Narrative:

Aircraft departed jzi on jul/wed/98 at approximately XX40Z en route to 26N on a VFR flight with 3 passenger, my wife and 2 children. En route, a 'low voltage' indicator light would flash intermittently. These indications were interspersed with long periods of normal charging indications. The flight was continuing without difficulty, but it seemed prudent to have the airplane examined. I chose to land at iso. A mechanic at the FBO examined the plane, and a determination was made that the alternator was charging. However, it seemed to have low output when it was heavily loaded. I discussed the alternatives with him, and he stated that I could safely proceed to my destination so long as I kept the load minimal and went VFR. I contacted the plane's owner, at XXX aviation, and discussed the matter with them. Given the advice I received, I decided to proceed VFR. I did change my intended destination from 26N to 1n4 so that the alternator could be further evaluated and replaced if that turned out to be necessary. After confirming with FSS that VFR conditions were prevailing and forecast, we departed for 1n4 (woodbine, nj). After the engine was started, I noted the alternator was charging. As suggested, I kept the electrical load to a minimum -- just the transponder, navigation lights and 1 radio. I even pulled the circuit breakers on the autoplt and the electric trim. I always travel with a hand-held radio and portable GPS with 2 extra sets of batteries, and I feel that even in the unlikely event there was an electrical failure, I had appropriate back up system. We requested VFR flight following up the coast. The flight proceeded uneventfully with the exception of difficulty with radio communications in the vicinity of norfolk and patuxent approach having difficulty with our transponder. Subsequent controllers did not have difficulty with either our radios or transponder. The alternator indicator switched to show a continuous discharge indication at sometime near our destination. I cycled and then pulled the altitude fld circuit breaker as appropriate. I weighed my options, and given our position and the knowledge that we were planning on having the symptoms evaluated at woodbine, I judged that it was best to continue to land at 1n4. An initial approach was made to 1n4. Since we were unable to raise the FBO on unicom, we chose runway 30 as our landing runway after receiving ATIS at acy. During our first landing approach, the approach was too fast to allow for a safe landing, and after a brief touchdown a go around was executed. This included raising the gear. At the mid- field downwind leg when I dropped the gear, a loud screeching noise began. It sounded like metal being torn apart, and my first thought was that something had impacted with the airframe (such as a bird) or was being torn off of it or that something in the engine was binding up. When the panel lights (radios) began flashing, it became apparent that this sound was associated with the battery failing and the equipment going off. Given the nature of this metallic sound, I was concerned that beyond the electrical failure, I might be dealing with an airframe or engine problem. The radios were dead, and throughout the pattern, the flaps would not extend beyond about 10 degrees. Given the fact that the previous landing attempt was complicated by a high airspeed on approach, my attention was focused on the flap problem and controling the airspeed. The first sign of further difficulty was when the airplane contacted the runway in a gear-up confign. The airplane slid down the runway, crossed the end of the runway and came to rest in the grass beyond. No injuries occurred. Several factors were combined to lead to this incident. First was my decision to proceed with flight with an intermittent problem. In the past, when (on a similar pleasure trip) I had a similar but continuous 'low voltage' flashing indicator, I diverted to an airport and followed