Narrative:

Description: as we taxied out for departure at lax we received a change of plan which required us to reprogram the FMS. Both cockpit crew members are new to the B737-800 FMC set-up. We were taxiing slowly and cautiously with the new airplane, 31 min taxi out, as we wanted to make sure the FMC was programmed properly for departure. Ground control told us to 'expect no delay at the end' and there was no one in line at the end. As we continued, the takeoff reference speeds continued to drop out and we received multiple uplink messages. The automated cockpit was working against us so we dropped down to the manual mode. The first officer I believe was distracted by the fact that the takeoff reference page did not display preflight complete as in the B737-300 and B737-500. I should explain at this point that I am a new captain (194 hours) attempting to check out an first officer who had never seen this FMS set-up in the actual airplane -- all FAA approved. The first officer correctly brought to my attention that the takeoff reference page did not display preflight complete. I verified that the temperature, takeoff reference speeds, and departure were all properly programmed and all was ready. I was being cautious in the turn with the 'longer' B737-800 to square the turn. I was also looking out the final approach to the east to observe the traffic situation and xchking the data entry as is normal crew duty. I do not know why I didn't see the hold short line. I have asked myself a thousand times why I didn't see it. I honestly do not recall what effect the angle of the late afternoon sun may have had on glaring the hold short signage. We ended up stopping at the runway boundary. Before we could report our error, ATC confirmed that we were past the hold line and to taxi on across to clear the runway. The traffic on final that I had observed earlier was now reported to be 4 mi out. No traffic priority was needed nor received. Later my telephone conversation with the lax tower revealed that we were the 2ND error of the day and the 6TH in the previous 2 weeks. Chain of events: the problem arose with a change of plan in a new airplane with a new captain checking out an first officer new to the FMS set-up. The problem was discovered abruptly as the runway appeared directly in front of us. Contributing factors were high workload, multiple distractions, and reduced visibility due to sun glare. Corrective action was to taxi on across the runway with clearance to do so. Human performance considerations: I perceived erroneously that the distance to the runway from the parallel taxiway was greater than it actually was. I perceived erroneously that there would be no delay at the end due to the radio advisory and observed traffic. I had every intention of stopping but misjudged the distance due to not seeing the hold short signage. Factors affecting the quality of human performance were working with new equipment in new sits and I believe our human performance was degraded by actually trying too hard to accomplish everything correctly. Prevent a recurrence, several steps can be taken: 1) in ground, across the taxiway, hold short lighting and wig-wag lights would have been extremely helpful. In this case fog was not a problem for visibility but the sun very well may have been. It seems to indicate some sort of common problem since we were the second error of aug/fri/98, and there were 6 similar in 2 weeks. 2) I remember when we checked out on the EFIS B737- 500's, several yrs ago, we had an EFIS training device and trained on the ground. I think a ground based training device (ACARS interface) would be better than aircraft training. Isn't that why we have simulators? 