Narrative:

We were flying a normal flight from iah to phl. Only abnormal thing was that APU was weak and we were able to only get 19.9% N2 rotation when starting the #2 engine (20% required). On takeoff on runway 14L at iah we weighed approximately 120000 pounds and had 98 passenger on board with approximately 27000 pounds of fuel. On takeoff roll we had the briefest 'master caution' flicker (about 1/4 of a second). This happened several times (beyond 80K). I asked the first officer 'what is that?' he said he didn't know. About the same time the gear was coming up -- to 400 ft AGL (somewhere in there) the master caution light illuminated along with the 'overheat/det' light on the 'recall light panel.' this drew our attention to the fire control panel which had the right engine (engine #2 overheat) light illuminated. I continued to fly the aircraft and told the first officer to get out his 'QRH.' I declared an emergency. We went through the procedures (correctly for the most part). The first officer initially didn't go to the immediate action items until I told him to -- he went to the 'overheat procedure' deeper in the book, which should come second. I elected to keep 1 degree flaps/slats as it was VFR and I knew we would be soon maneuvering for a landing (we were already on downwind to runway 26). We told them we wanted to return and to have the 'equipment' standing by. During this very busy time, we notified the flight attendants, the passenger and the company. I asked for delaying vectors as I didn't want to get into the situation of an unstabilized approach and a single engine go around! The overheat light went out after we shot both fire bottles on the procedure. We followed the standard single engine ILS profile and landed on runway 26 at an estimated 120000 pounds after an estimated single engine flight time of 17 mins. Upon touchdown, the sink rate was very low, the landing smooth, and on centerline and we turned off the runway with several thousand ft to spare. I did not have the flight attendant put the passenger in the brace position as I did not want to alarm them unnecessarily as things were under control. I made the necessary logbook write-ups, including one for overweight landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 SHUTS DOWN AN ENG AFTER TKOF BECAUSE IT OVERHEATS. FLC DECLARES AN EMER AND RETURN LAND.

Narrative: WE WERE FLYING A NORMAL FLT FROM IAH TO PHL. ONLY ABNORMAL THING WAS THAT APU WAS WEAK AND WE WERE ABLE TO ONLY GET 19.9% N2 ROTATION WHEN STARTING THE #2 ENG (20% REQUIRED). ON TKOF ON RWY 14L AT IAH WE WEIGHED APPROX 120000 LBS AND HAD 98 PAX ON BOARD WITH APPROX 27000 LBS OF FUEL. ON TKOF ROLL WE HAD THE BRIEFEST 'MASTER CAUTION' FLICKER (ABOUT 1/4 OF A SECOND). THIS HAPPENED SEVERAL TIMES (BEYOND 80K). I ASKED THE FO 'WHAT IS THAT?' HE SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW. ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE GEAR WAS COMING UP -- TO 400 FT AGL (SOMEWHERE IN THERE) THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED ALONG WITH THE 'OVERHEAT/DET' LIGHT ON THE 'RECALL LIGHT PANEL.' THIS DREW OUR ATTN TO THE FIRE CTL PANEL WHICH HAD THE R ENG (ENG #2 OVERHEAT) LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT AND TOLD THE FO TO GET OUT HIS 'QRH.' I DECLARED AN EMER. WE WENT THROUGH THE PROCS (CORRECTLY FOR THE MOST PART). THE FO INITIALLY DIDN'T GO TO THE IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEMS UNTIL I TOLD HIM TO -- HE WENT TO THE 'OVERHEAT PROC' DEEPER IN THE BOOK, WHICH SHOULD COME SECOND. I ELECTED TO KEEP 1 DEG FLAPS/SLATS AS IT WAS VFR AND I KNEW WE WOULD BE SOON MANEUVERING FOR A LNDG (WE WERE ALREADY ON DOWNWIND TO RWY 26). WE TOLD THEM WE WANTED TO RETURN AND TO HAVE THE 'EQUIP' STANDING BY. DURING THIS VERY BUSY TIME, WE NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANTS, THE PAX AND THE COMPANY. I ASKED FOR DELAYING VECTORS AS I DIDN'T WANT TO GET INTO THE SIT OF AN UNSTABILIZED APCH AND A SINGLE ENG GAR! THE OVERHEAT LIGHT WENT OUT AFTER WE SHOT BOTH FIRE BOTTLES ON THE PROC. WE FOLLOWED THE STANDARD SINGLE ENG ILS PROFILE AND LANDED ON RWY 26 AT AN ESTIMATED 120000 LBS AFTER AN ESTIMATED SINGLE ENG FLT TIME OF 17 MINS. UPON TOUCHDOWN, THE SINK RATE WAS VERY LOW, THE LNDG SMOOTH, AND ON CTRLINE AND WE TURNED OFF THE RWY WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND FT TO SPARE. I DID NOT HAVE THE FLT ATTENDANT PUT THE PAX IN THE BRACE POS AS I DID NOT WANT TO ALARM THEM UNNECESSARILY AS THINGS WERE UNDER CTL. I MADE THE NECESSARY LOGBOOK WRITE-UPS, INCLUDING ONE FOR OVERWT LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.