a mechanic's advice when told the aircraft was not safe to fly until repaired. The ensuing 6 hour delay in my trip was nothing compared to the grief and stress this affair has caused. Although I felt I could rely on the mechanic to give me sound advice, I will be more cautious in the future with any potential problem. I have since learned that I should have probably sought a ferry permit in any case. Secondly, I learned how difficult it is to actually use a hand-held portable radio in the cockpit. Although I knew how it worked and had tried it out on the ground, I had never attempted using it in the cockpit. During the brief radio difficulties around norfolk, I tried it and could barely hear it -- I needed an earplug (which I didn't have) to be able to hear it over the cabin noise. This turned out to be an issue later, because after my electrical system failed during my go around, individuals on the ground saw my gear up and attempted to radio me. Although I kept calling position in the pattern on my dead radio (habits die hard), I obviously didn't hear them. If I had been carrying an earplug for the hand-held radio, I would have used that instead and might have heard them, averting the incident. The most obvious factor here, which may be the hardest to correct, is how to handle the interruption of a checklist. I had started through gumps and got distracted by the noise/electrical failure right after 'undercarriage.' I never confirmed the gear down part of the checklist. I even have a personal one-step check I 'always' do immediately after turning final that consists of saying aloud 'on final, gear down' and checking the status of the gear. I was just so focused on the airspeed and making sure I kept it down with the flaps minimally extended that even this was missed. In fact, I was flying with my wife, who is also a pilot, in the copilot's seat. She was also so focused on the noise we heard on the downwind leg that she overlooked this all as well. In medicine, there is a phrase coming from 'the house of god' by samuel shem that paraphrased says, 'at a code, check your own pulse first.' although there was an unexpected distraction right at gear extension, once I had realized that the airplane was still flying and the engine was still running smoothly, I should have taken a step or two back, and rerun through the checklist. Having been interrupted in that process in the manner I was, there was no way I could have been sure just where I had left off when I was distracted. Beyond this, I have thought about how 'emergency training' is structured and I would suggest that more attention be paid to 'compound emergencys.' all the practice I have done on 'electrical failures' has amounted to a cfii announcing that I had a failure in-flight somewhere between points a and B. Then I would run through the drill in an orderly manner, proceed to an airport and demonstrate that I knew how to pump down the gear and land without flaps. It is always simple, direct, straightforward, and in retrospect, nothing like the real event. Emergencys practiced in the pattern are usually 'engine failures' on takeoff or landing. I would expand the pattern emergency training to include electrical (and potentially other) emergencys as well, so that one has to really stop what one is doing, consider the situation and then resume a checklist. This would be a more difficult exercise than simply having an 'emergency' checklist to go through while one is simply navigating the plane and not already in the middle of another checklist. Finally, I do participate in a safety program and have found that most of my review training 'emergencys' deal with partial panel instrument work -- I will be specifically requesting my instructors to throw a more varied list of emergencys at me in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MO2J PLT LANDED GEAR UP AFTER HAVING ELECTRICAL FAILURE, AND THEN RUNNING THE BATTERY DOWN.