3) even though FAA approved, perhaps we should re-evaluate whether it is a good idea to use new line capts to familiarize 'new to the automation' crew members, without the benefit of check airman training. I'm suggesting that the captain should have at least 3-5 long legs of experience before passing on his knowledge to others. 4) continue and re-emphasize awareness that pertain to sits like this, ie, ASRS newsletter, statistics and discussions in recurrent training. 5) publish problem areas (disseminate the information) encountered on the line sooner and more thoroughly pertaining to ACARS interface, uplink prompts, and messages that can't be found or have no meaning. I truly hope that this report can enhance air safety. Supplemental information from acn 411871: the new B737-800 has a highly automated data uplink to load all the pertinent information into the FMC's, supposedly during preflight. This uplink is quite slow in supplying the needed information. Prior to pushback, the data we knew (temperature, departure runway, SID) were loaded. Upon calling ground control our assumed departure runway of 25R was changed to runway 24L. Contacting north complex ground we were told to expedite and expect no delay at the runway. The captain was prudent in taxiing slowly, squaring off turns because of this being a considerably longer aircraft. The performance init, takeoff data (including V speeds) and cruise wind data had yet to arrive through the data link. I suggested we stop until we were ready. Just then the performance init and takeoff data arrived into the FMC's, for runway 25R. The V speeds are runway specific. Trying to load the correct data 3 times manually was unsuccessful. The V speeds kept dropping out. I again recommended stopping, myself nor the magic boxes were ready. At this point I estimate my head had been down 60-70 seconds, way too long. Captain said try again. On the 4TH attempt the box accepted the speeds, I don't know why, nothing different had been done. About this time I became aware of a very prominent shift in sunlight entering the cockpit. I looked up, got my bearings and shouted 'stop.' we were across the hold short line for runway 24L and approximately 25 ft from the runway. I looked right and saw an aircraft a good distance out (several mi) on final for one of the runway 24's. The tower called us stating 'we show you across the hold short line for runway 24L, traffic is an air carrier MD80 on 4 mi final runway 24L. Cleared to cross runway 24L, hold short of runway 24R.' no go around by the air carrier was necessary. What can you say? It could have been a lot worse. Comments/conclusions: 1) for what it's worth, I had all relevant training bulletins instructing me while trying to load data at the gate. Only the route information came through 'as advertised.' the remainder arrived during taxi, a terrible time to be distracted. Had this information been in a more timely manner, ie, at the gate, I doubt I'd be writing this and you would not have to be reading it. 2) this was the captain's 2ND time in the aircraft after a quick initial check out from dca to ewr. The captain is now 'qualified' to train me on my first leg. This is approved by the FAA. 3) don't move the aircraft until all is done, or if moving, stop till everything is right. 4) ground control (or tower) should not hurry you along. It can lead to mistakes. Thank you. P.south. After this report was written, I again had the dubious honor of flying the B737-800. The uplink worked pretty much the same. We landed everything manually at the gate this time. I won't allow myself to get set up again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800. IOE CHK AIRMAN, WAS GIVING TRAINING TO A NEW PLT, AND ACCIDENTALLY TAXIED ONTO THE DEP RWY.

