HYDS ZERO FLAP LNDG,' WAS THE FACT THAT PRIOR TO THIS EVENT ANOTHER CREW HAD A HYD PROB AND DID NOT EXTEND THE GEAR WITH THE EMER EXTENSION SYS. ON LNDG, THAT CREW HAD ONE GEAR COLLAPSE AND THE CAPT WAS TERMINATED. IN THIS INSTANCE, THE CAPT USED THE EMER GEAR EXTENSION SYS PRIOR TO PLACING THE GEAR DOWN, AS THE CHKLIST STATES. HE DID NOT TRY THE FLAPS TO SEE IF THEY WOULD WORK SINCE THE CHKLIST CALLS FOR A NO FLAP LNDG WITH 'NO HYDS.' THE HYD PRESSURE GAUGE WHICH SHOWED '0' PRESSURE, IS ON THE UPPER L PORTION OF THE SAME CONSOLE THAT SUFFERED THE SODA CAN EXPLOSION. IT IS, LIKE THE RADIO FREQ DISPLAY, ELECTRICALLY POWERED. RPTR NOW BELIEVES THAT THE HYD PROB WAS JUST A FALSE INDICATION. WHEN THE MECH ASKED FOR THE LOGBOOK WRITE-UP, HE ASKED THE CAPT TO NOT PLACE INTO THE LOG THE EVENT OF THE SODA CAN, SAYING, 'THEY KNEW WHAT THE PROB WAS AND THAT THEY WILL REPLACE THE ENTIRE CONSOLE.' BY THIS TIME, THE CONSOLE WAS DRIED OUT AND HYD PRESSURE INDICATION WAS COMING BACK UP. THE FAA WAS CONCERNED WITH THE RETURN TO DFW INSTEAD OF LNDG AT WACO. THIS WAS NOT AN ENG FAILURE AND 'CLOSEST ARPT' DID NOT APPLY. DEST AND CLOSEST ARPT HAD BUT 6000 FT OF RWY AVAILABLE. THE ACFT USED 8000 FT OF RWY ON THE ROLLOUT AT DFW. THERE HAS BEEN NO COMPANY FEEDBACK TO THE CAPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 407894: WE HURRIED TO DRY THE SODA. AFTER A FEW MINS, THE HYD WARNING LIGHT AND CHIME CAME ON. THE MAIN ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE WAS FALLING TO ZERO. THE EMER AND BRAKE ACCUMULATORS REMAINED NORMAL. HYD QUANTITY REMAINED THE SAME. WE DECIDED TO TREAT THE HYD PROB AS A SEPARATE PROB, NOT PART OF THE SPILLED SODA PROB. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND WERE CLRED DIRECT DFW. WE NOTIFIED COMPANY AND BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS. WE FOLLOWED THE CHKLIST, INCLUDING PULLING THE EMER GEAR HANDLE AND NOT MOVING THE FLAP HANDLE, THEREFORE A '0' DEG FLAP LNDG. WE CLRED THE RWY AND DEPLANED ON THE TXWY AS RECOMMENDED BY THE CHKLIST, TO PREVENT LOSS OF ALL HYDS WHILE TAXIING ON THE RAMP. PREVENTION: BE VERY CAREFUL WHILE HANDLING LIQUID OVER THE RADIO RACK OR OTHER ELECTRONICS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.