Narrative: ACFT DEPARTED JZI ON JUL/WED/98 AT APPROX XX40Z ENRTE TO 26N ON A VFR FLT WITH 3 PAX, MY WIFE AND 2 CHILDREN. ENRTE, A 'LOW VOLTAGE' INDICATOR LIGHT WOULD FLASH INTERMITTENTLY. THESE INDICATIONS WERE INTERSPERSED WITH LONG PERIODS OF NORMAL CHARGING INDICATIONS. THE FLT WAS CONTINUING WITHOUT DIFFICULTY, BUT IT SEEMED PRUDENT TO HAVE THE AIRPLANE EXAMINED. I CHOSE TO LAND AT ISO. A MECH AT THE FBO EXAMINED THE PLANE, AND A DETERMINATION WAS MADE THAT THE ALTERNATOR WAS CHARGING. HOWEVER, IT SEEMED TO HAVE LOW OUTPUT WHEN IT WAS HEAVILY LOADED. I DISCUSSED THE ALTERNATIVES WITH HIM, AND HE STATED THAT I COULD SAFELY PROCEED TO MY DEST SO LONG AS I KEPT THE LOAD MINIMAL AND WENT VFR. I CONTACTED THE PLANE'S OWNER, AT XXX AVIATION, AND DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH THEM. GIVEN THE ADVICE I RECEIVED, I DECIDED TO PROCEED VFR. I DID CHANGE MY INTENDED DEST FROM 26N TO 1N4 SO THAT THE ALTERNATOR COULD BE FURTHER EVALUATED AND REPLACED IF THAT TURNED OUT TO BE NECESSARY. AFTER CONFIRMING WITH FSS THAT VFR CONDITIONS WERE PREVAILING AND FORECAST, WE DEPARTED FOR 1N4 (WOODBINE, NJ). AFTER THE ENG WAS STARTED, I NOTED THE ALTERNATOR WAS CHARGING. AS SUGGESTED, I KEPT THE ELECTRICAL LOAD TO A MINIMUM -- JUST THE XPONDER, NAV LIGHTS AND 1 RADIO. I EVEN PULLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON THE AUTOPLT AND THE ELECTRIC TRIM. I ALWAYS TRAVEL WITH A HAND-HELD RADIO AND PORTABLE GPS WITH 2 EXTRA SETS OF BATTERIES, AND I FEEL THAT EVEN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THERE WAS AN ELECTRICAL FAILURE, I HAD APPROPRIATE BACK UP SYS. WE REQUESTED VFR FLT FOLLOWING UP THE COAST. THE FLT PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF DIFFICULTY WITH RADIO COMS IN THE VICINITY OF NORFOLK AND PATUXENT APCH HAVING DIFFICULTY WITH OUR XPONDER. SUBSEQUENT CTLRS DID NOT HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH EITHER OUR RADIOS OR XPONDER. THE ALTERNATOR INDICATOR SWITCHED TO SHOW A CONTINUOUS DISCHARGE INDICATION AT SOMETIME NEAR OUR DEST. I CYCLED AND THEN PULLED THE ALT FLD CIRCUIT BREAKER AS APPROPRIATE. I WEIGHED MY OPTIONS, AND GIVEN OUR POS AND THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE WERE PLANNING ON HAVING THE SYMPTOMS EVALUATED AT WOODBINE, I JUDGED THAT IT WAS BEST TO CONTINUE TO LAND AT 1N4. AN INITIAL APCH WAS MADE TO 1N4. SINCE WE WERE UNABLE TO RAISE THE FBO ON UNICOM, WE CHOSE RWY 30 AS OUR LNDG RWY AFTER RECEIVING ATIS AT ACY. DURING OUR FIRST LNDG APCH, THE APCH WAS TOO FAST TO ALLOW FOR A SAFE LNDG, AND AFTER A BRIEF TOUCHDOWN A GAR WAS EXECUTED. THIS INCLUDED RAISING THE GEAR. AT THE MID- FIELD DOWNWIND LEG WHEN I DROPPED THE GEAR, A LOUD SCREECHING NOISE BEGAN. IT SOUNDED LIKE METAL BEING TORN APART, AND MY FIRST THOUGHT WAS THAT SOMETHING HAD IMPACTED WITH THE AIRFRAME (SUCH AS A BIRD) OR WAS BEING TORN OFF OF IT OR THAT SOMETHING IN THE ENG WAS BINDING UP. WHEN THE PANEL LIGHTS (RADIOS) BEGAN FLASHING, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THIS SOUND WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BATTERY FAILING AND THE EQUIP GOING OFF. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THIS METALLIC SOUND, I WAS CONCERNED THAT BEYOND THE ELECTRICAL FAILURE, I MIGHT BE DEALING WITH AN AIRFRAME OR ENG PROB. THE RADIOS WERE DEAD, AND THROUGHOUT THE PATTERN, THE FLAPS WOULD NOT EXTEND BEYOND ABOUT 10 DEGS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS LNDG ATTEMPT WAS COMPLICATED BY A HIGH AIRSPD ON APCH, MY ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON THE FLAP PROB AND CTLING THE AIRSPD. THE FIRST SIGN OF FURTHER DIFFICULTY WAS WHEN THE AIRPLANE CONTACTED THE RWY IN A GEAR-UP CONFIGN. THE AIRPLANE SLID DOWN THE RWY, CROSSED THE END OF THE RWY AND CAME TO REST IN THE GRASS BEYOND. NO INJURIES OCCURRED. SEVERAL FACTORS WERE COMBINED TO LEAD TO THIS INCIDENT. FIRST WAS MY DECISION TO PROCEED WITH FLT WITH AN INTERMITTENT PROB. IN THE PAST, WHEN (ON A SIMILAR PLEASURE TRIP) I HAD