Narrative: DESCRIPTION: AS WE TAXIED OUT FOR DEP AT LAX WE RECEIVED A CHANGE OF PLAN WHICH REQUIRED US TO REPROGRAM THE FMS. BOTH COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS ARE NEW TO THE B737-800 FMC SET-UP. WE WERE TAXIING SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY WITH THE NEW AIRPLANE, 31 MIN TAXI OUT, AS WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THE FMC WAS PROGRAMMED PROPERLY FOR DEP. GND CTL TOLD US TO 'EXPECT NO DELAY AT THE END' AND THERE WAS NO ONE IN LINE AT THE END. AS WE CONTINUED, THE TKOF REF SPDS CONTINUED TO DROP OUT AND WE RECEIVED MULTIPLE UPLINK MESSAGES. THE AUTOMATED COCKPIT WAS WORKING AGAINST US SO WE DROPPED DOWN TO THE MANUAL MODE. THE FO I BELIEVE WAS DISTRACTED BY THE FACT THAT THE TKOF REF PAGE DID NOT DISPLAY PREFLT COMPLETE AS IN THE B737-300 AND B737-500. I SHOULD EXPLAIN AT THIS POINT THAT I AM A NEW CAPT (194 HRS) ATTEMPTING TO CHK OUT AN FO WHO HAD NEVER SEEN THIS FMS SET-UP IN THE ACTUAL AIRPLANE -- ALL FAA APPROVED. THE FO CORRECTLY BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT THE TKOF REF PAGE DID NOT DISPLAY PREFLT COMPLETE. I VERIFIED THAT THE TEMP, TKOF REF SPDS, AND DEP WERE ALL PROPERLY PROGRAMMED AND ALL WAS READY. I WAS BEING CAUTIOUS IN THE TURN WITH THE 'LONGER' B737-800 TO SQUARE THE TURN. I WAS ALSO LOOKING OUT THE FINAL APCH TO THE E TO OBSERVE THE TFC SIT AND XCHKING THE DATA ENTRY AS IS NORMAL CREW DUTY. I DO NOT KNOW WHY I DIDN'T SEE THE HOLD SHORT LINE. I HAVE ASKED MYSELF A THOUSAND TIMES WHY I DIDN'T SEE IT. I HONESTLY DO NOT RECALL WHAT EFFECT THE ANGLE OF THE LATE AFTERNOON SUN MAY HAVE HAD ON GLARING THE HOLD SHORT SIGNAGE. WE ENDED UP STOPPING AT THE RWY BOUNDARY. BEFORE WE COULD RPT OUR ERROR, ATC CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE PAST THE HOLD LINE AND TO TAXI ON ACROSS TO CLR THE RWY. THE TFC ON FINAL THAT I HAD OBSERVED EARLIER WAS NOW RPTED TO BE 4 MI OUT. NO TFC PRIORITY WAS NEEDED NOR RECEIVED. LATER MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE LAX TWR REVEALED THAT WE WERE THE 2ND ERROR OF THE DAY AND THE 6TH IN THE PREVIOUS 2 WKS. CHAIN OF EVENTS: THE PROB AROSE WITH A CHANGE OF PLAN IN A NEW AIRPLANE WITH A NEW CAPT CHKING OUT AN FO NEW TO THE FMS SET-UP. THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED ABRUPTLY AS THE RWY APPEARED DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF US. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE HIGH WORKLOAD, MULTIPLE DISTRACTIONS, AND REDUCED VISIBILITY DUE TO SUN GLARE. CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TO TAXI ON ACROSS THE RWY WITH CLRNC TO DO SO. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: I PERCEIVED ERRONEOUSLY THAT THE DISTANCE TO THE RWY FROM THE PARALLEL TXWY WAS GREATER THAN IT ACTUALLY WAS. I PERCEIVED ERRONEOUSLY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DELAY AT THE END DUE TO THE RADIO ADVISORY AND OBSERVED TFC. I HAD EVERY INTENTION OF STOPPING BUT MISJUDGED THE DISTANCE DUE TO NOT SEEING THE HOLD SHORT SIGNAGE. FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE WERE WORKING WITH NEW EQUIP IN NEW SITS AND I BELIEVE OUR HUMAN PERFORMANCE WAS DEGRADED BY ACTUALLY TRYING TOO HARD TO ACCOMPLISH EVERYTHING CORRECTLY. PREVENT A RECURRENCE, SEVERAL STEPS CAN BE TAKEN: 1) IN GND, ACROSS THE TXWY, HOLD SHORT LIGHTING AND WIG-WAG LIGHTS WOULD HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY HELPFUL. IN THIS CASE FOG WAS NOT A PROB FOR VISIBILITY BUT THE SUN VERY WELL MAY HAVE BEEN. IT SEEMS TO INDICATE SOME SORT OF COMMON PROB SINCE WE WERE THE SECOND ERROR OF AUG/FRI/98, AND THERE WERE 6 SIMILAR IN 2 WKS. 2) I REMEMBER WHEN WE CHKED OUT ON THE EFIS B737- 500'S, SEVERAL YRS AGO, WE HAD AN EFIS TRAINING DEVICE AND TRAINED ON THE GND. I THINK A GND BASED TRAINING DEVICE (ACARS INTERFACE) WOULD BE BETTER THAN ACFT TRAINING. ISN'T THAT WHY WE HAVE SIMULATORS? 