Narrative:

I was scheduled to start my 4 leg pm flying day in st louis. Everything was uneventful prior to arriving at the gate where we were informed the aircraft would be 25 mins late. As the PNF (for this leg -- stl to lit) and first officer, I reviewed the WX and release. Upon descent into lit, I copied the ATIS which did not mention that the northeast 800 ft of runway 4L/22R was closed. Approach control told us to expect a visual approach to runway 4R. We requested and received a visual approach to runway 4L. No mention was made by approach control of the shortened runway status. Subsequently, we were given clearance to land runway 4L by lit tower and again no mention was made of the shortened runway status. The WX was clear with 10 mi visibility. The captain landed the aircraft flaps 30 degrees, on speed at approximately 1000 ft using regular procedures, reverse thrust to 80 KTS before braking. My attention was divided between the runway exit at taxiway J and the airspeed indicator, as it is my job to call out 80 KTS to the captain to reduce reverse and begin normal braking. It became obvious a short time later that the captain was not going to exit at taxiway J, so I shifted my focus down the runway to the departure end. At this time I noticed something on the runway, at the same time the captain began braking harder. There were 5 sandbags evenly spaced across the width of the runway. I would estimate we were doing about 30 KTS when tower advised us we were about to enter a closed portion of the runway. The captain steered between the sandbags and entered the closed portion at approximately 15 KTS ground speed, did a 180 degree turn, and exited at the point which we had entered. Taxi to the gate was uneventful. The captain did an exterior inspection and noted nothing unusual. This entire chain of events occurred because a single NOTAM amongst all those in the WX package was not noticed. Something as important as the primary turbojet runway being shortened (especially a relatively short runway to begin with) should be in the ATIS, and mentioned by both approach control and tower when assigning it for the approach and landing. None of those actions occurred. Finally, using 5 sandbags to indicate a runway closure is not visually adequate. The runway looked perfectly useable until very late in the landing rollout. Supplemental information from acn 409613: the destination metar was missing and I spent a little time trying to find it in the package before I showed it to the operations agent and requested current WX which he later provided. Unfortunately I missed the NOTAM on the second page of the WX package. The system was very intolerant of that simple error. There were three more opportunities that could have alerted me to the runway shortening and they weren't there: the ATIS contained no mention of it, the approach controller when he cleared me for the visual did not say anything about it, and the tower controller made no mention when he cleared me to land.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LNDG B737-300 INADVERTENTLY USES THE CLOSED PORTION OF RWY 4L AT LIT. APCH CTLR AND TWR CTLR DID NOT ADVISE CREW OF THE CLOSED 800 FT AT THE END. THE RWY CONFIGN HAD BEEN NOTAMED BUT THE FLC MISSED THAT IN THEIR FLT PLANNING. ATIS DID NOT CARRY THIS INFO EITHER.

Narrative: I WAS SCHEDULED TO START MY 4 LEG PM FLYING DAY IN ST LOUIS. EVERYTHING WAS UNEVENTFUL PRIOR TO ARRIVING AT THE GATE WHERE WE WERE INFORMED THE ACFT WOULD BE 25 MINS LATE. AS THE PNF (FOR THIS LEG -- STL TO LIT) AND FO, I REVIEWED THE WX AND RELEASE. UPON DSCNT INTO LIT, I COPIED THE ATIS WHICH DID NOT MENTION THAT THE NE 800 FT OF RWY 4L/22R WAS CLOSED. APCH CTL TOLD US TO EXPECT A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 4R. WE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 4L. NO MENTION WAS MADE BY APCH CTL OF THE SHORTENED RWY STATUS. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO LAND RWY 4L BY LIT TWR AND AGAIN NO MENTION WAS MADE OF THE SHORTENED RWY STATUS. THE WX WAS CLR WITH 10 MI VISIBILITY. THE CAPT LANDED THE ACFT FLAPS 30 DEGS, ON SPD AT APPROX 1000 FT USING REGULAR PROCS, REVERSE THRUST TO 80 KTS BEFORE BRAKING. MY ATTN WAS DIVIDED BTWN THE RWY EXIT AT TXWY J AND THE AIRSPD INDICATOR, AS IT IS MY JOB TO CALL OUT 80 KTS TO THE CAPT TO REDUCE REVERSE AND BEGIN NORMAL BRAKING. IT BECAME OBVIOUS A SHORT TIME LATER THAT THE CAPT WAS NOT GOING TO EXIT AT TXWY J, SO I SHIFTED MY FOCUS DOWN THE RWY TO THE DEP END. AT THIS TIME I NOTICED SOMETHING ON THE RWY, AT THE SAME TIME THE CAPT BEGAN BRAKING HARDER. THERE WERE 5 SANDBAGS EVENLY SPACED ACROSS THE WIDTH OF THE RWY. I WOULD ESTIMATE WE WERE DOING ABOUT 30 KTS WHEN TWR ADVISED US WE WERE ABOUT TO ENTER A CLOSED PORTION OF THE RWY. THE CAPT STEERED BTWN THE SANDBAGS AND ENTERED THE CLOSED PORTION AT APPROX 15 KTS GND SPD, DID A 180 DEG TURN, AND EXITED AT THE POINT WHICH WE HAD ENTERED. TAXI TO THE GATE WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE CAPT DID AN EXTERIOR INSPECTION AND NOTED NOTHING UNUSUAL. THIS ENTIRE CHAIN OF EVENTS OCCURRED BECAUSE A SINGLE NOTAM AMONGST ALL THOSE IN THE WX PACKAGE WAS NOT NOTICED. SOMETHING AS IMPORTANT AS THE PRIMARY TURBOJET RWY BEING SHORTENED (ESPECIALLY A RELATIVELY SHORT RWY TO BEGIN WITH) SHOULD BE IN THE ATIS, AND MENTIONED BY BOTH APCH CTL AND TWR WHEN ASSIGNING IT FOR THE APCH AND LNDG. NONE OF THOSE ACTIONS OCCURRED. FINALLY, USING 5 SANDBAGS TO INDICATE A RWY CLOSURE IS NOT VISUALLY ADEQUATE. THE RWY LOOKED PERFECTLY USEABLE UNTIL VERY LATE IN THE LNDG ROLLOUT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 409613: THE DEST METAR WAS MISSING AND I SPENT A LITTLE TIME TRYING TO FIND IT IN THE PACKAGE BEFORE I SHOWED IT TO THE OPS AGENT AND REQUESTED CURRENT WX WHICH HE LATER PROVIDED. UNFORTUNATELY I MISSED THE NOTAM ON THE SECOND PAGE OF THE WX PACKAGE. THE SYS WAS VERY INTOLERANT OF THAT SIMPLE ERROR. THERE WERE THREE MORE OPPORTUNITIES THAT COULD HAVE ALERTED ME TO THE RWY SHORTENING AND THEY WEREN'T THERE: THE ATIS CONTAINED NO MENTION OF IT, THE APCH CTLR WHEN HE CLRED ME FOR THE VISUAL DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT IT, AND THE TWR CTLR MADE NO MENTION WHEN HE CLRED ME TO LAND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.