A SIMILAR BUT CONTINUOUS 'LOW VOLTAGE' FLASHING INDICATOR, I DIVERTED TO AN ARPT AND FOLLOWED A MECH'S ADVICE WHEN TOLD THE ACFT WAS NOT SAFE TO FLY UNTIL REPAIRED. THE ENSUING 6 HR DELAY IN MY TRIP WAS NOTHING COMPARED TO THE GRIEF AND STRESS THIS AFFAIR HAS CAUSED. ALTHOUGH I FELT I COULD RELY ON THE MECH TO GIVE ME SOUND ADVICE, I WILL BE MORE CAUTIOUS IN THE FUTURE WITH ANY POTENTIAL PROB. I HAVE SINCE LEARNED THAT I SHOULD HAVE PROBABLY SOUGHT A FERRY PERMIT IN ANY CASE. SECONDLY, I LEARNED HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO ACTUALLY USE A HAND-HELD PORTABLE RADIO IN THE COCKPIT. ALTHOUGH I KNEW HOW IT WORKED AND HAD TRIED IT OUT ON THE GND, I HAD NEVER ATTEMPTED USING IT IN THE COCKPIT. DURING THE BRIEF RADIO DIFFICULTIES AROUND NORFOLK, I TRIED IT AND COULD BARELY HEAR IT -- I NEEDED AN EARPLUG (WHICH I DIDN'T HAVE) TO BE ABLE TO HEAR IT OVER THE CABIN NOISE. THIS TURNED OUT TO BE AN ISSUE LATER, BECAUSE AFTER MY ELECTRICAL SYS FAILED DURING MY GAR, INDIVIDUALS ON THE GND SAW MY GEAR UP AND ATTEMPTED TO RADIO ME. ALTHOUGH I KEPT CALLING POS IN THE PATTERN ON MY DEAD RADIO (HABITS DIE HARD), I OBVIOUSLY DIDN'T HEAR THEM. IF I HAD BEEN CARRYING AN EARPLUG FOR THE HAND-HELD RADIO, I WOULD HAVE USED THAT INSTEAD AND MIGHT HAVE HEARD THEM, AVERTING THE INCIDENT. THE MOST OBVIOUS FACTOR HERE, WHICH MAY BE THE HARDEST TO CORRECT, IS HOW TO HANDLE THE INTERRUPTION OF A CHKLIST. I HAD STARTED THROUGH GUMPS AND GOT DISTRACTED BY THE NOISE/ELECTRICAL FAILURE RIGHT AFTER 'UNDERCARRIAGE.' I NEVER CONFIRMED THE GEAR DOWN PART OF THE CHKLIST. I EVEN HAVE A PERSONAL ONE-STEP CHK I 'ALWAYS' DO IMMEDIATELY AFTER TURNING FINAL THAT CONSISTS OF SAYING ALOUD 'ON FINAL, GEAR DOWN' AND CHKING THE STATUS OF THE GEAR. I WAS JUST SO FOCUSED ON THE AIRSPD AND MAKING SURE I KEPT IT DOWN WITH THE FLAPS MINIMALLY EXTENDED THAT EVEN THIS WAS MISSED. IN FACT, I WAS FLYING WITH MY WIFE, WHO IS ALSO A PLT, IN THE COPLT'S SEAT. SHE WAS ALSO SO FOCUSED ON THE NOISE WE HEARD ON THE DOWNWIND LEG THAT SHE OVERLOOKED THIS ALL AS WELL. IN MEDICINE, THERE IS A PHRASE COMING FROM 'THE HOUSE OF GOD' BY SAMUEL SHEM THAT PARAPHRASED SAYS, 'AT A CODE, CHK YOUR OWN PULSE FIRST.' ALTHOUGH THERE WAS AN UNEXPECTED DISTR RIGHT AT GEAR EXTENSION, ONCE I HAD REALIZED THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS STILL FLYING AND THE ENG WAS STILL RUNNING SMOOTHLY, I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN A STEP OR TWO BACK, AND RERUN THROUGH THE CHKLIST. HAVING BEEN INTERRUPTED IN THAT PROCESS IN THE MANNER I WAS, THERE WAS NO WAY I COULD HAVE BEEN SURE JUST WHERE I HAD LEFT OFF WHEN I WAS DISTRACTED. BEYOND THIS, I HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT HOW 'EMER TRAINING' IS STRUCTURED AND I WOULD SUGGEST THAT MORE ATTN BE PAID TO 'COMPOUND EMERS.' ALL THE PRACTICE I HAVE DONE ON 'ELECTRICAL FAILURES' HAS AMOUNTED TO A CFII ANNOUNCING THAT I HAD A FAILURE INFLT SOMEWHERE BTWN POINTS A AND B. THEN I WOULD RUN THROUGH THE DRILL IN AN ORDERLY MANNER, PROCEED TO AN ARPT AND DEMONSTRATE THAT I KNEW HOW TO PUMP DOWN THE GEAR AND LAND WITHOUT FLAPS. IT IS ALWAYS SIMPLE, DIRECT, STRAIGHTFORWARD, AND IN RETROSPECT, NOTHING LIKE THE REAL EVENT. EMERS PRACTICED IN THE PATTERN ARE USUALLY 'ENG FAILURES' ON TKOF OR LNDG. I WOULD EXPAND THE PATTERN EMER TRAINING TO INCLUDE ELECTRICAL (AND POTENTIALLY OTHER) EMERS AS WELL, SO THAT ONE HAS TO REALLY STOP WHAT ONE IS DOING, CONSIDER THE SIT AND THEN RESUME A CHKLIST. THIS WOULD BE A MORE DIFFICULT EXERCISE THAN SIMPLY HAVING AN 'EMER' CHKLIST TO GO THROUGH WHILE ONE IS SIMPLY NAVING THE PLANE AND NOT ALREADY IN THE MIDDLE OF ANOTHER CHKLIST. FINALLY, I DO PARTICIPATE IN A SAFETY PROGRAM AND HAVE FOUND THAT MOST OF MY REVIEW TRAINING 'EMERS' DEAL WITH PARTIAL PANEL INST WORK -- I WILL BE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTING MY INSTRUCTORS TO THROW A MORE VARIED LIST OF EMERS AT ME IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.