3) EVEN THOUGH FAA APPROVED, PERHAPS WE SHOULD RE-EVALUATE WHETHER IT IS A GOOD IDEA TO USE NEW LINE CAPTS TO FAMILIARIZE 'NEW TO THE AUTOMATION' CREW MEMBERS, WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF CHK AIRMAN TRAINING. I'M SUGGESTING THAT THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST 3-5 LONG LEGS OF EXPERIENCE BEFORE PASSING ON HIS KNOWLEDGE TO OTHERS. 4) CONTINUE AND RE-EMPHASIZE AWARENESS THAT PERTAIN TO SITS LIKE THIS, IE, ASRS NEWSLETTER, STATISTICS AND DISCUSSIONS IN RECURRENT TRAINING. 5) PUBLISH PROB AREAS (DISSEMINATE THE INFO) ENCOUNTERED ON THE LINE SOONER AND MORE THOROUGHLY PERTAINING TO ACARS INTERFACE, UPLINK PROMPTS, AND MESSAGES THAT CAN'T BE FOUND OR HAVE NO MEANING. I TRULY HOPE THAT THIS RPT CAN ENHANCE AIR SAFETY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 411871: THE NEW B737-800 HAS A HIGHLY AUTOMATED DATA UPLINK TO LOAD ALL THE PERTINENT INFO INTO THE FMC'S, SUPPOSEDLY DURING PREFLT. THIS UPLINK IS QUITE SLOW IN SUPPLYING THE NEEDED INFO. PRIOR TO PUSHBACK, THE DATA WE KNEW (TEMP, DEP RWY, SID) WERE LOADED. UPON CALLING GND CTL OUR ASSUMED DEP RWY OF 25R WAS CHANGED TO RWY 24L. CONTACTING N COMPLEX GND WE WERE TOLD TO EXPEDITE AND EXPECT NO DELAY AT THE RWY. THE CAPT WAS PRUDENT IN TAXIING SLOWLY, SQUARING OFF TURNS BECAUSE OF THIS BEING A CONSIDERABLY LONGER ACFT. THE PERFORMANCE INIT, TKOF DATA (INCLUDING V SPDS) AND CRUISE WIND DATA HAD YET TO ARRIVE THROUGH THE DATA LINK. I SUGGESTED WE STOP UNTIL WE WERE READY. JUST THEN THE PERFORMANCE INIT AND TKOF DATA ARRIVED INTO THE FMC'S, FOR RWY 25R. THE V SPDS ARE RWY SPECIFIC. TRYING TO LOAD THE CORRECT DATA 3 TIMES MANUALLY WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. THE V SPDS KEPT DROPPING OUT. I AGAIN RECOMMENDED STOPPING, MYSELF NOR THE MAGIC BOXES WERE READY. AT THIS POINT I ESTIMATE MY HEAD HAD BEEN DOWN 60-70 SECONDS, WAY TOO LONG. CAPT SAID TRY AGAIN. ON THE 4TH ATTEMPT THE BOX ACCEPTED THE SPDS, I DON'T KNOW WHY, NOTHING DIFFERENT HAD BEEN DONE. ABOUT THIS TIME I BECAME AWARE OF A VERY PROMINENT SHIFT IN SUNLIGHT ENTERING THE COCKPIT. I LOOKED UP, GOT MY BEARINGS AND SHOUTED 'STOP.' WE WERE ACROSS THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 24L AND APPROX 25 FT FROM THE RWY. I LOOKED R AND SAW AN ACFT A GOOD DISTANCE OUT (SEVERAL MI) ON FINAL FOR ONE OF THE RWY 24'S. THE TWR CALLED US STATING 'WE SHOW YOU ACROSS THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 24L, TFC IS AN ACR MD80 ON 4 MI FINAL RWY 24L. CLRED TO CROSS RWY 24L, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 24R.' NO GAR BY THE ACR WAS NECESSARY. WHAT CAN YOU SAY? IT COULD HAVE BEEN A LOT WORSE. COMMENTS/CONCLUSIONS: 1) FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH, I HAD ALL RELEVANT TRAINING BULLETINS INSTRUCTING ME WHILE TRYING TO LOAD DATA AT THE GATE. ONLY THE RTE INFO CAME THROUGH 'AS ADVERTISED.' THE REMAINDER ARRIVED DURING TAXI, A TERRIBLE TIME TO BE DISTRACTED. HAD THIS INFO BEEN IN A MORE TIMELY MANNER, IE, AT THE GATE, I DOUBT I'D BE WRITING THIS AND YOU WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE READING IT. 2) THIS WAS THE CAPT'S 2ND TIME IN THE ACFT AFTER A QUICK INITIAL CHK OUT FROM DCA TO EWR. THE CAPT IS NOW 'QUALIFIED' TO TRAIN ME ON MY FIRST LEG. THIS IS APPROVED BY THE FAA. 3) DON'T MOVE THE ACFT UNTIL ALL IS DONE, OR IF MOVING, STOP TILL EVERYTHING IS RIGHT. 4) GND CTL (OR TWR) SHOULD NOT HURRY YOU ALONG. IT CAN LEAD TO MISTAKES. THANK YOU. P.S. AFTER THIS RPT WAS WRITTEN, I AGAIN HAD THE DUBIOUS HONOR OF FLYING THE B737-800. THE UPLINK WORKED PRETTY MUCH THE SAME. WE LANDED EVERYTHING MANUALLY AT THE GATE THIS TIME. I WON'T ALLOW MYSELF TO GET SET UP AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.